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Abstract 
This thesis explores various aspects of children's 
undeTrstauding of similarity and difference and of the terms 
'same' ar, d 'different'. 
Understanding of 'same' appeared to be good but there 
wL3ý some evidence that it might not be complete. 
UT cPrstarýding of 'different' was clearly inferior to that of 
e and some children misinterpreted "it as meaning 
this being supported by an experiment looking at 
int rpretationn of 'same', 'different' and a nonsense word, 
Following Carey 
fiwC)renesc. of similaritu and difference was investigated 
i., so er1 experiment- s. S ubjects were required to give a 
similarity or a difference between two items, either named 
or pictured, in experiments developed from Claparede's work; 
they had to select from an array of items one either the 
same as or different from a target item and to justify that 
choice; and they had to judge whether two items were the 
same or riot or were different or not in an experiment 
similar to one devised by Vurpillot. 
The children found more difficulty with similarity than 
wI h difference. It was suggested that similarity was 
tq; pically handled in a holistic fashion, by a process of 
aT-"-, 1ocy while difference was treated by analysis into 
component parts. The ability to analyse similarity 
d¬ýývcaioved with age. If similarity is not analysed into 
component points, these points cannot be mentioned in 
responses. 
An information-processing model of awareness was used 
to explain perseverative responses and the giving of 
differences when similarities were requested. It was 
surges ßeä that these resulted in part from a failure to make 
transitions in awareness between different levels 
appropriately. 
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Section I. The determination of similarities and differences between 
items. 
Chapter 1. Introduction. 
This first section is concerned with children's awareness of 
similarities and differences between objects. The investigations to 
be described owe much of their inspiration to a paper by Claparede 
(1918) directed towards just these problems, which will be described 
in some detail below. Other contributions to current thinking on the 
nature and role of awareness in cognitive development will then be 
considered and the chapter will conclude with a discussion of how the 
properties of objects and their relationship to each other might affect 
the responses given by children in the tasks set. 
Although this work is concerned with awareness in children it is 
worth noting that there seems to be a revival of interest in awareness 
in psychology generally. Work on split-brain patients has led to 
speculation as to whether awareness is a function only of the left 
hemisphere or whether each individual possesses two centres of aware- 
ness, one of which is mute (Eccles, 1973). Weiskrantz et al. (1974) 
report a case of a man who following brain surgery was not aware of 
seeing anything in most of one visual field but could correctly "guess" 
the location, colour, shape and orientation of stimuli presented in 
that field, and Marcel and Patterson (1978) find a variety of effects 
indicating that their subjects semantically process words they are not 
aware of having seen. 
Before proceeding to a consideration of work in cognitive develop- 
ment some clarification of how the term "awareness" is to be used seems 
in order. Polanyi (1968) draws a distinction between what he calls 
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"focal" and "subsidiary" awareness. We are focally aware of what it 
is we are directly attending to at any moment and it is the contents 
of focal awareness on which we can report. In becoming aware of such 
focal targets we rely on subsidiary awareness of other particulars. 
Thus in listening to a speaker we are normally focally aware of his 
meaning and subsidiarily aware of the words he is using. We can shift 
our attention and our focal awareness to the words but we cannot at 
the same instant be focally aware of both words and message. For 
Polanyi subsidiary awareness covers all the things we rely on in 
attending to a focal target, including those of which we can never 
become focally aware, such as the particular movements of the ear drum 
in the above example. What follows is concerned only with focal aware- 
ness in Polanyi's sense. The simple term "awareness" will be used and 
where this involves translating the terms other authors prefer it is 
hoped that this does not do violence to their views. 
Previously accepted views on the nature of awareness were much 
altered by Freud's insistence that there are such things as unconscious 
mental processes: that is, the conscious and the mental cannot be 
simply identified with each other. Unfortunately, the paper in which 
Freud set out his position on awareness has been lost, and his views 
must be gathered from comments in other works, especially a companion 
paper to the missing one, entitled Me Unconscious' (Freud 1957, first 
published 1915). 
In 'The Unconscious? Freud offers a three-way distinction between 
the conscious (Cs. ), pre-conscious (Pcs. ) and unconscious (Ucs. ). The 
Cs. contains that of which we are actually aware, the Pes. that of 
which we can become aware and the Ucs. that which is incapable of 
reaching awareness, sometimes but not always because it has been repressed 
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by the Pcs. Mental processes in the Ucs. are different in kind from 
those in the Cs. and Pcs.: they do not allow contradiction, there is 
very free association of ideas and no regard for the passage of time 
or for external reality. The distinction between the Ucs. on the one 
hand and the Cs. and Pcs. on the other develops gradually in childhood, 
to become fully established at puberty. The critical factor allowing 
the possibility of awareness is language. An unconscious idea is 
represented by a charged memory-trace of an object, which can only 
enter awareness if it is linked to a charged representation of a cor- 
responding word. 
Given the absence of a sharp division between the unconscious and 
other systems in childhood and the nature of mental processes in the 
unconscious which Freud proposes one might well expect to find children's 
thinking to be strange or illogical but his theory does not allow pre- 
cise predictions to be made. 
It was in the climate of opinion stimulated by Freud that Claparede 
published the paper referred to above entitled "La conscience de la 
ressemblance et de la difference chez ltenfant" (Claparede 1918). This 
paper starts with a report of some experimental findings concerning 
children's ability to give similarities between objects and then a 
general theory of the origins of awareness is presented. 
Claparede asked a number of children - the ages he reports range 
from 5 to 8 years - what was similar about a bee and, in succession, a 
wasp, fly, bird, rabbit, rose, stone and traffic accident. (The last 
is 'accident de voiture' in the original. It seems that at the time 
Clapare"de was writing 'voiture' could refer to either a horse-drawn or 
horseless carriage. ) The actual results Claparede reports are anecdotal 
and therefore qualitative rather than quantitative in nature but the 
overall picture seems clear enough. The children, particularly the 
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younger ones, found the task difficult and increasingly so as they pro- 
ceeded down the series. On some occasions differences between the two 
items were given instead of similarities. Since the children might give 
similarities for the first cases and then start to give differences this 
could not be due to any simple misunderstanding of the question. 
Some answers were less clearly right or wrong than others. Any 
relationship might be offered as a similarity e. g. a bee might be said 
to be like a bird because the bird eats the bee. Claparede comments 
that some answers were 'not so much felt as deduced'. Occasionally a 
binary comparison question was asked, e. g. if a child failed to give a 
similarity either between a bee and a rose or between a bee and a 
rabbit he would be asked whether the bee was more like the rose or more 
like the rabbit, and requested to justify his choice. This proved 
easier than the simple comparison, sometimes leading to quite sophisti- 
cated answers but on other occasions merely resulting in a child giving 
an answer in terms of a common difference e. g. a child asked whether a 
bee is more like a rabbit or a rose opts for the rose ? because the bee 
doesn't have ears like the rabbit'. 
Claparede concludes from this study that differences are more 
available to awareness than similarities, children becoming increasingly 
aware of similarities with age. In drawing this conclusion he makes 
two plausible assumptions: firstly, that differences are given when 
similarities are asked for because differences are more available to 
awareness, and secondly, that awareness of a similarity is indicated by 
ability to articulate it. 
Claparede never asked his subjects for differences, so his 
evidence that they are more aware of them than of similarities is in- 
direct: simply that they sometimes offered differences when asked for 
similarities. Of course, if one grants the second assumption, it 
seems that in these particular instances the children must not have 
been aware of similarities between the items, or they would surely have 
00 
given them, since as has been noted, simple misunderstanding of the 
question is not a possible explanation, and they must have been aware 
of the differences they cited. Why they should sometimes give 
differences in these circumstances is a mystery Claparede does not 
explain. However, we do not know what would have happened if the 
children had been asked for differences: they might not even have able 
to give the differences they offered spontaneously since doing some- 
thing freely and doing it to order can be quite different tasks. They 
might on occasion give a similarity when no difference came to mind. 
So while a discussion of the rest of Claparede's paper must be based 
on an acceptance of this assumption some doubt concerning it must remain. 
The second assumption is that if a child does not articulate a 
similarity he is aware of none. There seems no reason to question this 
in the case where differences are given instead, but what of instances 
where no answer at all is given? Could it not be that the child is 
aware of some similarity but unable to put it into words? This is a 
very similar objection to that made by Brainerd (1973) against the 
Piagetian practice of requiring children to give verbal justifications 
of their answers. For me it is difficult to imagine having a clear- 
cut awareness of something without being able to express it in some 
way. One may of course not be able to express oneself well, and in the 
present context of testing young children it is essential that they 
should feel sufficiently at ease to venture a somewhat poorly formulated 
response. Given that proviso the practice seems sound and indeed one 
wonders what better route to another's awareness there might be. 
In the second half of his paper, Claparede presents a theory to 
explain his findings. He notes that although awareness of similarity 
is late in emerging children make much use of it automatically from 
very early in life. Symbolic play and over-extension in early language 
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are two examples he cites. He wishes to explain this contrast as well 
as that between similarities and differences in the degree to which 
children are aware of them. In fact Claparede believes that his 
results are but one instance of a general law which he calls the law 
of awareness (""loi de la prise de conscience") and expresses as 
follows: "the child (or, in general, the individual) becomes conscious 
of a relation so much the later to the degree that his behaviour has 
involved the automatic (instinctive, unconscious) use of that relation 
the earlier and the longer". The paper then goes on to describe the 
mechanism by which Clapaxede believes one becomes aware of relations. 
This is disadaptation. The possibility of awareness arises whenever 
an individual's automatic reactions are not adapted to a situation and 
cannot adapt to it. Awareness is not inevitable in these cases, as 
intellectual development must also be sufficiently advanced, but there 
is no awareness without disadaptation. Clearly the purpose of this 
mechanism is to allow conscious adaptation when automatic processes 
fail. 
The relationship between the law of awareness and the disadaptation 
mechanism is not clear. Obviously if both are to hold then either dis- 
adaptation must be less likely to occur in the case of long-standing 
automatic reactions or it must be less likely to succeed in inducing 
awareness in these cases. Both seem possible. In support of the former 
it can be noted that many of our earliest reactions have an innate basis 
and will be well adapted to their ends as a result of natural selection. 
For the latter possibility we can move from "the earlier?, in the 
law of awareness to "the longer". It could be that continued auto- 
matic use of a relation in itself builds a barrier against that relation 
coming into awareness. It is a matter of common experience, as well as 
being attested to in the literature on skill (e. g. Legge and Barber, 1976), 
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that in the acquisition of a skill such as handwriting or driving a 
car the actions can at first only be carried out under the control of 
awareness but later become automatic and it then becomes difficult for 
the individual to be aware of his actions in exercising such a skill. 
Such an argument is employed by Karmiloff-Smith (1978) in the context 
of children's assignment of gender to French nouns. She noted that 
her subjects, the younger ones in particular, used phonological clues 
in preference to any other but cited syntactic and semantic indicators 
when asked about what they had used. Karmiloff-Smith argued that the 
early and much used phonological process had become so automatic that 
it was not accessible to awareness in the way that the other processes, 
which had emerged later and were used more rarely, were. 
Why should children be less aware of similarities than differences? 
Claparede invokes both the law of awareness and the disadaptation 
mechanism, though his argument in the former case is less clear. 
Claparede argues that the neonate is capable of sensing the differences 
between a vast number of different states of affairs but has only a 
few reactions at his disposal and so he must respond in the same way to 
a number of different situations, distinguished as different by the 
senses. That is, the first responses of the child involve the recog- 
nition of similarities, although at this stage there is no awareness of 
them. It would seem that the system must also take account of differences 
since although the same response must be made to a number of different 
situations there will obviously be instances where that response is 
inappropriate. However it may be that the way the system actually works 
is that a particular response is initially made to some set of situations 
(and the organism does not distinguish between these) and then new 
situations start to provoke that response on the basis of similarity so 
that difference has no actual role to play. This would certainly accord 
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with Piaget's description of early development, (e. g. Piaget and 
Inhelder, 1969), whereby the domain for a particular reaction is 
gradually increased by a process of assimilation. So, since the 
individual makes use of similarities earlier than differences, by the 
law of awareness he becomes aware of similarities later. 
Another consequence of the individual having few reactions at 
his disposal compared to the number of situations to which he must 
react is that disadaptation is more likely to occur with respect to 
differences than to similarities. That is, the invididual is more 
likely to respond similarly to situations requiring different responses 
than to act differently in two situations which actually required the 
same response. Also, if an individual believes that a situation calls 
for a particular response but then finds that that response fails, he 
knows that this must be because that particular situation is in fact 
different in some way from those in which the response works, and he 
has only to work out what the exact difference is. Failure, that is, 
can tell the actor that the new situation B is different from an old 
situation A. It cannot indicate that B is like an old situation C, 
and that the response appropriate to C is also appropriate to B. So 
the disadaptation mechanism also is more likely to bring differences 
into awareness than similarities. 
Claparede indeed sees becoming aware of similarities as so 
difficult that he believes it to be the acme of mental functioning. 
He remarks that 'to find, in the mass of old experiences, that which 
has some hidden similarity with the present situation, is precisely 
the act of genius' and elsewhere that tto think is to perceive 
similarities'. 
One may infer from what Claparede says that once one has become 
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aware of some relation that relation will subsequently be accessible 
to awareness. This seems the only way to connect his theory with his 
experiment. Presumably the similarities, and the differences, that 
the children report are those of which they have previously been made 
aware in active encounters. Some inventiveness is needed to imagine 
how this could have happened. Suppose a child says that a bee and a 
wasp are alike in that they both have stripes. By Claparede' s account 
his awareness of this similarity must have arisen from an encounter 
when he reacted to one of these insects in a way different to that in 
which he would have done to the other, when the appropriate response 
was to treat them similarly because of their stripes. Perhaps in this 
case the story can be given some plausibility if one imagines that the 
consequence of the child's disadapted response was that he was stung, 
stripes on insects being an indication that they sting. However it 
would be difficult to concoct such scenes for each similarity and 
difference reported and it seems that nothing less precise will do. 
Take another instance, one which Claparede reports, of a child who can 
think of no similarity between a bee and a bird. Surely Claparede would 
have to agree that such a child, if asked how either a bee or a bird 
moved, would say that it flew, that is, he is aware that a bee flies 
and that a bird flies. The only thing that escapes his awareness is 
that they are alike in that they fly. 
Claparede's theory seems then to stretch credibility even here, 
and it offers no explanation of why binary comparisons should be easier 
than simple ones or of why the children should ever give differences 
when asked for similarities. The order of difficulty of the items 
does seem to be an instance of the law of awareness, in 
that the ways in which the members of the last pairs in the sequence 
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are similar are those with respect to which our earliest and most 
basic reactions are the same. The disadaptation mechanism carries 
some plausibility and probably should not be ruled out entirely but 
it seems that Claparede offers only a partial account of the origins 
of awareness. 
Claparede's suggestion that all awareness arises from dis- 
adaptation is viewed with some disfavour by Campbell. (1979) who sees 
it as portraying men as like automatons most of the time, only lighting 
up with awareness when they run into difficulties. This is perhaps 
overly harsh on Claparede. Firstly, the number of situations requiring 
awareness seems very large - for instance, on almost all occasions when 
we say something we must decide what to say consciously. Secondly, if 
as suggested above, Claparede believed that once an individual has 
become aware of something as a consequence of d. isadaptation it will be 
available to awareness in the future, we are likely to be aware of a 
great many things without having to run into difficulties concerning 
them each day. However, as has been said, it is difficult to see how 
disadaptation could be the sole source of awareness. 
Piaget also, in his works on awareness, (Piaget 1977,1978), 
acknowledges Clapaxede but argues that awareness can arise without 
disadaptation. Piaget's experiments on the growth of awareness all 
involve physical actions; thus his experiments are concerned with the 
kind of situations to which Claparede's theory, as well as his own, most 
obviously applies. Piaget set children aged from 4 to 12 a number of 
tasks such as playing tiddlywinks or solving the Hanoi tower problem. 
(Most, like tiddlywinks, were problems where physical action was of 
the essence rather than, like the Hanoi tower, logical problems in 
physical form. ) Because of the physical nature of the problems, success 
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was possible without awareness of how it came about and Piaget 
studied the children's gradually increasing awareness of what exactly 
they had done and of the nature of the objects with which they were 
dealing. According to Piaget failure can facilitate awareness but 
success does not prevent it. The process of assimilation, of cog- 
nitive structures enlarging the field on which they can be brought to 
bear, will lead to awareness without the intervention of disadaptation. 
Claparede and Campbell speak of awareness as an all-or-none 
phenomenon: one is either aware of something or one is not with no inter- 
mediate position possible. Piaget however suggests that awareness can 
admit of degrees. He notes the existence of what he calls "elementary 
consciousness", referring to cases where one is transiently aware of 
something but this is not integrated with awareness of anything else. 
For Piaget integration is a principal characteristic of full-blown 
awareness and there is a continuum of degrees of awareness depending on 
the extent of integration. "Elementary consciousness" seems to be a 
kind of focal awareness, in Polanyi ts sense, although as for subsidiary 
awareness, reporting on it is difficult. 
Piaget's principal interest is in the changing content of aware- 
ness. In the first stage the child is aware only of the goal of his 
action and the results: success or failure in attaining the goal. (It 
is worth noting in passing that Kirkpatrick (1908) saw these two as the 
only functions of awareness: that it should set the goal and note the 
results while automatic mechanisms do the rest. ) These two, goal and 
results, lie on the point of interaction between the subject and that on 
which he is acting and Piaget sees awareness as moving from this point 
towards the centre of both subject and object, as in Fig. 1: 1, taken 
from Piaget (1977). 
0 It 2 
C 
S Subject 
0 Object 
P Periphery 
P 
C Centre of subject 
C' Centre of object 
C? 
Figure 1: 1. The double movement of awareness. (From Piaget, 1977). 
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Awareness, then, proceeds from the periphery to the centre. The 
movement towards C consists of the subject gradually becoming aware of 
the means he employed and the reasons for selecting those means. As 
awareness proceeds towards C'the subject becomes aware of the intrinsic 
properties of the object which determine how it responds to his actions. 
These two movements occur simultaneously. 
The properties of objects which Piaget sees as the latest to come 
into awareness because they lie close to C'and are therefore the last 
to be reached by the centripetal movement of awareness are likely to be 
the same properties whose late emergence into awareness Claparede 
explained as being because they are those which control our earliest 
and most basic reactions. The two explanations may not be independent: 
no doubt it is because objects are as they are that our reactions are 
as they are. 
Both theories concentrate on awareness arising through action 
although Claparede uses a verbal task to test for it. Piaget does 
however speak of awareness as consisting of assimilation through concepts, 
as opposed to practical assimilation in action, and this makes clear 
the possibility of awareness coming to be outside the context of physical 
action. 
The above might seem a very limited discussion of the phenomenon 
of awareness, confined as it is almost entirely to considering the dawn 
of awareness of a few points in children. A few slightly more general 
remarks will be made in conclusion. 
From an evolutionary-point of view awareness must have arisen, in 
humans and possibly some other species as well, because it served some 
function. If we have awareness we are less strictly bound by rule than 
if we are limited to automatic responses arising from instinct and 
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conditioning, and we can more flexibly assess a situation and 
possible courses of action in that situation. This of course also 
means that awareness is only useful when the solution which would be 
adopted by automatic means is not the best one. That is, Claparede 
was partly right when he said that awareness has its origins in dis- 
adaptation but it seems that this is more likely to apply phylo- 
genetically than ontogenetically. Since automatic mechanisms may produce 
a solution in some situation which works, but is-nonetheless not the 
best solution, there is an advantage to having awareness even when the 
unconscious reactions do not actually break down. 
The remainder of this chapter will consist of a discussion of how 
the properties of . objects and children's concepts of them are likely to 
affect both the difficulty of different comparisons in Claparede's task 
and the particular answers given. 
Partial answers to these questions are implicit in both Claparede's 
and Piaget's theories of awareness, but the difficulties involved in 
applying Claparedets account have already been discussed. Piaget's 
contribution is clearer. Peripheral properties are more accessible to 
awareness and therefore it will be easier to give similarities between 
pairs of objects if they have peripheral properties in common than if 
their only shared properties are central ones. If two objects differ 
in their most peripheral properties then these differences will be more 
available to awareness than any similarities, though this is not a 
sufficient explanation of why differences are sometimes cited. Piaget's 
use of the central-peripheral terminology is not entirely metaphorical - 
a property, such as colour, which is physically on the surface of an 
object will be peripheral in his terms. To the extent that the terms 
are applied metaphorically, as in saying that "being an insect" is a 
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central property, some intuition will be needed in applying them. 
Another way of looking at the problem is in terms of the dis- 
Unction made by Vygo tsky (1962) between spontaneous and scientific 
concepts. Spontaneous concepts are those, such as "brother", learnt 
by the child in his everyday life, generally with respect to the 
objects in question. Scientific concepts are those explicitly taught 
at school, generally by verbal definition, that is, by relating them 
to other concepts. The child normally uses both kinds of concept 
correctly but Vygot sky found that conscious manipulation of scientific 
concepts precedes that of spontaneous concepts, which he attributes to 
the former's being linked to other concepts from the start. In time 
children learn to organise their spontaneous concepts in a network of 
concepts of both kinds and to the extent that they have done this 
they will be aware of these too. Although the difference between 
spontaneous and scientific concepts is presented as a dichotomy, the 
degree to which a concept is linked to other concepts must be a con- 
tinuum, and awareness of concepts must be a matter of degree since 
Vygotsky found that the gap between the ability to handle spontaneous 
and scientific concepts occurred at different ages, depending on the 
precise task used. That is, the ability to manipulate a concept in 
one situation does not guarantee that ability in all situations. There 
should be some age group which finds it easier to give similarities 
between pairs of objects if they are instances of the same scientific 
concept than if they are instances of the same spontaneous concept, 
and children at this age should answer in terms of scientific concepts. 
This stage is unlikely to occur very early in the child's school career, 
both because the general difficulty of the task could depress per- 
formance with both kinds of concept and because the child will not then 
have acquired very many scientific concepts. 
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Although the distinction between spontaneous and scientific 
concepts is clear in principle it may be difficult to apply in 
practice. One could never be absolutely certain how a particular 
concept was initially acquired by an individual child. More 
importantly, scientific concepts will be introduced which refer to a 
category already served by a spontaneous concept, perhaps particularly 
with biological concepts. A child will have acquired such concepts as 
""bird"" and ""fruitº" before starting school but at some stage in his 
schooling these terms will be explicitly defined and related to other 
concepts. This may simply speed up the normal process of the child 
organising his spontaneous concepts to which Vygotsky refers but it may 
lead to two concepts named by the same word existing side by side, at 
least for a time. Even in adults one occasionally finds uncertainty, 
for instance, as to whether or not a tomato is a fruit, and this could 
be because, as it were, it is a scientific fruit but not a spontaneous 
one. 
The distinction between spontaneous and scientific concepts cuts 
across Piaget's classification in as much as a spontaneous concept 
could certainly involve either peripheral or central properties and in 
principle the same is true of scientific concepts although these may 
more often involve central properties. 
In his paper Clapaxede comments that the answers he obtained 
sometimes indicated that the child was thinking of a particular instance 
denoted by the word in question and not of the category in general. 
He quotes the example of a child who gives "being yellow" as a property 
of a bird, because, Claparke believes, her image of a bird is of a 
canary. This comment is suggestive of recent work on the structure of 
natural categories by Eleanor Rosch (Rosch 1977; Rosch and Mervis 
1975; Rosch et al. 1976). Rosch makes two principal claims: that 
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natural taxonomies are so structured that one level, which can be 
objectively identified, can be regarded as more basic than the others, 
and that at all levels categories are organised around prototypes. 
One might say of Claparede 's subject that for her a canary was a proto- 
typical bird. 
What Rosch calls the basic level in a taxonomy is the most 
inclusive level at which members of a category have many properties in 
common. Thus "chairs" is a basic level category and members of the 
category chair have many shared attributes while members of the super- 
ordinate category furniture have comparatively few and members of the 
subordinate category dining chair do not share many more properties 
than do all instances of the basic level category. Basic level cate- 
gories, then, have a high degree of internal similarity combined with 
a high degree of contrast with other categories at the same level. 
Rosch argues that because of this it is most efficient for people to 
conceptualise objects in terms of their basic level category membership 
and she offers (Rosch et al. 1976) several lines of evidence suggesting 
that they do in fact do so. If adults are asked to judge whether or 
not a picture is of a member of a particular category they are faster 
if it is a basic level category than if it is either a superordinate 
or a subordinate category. Adults name pictures with basic level 
names although they know appropriate superordinate and subordinate 
terms and even if the superordinate is of higher frequency in the 
language. Three year olds also name pictures with basic level names, 
even when these names are wrong. Five and six year olds find it easier 
to sort objects together if they are members of the same basic level 
category than if their only common membership is at the superordinate 
level. Rosch et al. also examined Roger Brown's data on the vocabulary 
of his subject Sarah at Stage I (Mean length of utterance 1.0 to 2.0 
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morphemes) and found that almost all the terms she used were names 
for basic level categories. Roschts work suggests that the peculiar 
status of the basic level is even more enhanced for children, and 
especially very young children, than for adults. 
This part of Rosch's theory suggests that it should be easier to 
give similarities between pairs of objects if they are members of the 
same basic level category than if they are not, without it being very 
much easier if they are also instances of the same subordinate category - 
the properties cited are likely to be properties at the basic level 
anyway. That is, there should be a discontinuity in level of difficulty 
at the point at which one moves from comparisons within basic level 
categories to comparisons across such categories. It may be that 
members of the same basic level category are seen as intrinsically the 
same kind of thing, while objects which have no common basic level 
category membership are seen as intrinsically different. One would 
expect any differences given in Claparýde's task to distinguish between 
the objects in terms of their basic level category membership. 
The other prong of Rosch's theory concerns the internal organi- 
sation of natural categories, of whatever level. Following 
Wittgenstein (1953) Rosch (Rosch and Mer7is 1975) argues that there 
need be no property that is true of all members of a category, but 
that they are related by family resemblances. Members of a family tend 
to resemble each other because some of them will have the same colour hair 
and some of them the same shaped nose and so on but they would not all 
be expected to share any one feature. Similarly most chairs have legs 
but some modernistic ones do not, most have a horizontal surface but 
deck chairs do not, most can be sat upon but toy chairs cannot - there 
is no feature which is true of all chairs but several which are typical 
of chairs. Some chairs have more of these typical properties than 
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others and these can be regarded as better exemplars of chairs, or, 
in Rosch's terminology, as prototypes for the category chair. Prototypes 
not only have more of the properties typical of their own category than 
non-prototypes, they also have fewer properties which are typical of 
other categories. When people hear a category name they tend to think 
of prototypes and this has effects such as that category membership 
statements can be verified faster if they refer to prototypes: "a sparrow 
is a bird" takes less time than "a penguin is a bird". It is, literally, 
easy to image prototypes for basic level categories, but prototypes 
must not be identified with images: they are abstractions from proto- 
typicality ratings, and at levels higher than the basic level they cannot 
be visualised. 
Bowerman (1977) has applied the notion of prototypes to children's 
early language learning. Her daughters' early words seemed to have a 
prototypical referent, almost always the first referent for which the 
word was used, while other referents were related to the prototype by 
a series of family resemblances. Thus the basic organisation of the 
child's categories is the same as for an adult although the variety of 
instances that may be included in one category by a child may make it 
appear bizarre. 
Bowerman is of course considering a very early stage of develop- 
ment, before two years of age. By school age most terms will be very 
similar in extension to the adult's words but we do not know whether 
they would have the same prototypes. As noted, Bowerman found that the 
initial prototype was generally the first referent for the word. Where 
this does not coincide with the adult prototype the child will have to 
shift towards the adult norm at some point. The move to adult extension 
for a term will itself cause pressure to adopt the adult prototypes in 
cases where the child's initial prototype was different, as the latter 
will no longer have the characteristics of possessing more of the 
category's typical properties than other members of 
the category, but 
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it could be that the initial prototype retains its psychological 
effects in that it is the category member which comes to mind when 
the category name is mentioned. 
If categories are organised around prototypes in this way it 
is likely that answers to similarity problems will cite similarities 
between prototypes even when the properties given are not true of all 
members of the classes in question. This is the case with "they fly" 
as a similarity between a bee and a bird. No doubt the subject of 
Claparedet s who : gave this answer knew of the existence of flightless 
birds (though probably not of flightless bees). One feels that adults 
might well give the same response. Claparede's "canary" example raises 
a further possibility. What seems to have happened in this case is 
that the child has cited a property - being yellow - which is true of 
her prototype bird although not typical of the category in general and 
this when there are such typical properties as having wings available. 
It may be that this child's thinking was entirely tied to the prototype 
and that all the prototype's properties were equivalent for her, with- 
out any consideration of their distribution among other members of the 
category. This is of course but a single fragment of evidence but it 
will be interesting to discover whether other children show the same 
phenomenon. 
As with Vygotskyts distinction between spontaneous and scientific 
concepts it may be difficult to apply Rosch's theory in practice 
because of the problem of identifying what are basic level categories 
and what are prototypical referents for any of the words used. Rosch 
argues that it is in the nature of the world that objects fall into 
categories, that these categories have a prototype and family resemblance 
structure and that one level of categorisation in a taxonomy can be 
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considered more basic than others but she also acknowledges "that all 
cognitive categories are interactions between the correlational structures 
that exist in the world and the state of knowledge of the perceivers". 
(Rosch 1977). Indeed Rosch also acknowledges that not only the knowledge, 
but also the interests, of the individual and culture are involved. This 
accounts for her discovery that for her adult subjects "tree", "fish" 
and "bird" (and not for instance ""oak", "salmon" and "sparrow") are basic 
level terms. Given that the knowledge and interests of children are 
different from those of adults it may well be that the level of categori- 
sation which is basic for them will be different in some domains. 
Brown (1958) makes such a point when he speaks of objects being named 
for children at the "level of usual utility", which he now (Brown 1976) 
identifies with Rosch's basic level, and says that, for instance, for 
very young children all coins are simply named "money" because different 
value coins do not yet have different functions for them. A further 
problem is that atypical members of a basic level category may themselves 
form categories with some basic level characteristics. That is, "bird" 
may name a basic level category for many people but the categories 
"duck" and "ostrich" may exist side by side with it. 
In spite of the various practical difficulties mentioned, it is 
hoped that the discussion in this chapter provides a framework within 
which the experiments to be described in the remainder of this section 
can be considered. 
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Chapter 2. Claparede's task: a replication and extension to two 
different modes of presentation. 
Introduction. 
The experiment to be reported in this chapter is an attempt to 
replicate that carried out by Claparede (1918) and described in 
detail in the previous chapter. It is hoped that the qualitative 
findings reported by Claparede will be repeated so that they can here 
be presented in a quantitative manner. These findings are: - 
(i) That some children cannot say what is similar about two items, 
this difficulty being more common in younger subjects. 
(ii) That some children who fail to give similarities in answer to 
a particular comparison will instead give differences. Some 
children give similarities in answer to easy problems and 
differences to subsequent more difficult problems. 
(iii) That comparisons are more difficult to the extent that the items 
to be compared are more dissimilar. 
(iv) That binary comparisons are easier than simple comparisons. 
(v) That any point of contact between two objects may be cited as a 
similarity between them, as in Clapaxede's example of a child 
saying that a bird is like a bee because the bird eats the bee. 
The nature of the answers given by the children to the similarity 
questions will be examined in an attempt to throw some light on the 
processes 'involved in their reaching these answers. 
"Claparede's procedure was entirely verbal. This is in contrast 
to the majority of cases where cognitive tasks are set children of this 
age group (about five to eight years) and in particular to the practice 
of Piaget and his associates who almost invariably use objects or 
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pictures in their assessment of the child's abilities. Inhelder and 
Piaget (1961) report that such procedures can make it easier for a 
child to solve a particular problem - for instance, a child who 
correctly answers the class inclusion question 'Are there more primulas 
or more flowers? ' applied to a number of pictures of flowers in front 
of him, states that there are more primulas when asked the same question 
about the flowers in the wood. However Wohlwill (1968 a) claims that 
verbal presentation is not necessarily more difficult and he finds 
that in the particular case of class inclusion it is actually easier. 
He found that his subjects fell into two groups: those who were 
consistently incorrect in the pictorial condition and those who made 
some correct responses in that condition. Of the former group exactly 
half scored zero in the verbal condition also, while the others 
showed some apparent improvement. Of the latter group nearly 80% 
improved their performance with verbal presentation, achieving higher 
scores than would be likely by chance and generally accompanying their 
correct answers by correct explanations. Wohlwill concluded that these 
latter subjects were children who possessed the basic logical abilities 
required in performing the operation of class inclusion but were 
hindered in. the actual performance by biases induced by pictorial 
presentation. 
In view of this difference of opinion in the literature it seems 
worthwhile to ask the question whether verbal or pictorial presentation 
would be easier in general in Claparede' s task and whether any difference 
would be particularly marked in subjects who obtain intermediate scores. 
In order to answer that question, both verbal and pictorial presentation 
are employed in the present experiment. 
In the previous chapter various possible frames of reference in 
which to view the results obtained using ClapareIe's task were 
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discussed. It was acknowledged that there would be difficulties in 
applying any of these but the attempt will be made to see whether 
each of them can be applied, and whether they aid understanding of 
the mental processes involved in performing the task. It is not that 
these theories will be tested against the results obtained. The 
questions to be asked are, can they be applied to the kind of data 
resulting from Claparede's task with any degree of confidence, and 
if so, do they afford any insight into the situation? 
The first of these frames of reference is the central-peripheral 
dimension proposed by Piaget (1977). Although this distinction is 
made between the two ends of a continuum it will be easier for present 
purposes to treat it as a dichotomy, between the more central and the 
more peripheral. Possible relationships between Piaget's theory and 
Claparede1s task were considered in a general way in the previous 
chapter. Here some specific predictions will be made. If the children's 
answers can be divided into those which cite central properties and 
those which cite peripheral ones: 
(i) Since pairs of items early in the series have more peripheral 
properties in common than later pairs, similarities given be- 
tween these items will be more likely to cite peripheral 
properties. 
(ii) Answers from older children will give a higher proportion of 
central properties than those from younger children, as the 
younger find access to central properties more difficult. This 
will be the case particularly for the earlier problems, where 
there are adequate peripheral similarities available, and there- 
fore no incentive for the younger children to look for central 
ones. Older children may give central properties even in answer 
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to these problems, as it is not particularly effortful for them 
to do so, and a central property may well seem a 'better?, a 
more sophisticated, answer. 
(iii) Differences, which suggest a lack of awareness, will cite peri- 
Y*, ' pheral properties. 
No specific predictions are made concerning answers citing 
relations (as they will hereafter be called e. g. the bird is like the 
bee because the bird eats the bee) or answers to binary comparison 
questions, but these will also be looked at in the light of the central- 
peripheral distinction. 
The effect of pictorial as opposed to verbal presentation has 
also to be considered. Those properties of objects which are directly 
portrayed are peripheral ones. One may therefore make the following 
prediction: 
(iv) A higher proportion of answers given to pictorially presented 
problems will cite peripheral properties than those to verbally 
presented problems. 
The second theory considered in the previous chapter as possibly 
useful in the present situation is Vygotsky's account of spontaneous 
and scientific concepts. The previous discussion suggested that this 
might be particularly difficult to apply to the answers given to 
Claparede's task. According to Vygotsky there is a stage of develop- 
ment at which spontaneous concepts are not accompanied by awareness to 
the same extent as scientific concepts and are consequently more prone 
to error. So if this distinction is to be useful then the following 
prediction must be supported: 
(i) At some level of development (i. e. age group) answers employing 
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scientific concepts will be more likely to be similarities than 
will answers employing spontaneous concepts. 
The last possible frame of reference considered in the previous 
chapter was Rosch's theory of the organisation of natural categories. 
This theory makes two major claims, firstly that for natural categories, 
one level of categorisation in a hierarchy is more basic than the 
others and secondly that all natural categories are organised around 
prototypes. From this, the following predictions are made: 
(i) If items to be compared are members of the same basic level cate- 
gory the problem will be much easier than otherwise. 
(ii) Properties of basic level prototypes will be cited in preference 
to others, and 
a) older children will show a greater ability to cite other 
properties than younger children 
b) answers other than similarities especially will cite pro- 
perties of basic level prototypes. 
In general it must be assumed that children have the same category 
structure - the same basic level and the same prototypes - as adults 
although the younger the child the more open to question is this 
assumption. Since adults show considerable agreement on these matters 
the writer's own intuitions will be used, spelled out where appropriate, 
but the possibility of the children's systems being different will not 
be forgotten. 
The röle of the pictures used in that form of presentation is 
also to be considered in relation to Rosch's theory, but no specific 
predictions are made. 
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Yethod. 
Subjects. 
In all, 1)7 children were tested and these were divided into 
six groups as follows: 
Nl (Nursery 1). 18 children, 1 aged 2: 9, the others 3: 4 - 4: 3" 
Mean age 3: 8, median 3: 8. 
N2 19 children aged 4: 5 - 5: 4, mean 4: 10, median 4: 11. 
P1 (Primary 1). 27 children aged 4: 11 - 5: 5, mean and median 5: 3. 
P2 30 children aged 6: 6 - 6: 11, mean and median 6: 9. 
P3/L 30 children aged 7: 5 - 9: 10, mean 7: 11, median 7: 9. 
This group composed of: 
P3 2)4 children, 1 aged 8: 3 and the others 7: 5 - 7: 11, mean and 
median 7: 8. 
Ph 6 children, 1 aged 9: 10 and the others 8: 6 - 8: 11, mean 9: 0, 
median 8: 11. 
P5/6 23 children, two aged 11: 7 and the others 10: 0 - 10: 11, mean 10: 8. 
median 10: 7. 
Both Ni and N2 contain a mixture of children from two playgroups, 
one run in the psychology department and used mainly by the children 
of the academic staff and one in the local community where the parental 
occupations would generally be of similar status - indeed also con- 
taming many academics' children - but some would be of lower socio- 
economic status than in the former case. The division between Ni and 
N2 was made simply on the basis of age. 
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The four P groups came from a local primary school, all those 
in any one school class being included in the same group. That is, 
those markedly different in age from the others had been kept back 
by the school (one in P3, one in P1 and two in P5/6). Pl, P2, P3 
and P5/6 were complete school classes. P5/6 was said to be a composite 
class but all the children seem to be of the primary six age group. 
This makes for an unfortunate gap, the only nine year old child to be 
tested being one of those held back. The children in P4 were part 
of a composite primary 3/4 class. The primary school in question was 
situated in what might be considered a deprived area, and the population 
is therefore different from that providing the subjects in Nl and 
N2. 
The age range used extends beyond that apparently used by 
Claparede in both directions. The nursery children were tested so 
as to establish a fairly low starting level of performance. It was 
originally intended that only the children in P1,2 and 3 would be 
tested from the primary school but the older children were included 
when it became obvious that nothing like a ceiling level was reached 
by the former groups. 
Stimuli. 
Two series of items were used, the first member in each being 
compared with the other members of its series in succession. The 
series were: 
Series A bee fly bird rabbit flower book car crash 
Series B fish crab seal cow tree comb birthday party. 
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Figure 2: 1. Stimulus materials used for pictorial presentation. 
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Pictures of all the items were drawn and are reproduced in 
Figure 2: 1. It must be noted that although a car crash and a birthday 
party are not objects, pictures of them are necessarily pictures of 
objects. Series A is almost identical with the series used by 
Clap arede, the changes made (omission of wasp, substitution of flower 
for rose and book for stone) being mainly for ease of pictorial rep- 
resentation. 
Terminological note: In what follows, 'an item' refers to an 
object or event in the above list, while 'a problem? refers to a pair 
of items presented to the children for comparison. 
Procedure. 
Each child was tested on both series, receiving one in verbal 
and the other in pictorial form. Half of the subjects received A 
pictorially and B verbally and the other half A verbally and B pic- 
torially, and half of each of these groups were given the verbal 
condition first and the other half the pictorial condition first. 
As far as possible these proportions were maintained within the subject 
groups but the vagaries of testing sometimes made the numbers a little 
uneven. Table 2: 1 shows the exact numbers receiving each order of 
conditions. 
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AV - BP 2 8 7 7 8 E 3° 
BP - AV 8 2 6 9 7 5 -') 7 
AP - BV 3 5 8 6 8 6 36 
BV - AP 5 L. 6 8 7 6 36 
AV & BP 10 10 13 16 15 11 75 
AP & BV 8 9 1)4 14 15 12 72 
V- P 7 12 13 15 15 12 7)4 
P- V 11 7 14 15 15 11 73 
Nl: 18 N2: 19 P1: 27 P2: 30 P3/4: 30 P5/6: 23 Total 147 
AV - BP -A series presented verbally followed by B pictorially, etc. 
Table 2: 1. Numbers of subjects receiving different testing schedules. 
The differences in number in the N groups, which are less marked 
in the subtotals, are due to the division between Ni and N2 being post 
hoc, the two not being tested as separate groups. 
All children were tested in rooms separate from but close to 
their playroom or classroom, the experimenter and subject sitting side 
by side at a table. At the start of testing the child was told "What 
I want you to do is to tell me whatts the same about some things. " For 
verbal presentation, the experimenter proceeded, using series A as an 
example, by saying "First of all, a bee and a fly. What's the same 
about a bee and a fly? " If the child did not then give a similarity, 
prompts were utilised as given in Table 2: 2. 
ýýV 
Child+s response 
No response 
"'Nothing" (or 
equivalent) 
A relation 
A difference 
Table 2: 2. Prompts. 
Prompt 
Can you think of anything that's the same 
about a bee and a fly? 
See if you can think of anything the same 
abou , then, a bee and a fly? 
They do go together like that but itts not 
really something the same about them, is it? 
Can you think of anything the same' 
That's a way that they're not the same, isn't 
it? Can you think of anything the same? 
Only one prompt was given for each comparison although if a 
child's response was unclear or unintelligible an attempt was made to 
elucidate it. (For instance if a child offers "a bee flies" in answer 
to the bee-fly comparison it is not clear whether he regards this as a 
similarity or a difference. ) The experimenter noted whether a 
similarity had been given for the problem and proceeded to the next. 
When two problems had been administered without a similarity being 
given a binary comparison question was asked e. g. "Is a bee more like 
a fly or more like a bird?? ' and when this was answered e. g. "fly". 
"And why is a bee more like a fly? " Prompts were given for binary com- 
parisons as for simple comparisons and the children were also prompted 
if they did not initially make a choice. 
Pictorial presentation was similar to verbal, but no names were 
used in referring to the depicted items. All the pictures for the 
appropriate series were set out on the table, the two for the particular 
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problem were selected and placed directly in front of the child and 
he was asked "What's the same about this one and this one? " When 
all the problems had been administered in the pictorial condition the 
child was asked to name the pictures as a check that they were 
correctly identified. The pictures were also occasionally used in 
the verbal condition: if there was any suspicion that a subject did 
not understand the names used, the pictures were put in front of him 
and he was asked to pick out the uncertain item. 
The precise wording of the instructions might vary slightly. 
If a child failed to give a similarity either to simple or binary 
comparison questions for three problems in a row or if he was 
obviously restless the series was terminated. All testing sessions 
were tape-recorded for later transcription. 
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Results. 
Sample protocols. 
The protocols of four children, one from each of the primary 
school groups, are given as examples in Appendix 2: 1. The cases were 
selected so as to show a range of abilities and to illustrate as many 
as possible of the points made in the text. The youngest child, Lynn, 
falls approximately into the bottom quarter as regards performance both 
in terms of number of problems attempted and number of similarities 
given. Michael falls at the median on both measures. Diane and 
Alexander both come into the top quarter, Alexander being one of the 
top four subjects in terms of number of similarities given. 
Names given to pictures. 
If the results from the pictorial presentation condition are to 
be compared with those with verbal presentation, knowledge of how the 
pictures were identified by the subjects is important. Pictorial 
presentation using a picture of a rabbit is only equivalent to verbal 
presentation using the word 'rabbit' if the picture is seen as a 
rabbit and not as a cat or an animal. There are then two questions to 
be answered: could the children correctly identify the pictures? and 
did they identify them at the level expected by the experimenter? 
Table 2: 3 summarises the position for the twelve pictures of 
objects (i. e. excluding car crash and birthday party, which will be 
considered later). Occasionally a child would give more than one 
name for a picture: these extra names are too few to distort the overall 
picture and are included. 
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Table 2: 3. Naming responses by item. 
Names considered correct are: 'bee', 'bumblebee', 'fly', 'blue- 
bottle', 'bird', 'rabbit', 'bunny rabbit', 'flower', 'daisy', 'book', 
'blue books, 'fish', 'fishie', 'trabt, 'seal', 'cow', 'tree', 'comb'. 
The vast majority of correct names given were those used in the verbal 
condition, or only trivially different from them. There were five 
instances each of bumblebee and bluebottle and three of daisy, at least 
some of which were probably not true subordinates. The one instance 
of Vblue book' seems more a description than a name. 
The names classified as wrong were not in general such as to 
suggest misidentification of the pictures: most were incorrect sub- 
ordinates, such as 'parrot' for the bird and 'sunflower' for the 
flower, or names of related objects, such as 'brush' for the comb and 
'session' for the seal, which accounted for 39% of all responses to 
the seal picture and was the only error to be made by any child in P5/6. 
The most common errors for bee and fly were to call each by the other's 
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name, each also being called by other insect names and 'spider?. 
Nineteen children used the same name for both these pictures. 
The level of 'no responses' seems acceptably low, and may often 
indicate reluctance rather than inability to respond. The 11% 
figure for the seal is a little worrying, combined with the fact that 
this picture elicited a number of bizarre errors: 'bird', 'eagle', 
fowl', + snail' . Some children may have had difficulty identifying 
this one picture. 
The two pictures which have not been considered so far, the car 
crash and the birthday party, give rise to different problems. These 
were intended to portray events, but were often named as objects, as 
Table 2: 4 shows. 
All responses to car crash, except 'no responses' were correct 
but only 15% specified an event. The birthday party was much more 
successful in this respect, 60% of subjects saying that it was of a 
birthday, a party or a birthday party, but this picture also elicited 
a few incorrect answers, such as 'children making cakes' and 'queen'. 
Where the pictures were used as a check on understanding in the 
verbal condition the children were almost always successful in picking 
out the required item, but one child in Ni and two in N2 claimed to 
be unable to find a fly, two children in N2 could not pick out a seal, 
one in Nl could not find a cow and one in Pl failed to find a crab. 
This is not a perfect test: the failures may just indicate inattention 
and success in matching picture to word is no guarantee that the word 
was understood in the original entirely verbal situation, but the high 
level of performance is reassuring. 
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car crash 
% crash 15 
% crashed cars 17 
% cars 65 
% ºno response' 3 
Absolute no. of responses 72 
birthday party 
% birthday, party 60 
% children, food 29 
% other 7 
% 'no responses' 4 
Absolute number of responses 75 
Table 2: L.. Naming responses to car crash and birthday party pictures. 
Number of problems attempted. 
The majority of testing sessions were terminated before all 
problems had been administered, the mean numbers of problei, s attempted 
by children in the different age groups being as follows: 
Ni N2 P1 P2 P3/l P5/6 Total 
7.1 10.6 7.9 9.6 10.5 11.5 9.6 
Table 2: 5. Mean no. of problems attempted, out of 12. 
In all, 45 children attempted all 12 problems, and these were 
distributed across the age groups as follows: 
No. 
%of 
group 
Ni N2 Pi P2 P3/4 P5/6 Total 
1 9 1 6 12 16 45 
6 14.7 4 20 40 70 31 
Table 2: 6. Distribution of subjects completing the task. 
The difference between the groups in the number of problems 
administered is statistically significant (Kruskal-Wallis 1-way 
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analysis of variance, H= 56.5, df = 5, P< . 001). Ir.. spection of the 
means shows this difference to have two sources: age and the population 
from which the subjects were drawn. This result is to be taken into 
account in the subsequent analysis. 
Response categories. 
The children's answers to those problems they attempted were 
classified in 4 categories: 
1. Similarities. Any response presented by the child as a similarity 
between the items, even if tendentious or untrue. 
2. Relations. Any relation between the two items which is neither 
a similarity nor a difference e. g. Michael's response to the bee- 
flower comparison 'That one goes on flowers'. 
3" Differences. Any difference between the two items. 
Li. No responses. No response at all, 'don't know', 'nothing', simple 
assertions that the two items are the same or that they are 
different, unintelligible or irrelevant responses. (There were a 
very few responses under the last two heads. ) 
This list could be regarded as a hierarchy, with a similarity as 
the best kind of response and a 'no response' as the worst. Some 
responses included in the 'no response? category might be thought of 
as superior to some of those further up the list but they are put in 
this order because the 'no responses' are uninformative. 
Any response consisting of more than one part was classified 
according to the part which would come highest in the above list, e. g. 
i: -0 
Lynn's response to the bee-rabbit comparison, tC os that's a rabbit and 
that's a fly so that's not the same', is considered a difference 
although 'That's not the same' on its own would be classed as a no 
response. In cases where there were two responses to the sane problem, 
one given after prompting, the first was recorded for purposes of 
analysis unless the prompted response would fall into a higher category 
in the above list, in which case it was recorded instead. Responses 
to binary comparison questions were classified in the same way as those 
to simple comparisons. 
Number of similarities given. 
Figure 2: 2 shows the proportions of answers of different kinds 
given by the children in the various age groups, both for the subjects 
as a whole and separately for those who attempted all problems. It 
should be borne in mind that in the latter case Ni and Pl are not 
groups, but single children. Prediction 1 was that some children would 
have difficulty in giving similarities, which is evident from the 
figure, and that this difficulty would be more marked for the younger 
children. The differences between the groups in proportion of answers 
given which are similarities are statistically significant, both for 
the subsample and for the whole group (Kruskal-Wallis 1-way analysis of 
variance, subsample: H= 15.32, df = 5, p (. 01; whole group: H= 55.23, 
df = 5, p<. 001) . Inspection of Figure 2: 2 suggests that, as with the 
number of problems attempted, not only age but also subject population 
is having an effect. The statistical tests are likely to be conservative, 
as when carried out on the whole group a higher proportion of the pro- 
blems attempted by the younger subjects will be the earlier ones, which 
should be easier if prediction 3 is supported, while if the subsample is 
used the younger age groups are more highly selected and may include only 
the brighter children. 
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Figure 2: 2. Percentages of responses falling into different categories. 
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Differences given. 
Prediction 2 was that some children would give differences, and 
more precisely that they would give similarities in answer to earlier 
problems and differences to later ones. This is clearly supported. 
81 of the 147 children gave at least one similarity and at least one 
difference. (Of the remaining 66 subjects, 43 gave only similarities, 
18 only differences and 5 neither of these. ) If the children's 
responses to series A and series B are considered separately, these 
81 subjects produced 98 series of responses containing both similarities 
and differences. Of these, in 68 cases all similarities came before 
any difference, in 4 cases all differences came before any similarities 
and the remaining cases were mixed. 
Difficulty of problems. 
Prediction 3 was that problems later in the two series would be 
more difficult than earlier ones. Figure 2: 3 shows the percentage 
of children in the subsample who attempt all problems who give a 
similarity in answer to each of the problems in the two conditions. 
The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the proportion of 
children giving a similarity and position in the series, taken across 
both series and conditions, is -0.86 ( p<. 001) for this subgroup. 
The prediction is therefore supported, despite the bumps evident in 
Figure 2: 3. 
Binary comparisons. 
Prediction 4 was that binary comparisons would be easier than 
simple ones. Some children were not asked any binary comparison 
questions as they did not have sufficient failures with simple ones, 
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Figure 2: 3. Proportions of subjects out of sample of 45 
giving similarities in answer to different problems. 
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and a larger number refused to make any binary choices, so there are 
only 122 children to be considered here. Overall these subjects gave 
similarities in answer to 37% of the simple comparison questions they 
were asked and to 53% of the binary comparisons. 72 children gave a 
higher proportion of similarities in answer to binary comparisons than 
to simple ones, 36 the reverse, and 14 gave the same proportion of 
similarities in their answers to both types of question. This difference 
is statistically significant (sign test, z=4.76, p< . 001). Since 
the children were only asked binary comparison questions in relation 
to problems they had failed as simple comparisons, the difference 
between the two types is likely to be underestimated by taking the 
proportion of similarities given. 
Relations. 
The fifth prediction was simply that some responses of the type 
which have been called relations would occur. This is so: 32 children 
gave at least one relation, 41 such responses occurring in all. The 
small number of these responses prevents very much being said about 
them.. They are not given by children of any particular age group 
nor by those of any particular ability level, as assessed by the number 
of similarities given. There was however considerable variation in 
the extent to which different problems elicited such responses, as 
Table 2: 7 shows. The comparison between a bee and a flower contributed 
over half the relations: bees were said to like, eat, go or land on 
flowers and to collect honey, nectar, pollen, holly or polythene from 
them. Some suggested connections between the items were more tenuous, 
such as that fish might be eaten at a birthday party. 
Oilj 
Series A No. of 
%age of Series B No. of 
%age of 
relations answers relations answers 
Bee - fly 1 1 Fish - crab 3 2 
bird 1 1 seal 1 1 
rabbit 1 1 cow 0 0 
flower 22 17 tree 1 1 
book 5 5 comb 0 0 
car 0 0 birthday 6 10 
crash party 
Table 2: 7. No. and percentage of relations given in answer to different 
problems. 
Verbal versus pictorial presentation. 
The next point to be considered is whether the children found 
verbal or pictorial presentation to be easier. Figure 2: 3 suggests 
that pictorial presentation was easier in general , although not for 
some problems in the B series. The question was tested statistically 
by comparing the number of similarities each subject gave in the two 
conditions, using a sign test. Where a subject had taken different 
numbers of problems in the two series the smaller number was taken into 
account for both series. 69 subjects were then found to score higher 
in the pictorial condition and 28 in the verbal condition, the 
remaining 50 having the same score for both conditions. This difference 
is statistically significant (Z = 4.06, p <. . 001). There seems to 
be 
no connection with level of ability, most subjects at all levels of 
ability, in terms of number of similarities given, finding pictorial 
presentation slightly easier than verbal presentation. The difference 
between the two modes of presentation, although consistent, is small: 112 
of the 147 children had scores for number of similarities given which did 
not differ by more than one between the different conditions. 
-, tj 
Analysis of answers by content. 
So far the children's answers have only been. considered as 
similarities, differences, relations and no responses. In the intro- 
duction a number of frames of reference within which the content of 
the answers could be assessed were proposed. These will be considered 
below, but first some general comments on the kinds of similarities 
the subjects offered will be given, so as to give an overall picture. 
The protocols in Appendix 2: 1 also give some idea of the nature of 
the children's responses. 
Content of similarities. 
As it is similarities with which we are principally concerned 
they alone are considered here. Tables 2: 8 and 2: 9 show the kinds of 
answer given. 
Age group : Ni N2 Pl P2 P3/4 P5/6 
Category Number 3 5 2 L 33 82 
names Percentage 12 7 5 3 3 5 
Physical No. 8 19 11 232 22 112 
properties % 32 27 28 20 17 7 
Motion No. 7 17 6 2 33 3L' 352 
% 28 25 11 28 26 21 
Common No. 2 16 82 312 33' 412 
part % 8 24 21 27 25 24 
Similar No. 0 2 4 18 20 28 
part % 0 3 10 15 15 16 
Habitat No. 2 6 6 5 13 ib 25 
% 8 9 15 4 u 15 
Other No. 3 4 4 2 43 21 
% 12 6 10 2 3 12 
Total No. 25 70 140 117 131 171 
% 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total 
Verbal Pictorial Total 
45% 212 2556 
2 7 5 
26 682 95 
11 21 17 
80 512 1312 
34 16 24 
552 78 1332 
24 24 24 
21 51 72 
9 16 13 
213 36 57 s/b 
9 11 10 
2L 14 38 
10 4 7 
233 321 554 
100 100 100 
Table 2: 8. Content of similarities by age group and presentation condition. 
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Examples of each kind of response can be four_d in the protocols. 
Category names were generally specific (e. g. 'both bees? ) but some- 
times superordinate (e. g. ? both animals'). Physical properties covers 
all similarities citing such properties as colour, shape and size, 
including cases where only parts of the items are said to have a common 
colaur, or whatever. Similar parts are answers such as I: ichael's to 
the bee-flower comparison: 'Cos it's got petals and that's like petals 
(wings)?. Motion, common part and habitat are self-explanatory. Most 
answers in the 'other' category cited other properties or activities of 
the items, a few of them quite sophisticated, such as 'living' or 
'growing'. Two examples from this category are Diane's response to 
the bee-book comparison, 'Both begin with "bt" and Alexander's to the 
bee-car crash problem, 'Both make a noise'. Compound answers such as 
'They can fly and they've both got wings' are considered to be composed 
of equal parts summing to 1 and account for the fractions in the tables. 
These tables are intended to give a general picture. Their use 
is limited by the fact that different children gave different numbers 
of similarities and in answer to different problems - in particular, a 
high proportion of the answers to later problems were given by older 
children. Some comments can be made however. 
The only age trend to stand out is the decline in the importance 
of physical properties with age. Many of these responses cited colour, 
particularly those from the younger children, so that the trend would 
have been even more striking if colour alone had been considered. 
Category names, physical properties and similar parts were more 
common with pictorial than with verbal presentation. Specific category 
names such as 'They're both bees' are obviously more reasonable responses 
to the question 'What's the same about this one and this one? ' than to 
tWhat Is the same about a bee and a fly? t The direct portrayal of 
physical properties and similar parts with pictorial presentation 
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may account for the differences in-these cases. 
ILotion and 'other' responses were more common with verbal than 
with pictorial presentation. Answers referring to the mode of motion 
of the items were made predominantly to the first two comparisons in 
each series, especially the A series. The children's favoured answer 
to the bee-fly and bee-bird comparisons was 'They fly' with verbal 
presentation, but 'They have wings' when presented pictorially. The 
difference in 'other' responses between the pictorial and verbal 
conditions may reflect a difference in strategy when the most common 
answers fail, as they form a higher proportion of answers to the more 
difficult problems. It may be that with pictorial presentation the 
pictures are scrutinised for some point of similarity and some non- 
essential agreement in colour or a similarity of parts is cited, while 
with verbal presentation the children must think of some unusual type 
of answer. 
There are very considerable differences between the problems in 
the kinds of answers they elicit: habitat is a striking case, given 
with one exception in answer to only two comparisons, fish-crab and 
fish-seal. Category names are only given to earlier problems because 
it is easier to find a common category name in these cases. Similarly 
motion should only be a possible answer for the earlier problems but 
reappears for the last in each series, when presented pictorially, 
because the pictures can be taken as representing objects capable of 
motion rather than events. The number of physical properties cited 
tends to increase with difficulty of problem. The experimenter was 
sometimes given the impression that these were regarded as not very 
good answers by the subjects and were given only if something they 
regarded as better could not be found. 
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The subjects showed much greater agreement in their responses 
to the first two problems in each series than to the later ones, the 
popular answers for the A series being already given. For the B 
series they were 'They swim' and 'They live in water (or the sea)'. 
For most other problems some similarity of colour is the most common 
answer given. 
Piagetts central-peripheral distinction. 
The first frame of reference considered in the introduction within 
which to consider the content of the children's answers was Piaget's 
central-peripheral dimension. Most of the children's replies cited 
what seemed to be clearly peripheral properties of the objects. 
Answers in the 'similar parts' category involve some degree of abstraction, 
but it seems to be purely empirical abstraction, in Piaget's terms. 
A few answers seemed to involve more central properties. These 
were those citing properties such as having motion or being coloured 
(as opposed to employing a particular mode of movement or being a 
particular colour) and potentialities such'as ? can be eaten' or 'can be 
cut'. Category names are also considered central properties in that 
they, as it were, point to the essence of the thing named. 
The small number of central properties mentioned, and the fact 
that they were in different numbers from different children and in 
answer to different problems, makes assessment of the situation diffi- 
cult, but some attempt can be made. 
The first prediction made in connection with the central-peripheral 
distinction was that similarities offered for problems early in the 
two series would be more likely to cite peripheral properties than those 
for later problems. Only 29 subjects offered both central and peri- 
pheral properties as similarities and these were about evenly divided as 
OA 
to whether they mentioned central properties to earlier or later 
problems, on average, than those which they answered in terms of peri- 
pheral properties. 
The second prediction was that older children would cite a higher 
proportion of central properties than younger ones. Of the small 
number of subjects who gave central similarities, nearly half were in 
the oldest group, the others being spread across the younger age groups 
as Table 2: 10 shows. 
N1 N2 Pi P2 P3/b P5/6 Total 
Number 3 3 2 5 5 14 32 
% of group 17 16 7 17 17 61 22 
Table 2: 10. Numbers and percentages of children offering central 
properties as similarities. 
These figures are however difficult to interpret: since the oldest 
children give the most similarities of any kind they have the most 
opportunity to give central ones. It is clear that the second part of 
the hypothesis, that the age difference would be most evident in the 
earlier problems, is not supported: it is the oldest group alone who 
tend to give central similarities in answer to the later problems. 
The third prediction was that differences would cite peripheral 
properties. In fact, of 313 differences, 96, or 31%, involved central 
properties. This compares with only 9% of similarities and so is 
clearly contrary to expectation. The 41 relations on the other hand 
were all peripheral, but this is probably in their nature, since they 
involve putting objects in the same scene, as it were. 
The final prediction concerning central and peripheral properties 
was that a higher proportion of answers with pictorial presentation 
O2 
would be peripheral in nature than those withverbal presentation. 
Although difficult to assess, the evidence points in the opposite 
direction: 16 subjects gave a higher proportion of peripheral simi- 
larities with verbal presentation than with pictorial presentation, 
only 11 giving a higher proportion in the pictorial condition. Of 
the 12 problems only 3 elicited a higher proportion of peripheral 
properties in the pictorial condition while 7 did so in the verbal 
condition. 
It must be admitted that application of the central-peripheral 
dimension to the present results is limited, both because the answers 
split so unevenly between the two categories and because support for 
the hypotheses derived from it is so weak. Post hoc it-was noticed 
that the picture seemed distorted by the inclusion of specific cate- 
gory names, which formed a large part of the number of central 
similarities - indeed, a quarter of all central similarities cited 
were specific category names given in answer to the bee-fly comparison. 
If specific category names were to be excluded from consideration the 
results become more in line with the hypotheses, as follows: 
(i) There remain only 20 children citing both central and peripheral 
properties as similarities, fifteen of these tending to give 
peripheral properties in answer to earlier problems than central 
ones, and only five doing the reverse. 
(ii) The figures given for P5/6 in Table 2: 10 remain the same while 
those for all other groups are reduced, accentuating the age 
difference. 
(iii) Central properties account for 6% of similarities and 3% of 
differences. 
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(iv) 8 subjects give a higher proportion of peripheral similarities 
with verbal than with pictorial presentation, and 12 the reverse. 
6 problems elicit-a higher proportion of peripheral properties 
in the verbal condition and 4 in the pictorial condition. 
Vygo. tsky's distinction between spontaneous and scientific concepts. 
The possibility of applying Vygotsky's distinction between 
spontaneous and scientific concepts has now to be considered. Although 
it is difficult to know when one is dealing with scientific concepts 
it seems that they are rarely employed in the children's answers. The 
size, shape and colour of the objects, their mode of motion, their 
habitat and their body parts all seem to be spontaneous concepts. 
Possibly the best instance of a scientific concept in the corpus is 
'animal' as applied to insects, birds and fish as well as mammals. How- 
ever this occurs only seven times in answer to simple comparison questions, 
always as a similarity. Other possible candidates for scientific con- 
cepts are 'insect', 'living' (as applied to both animals and plants) and 
'gills'. Of these, only 'gills' appears other than as a similarity. 
The relations recorded included, as noted above, suggestions of bees 
collecting from flowers such odd things as holly and polythene and this 
could be a result of the children attempting to relate a misunderstood 
school lesson to their spontaneous concepts. Given that even if the net 
is stretched as wide as this the number of answers involving scientific 
concepts is small, it is not reasonable to look for differences in their 
employment, either between age groups or as to whether or not they are 
mentioned as similarities. 
Rosch's theory of natural categories. 
We now come to the last suggested frame of reference, Rosch's 
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theory of natural categories. The first prediction based on this 
theory was that comparisons would be much easier if they were between 
members of the same basic level category. Yost of the problems 
clearly involve comparisons between members of different basic level 
categories, the one possible exception being the comparison of a bee 
and a fly. Rosch was surprised to find, in her own investigation of 
biological taxonomies, that 'tree', 'fish', and 'bird' seemed to be 
basic level categories for her adult subjects, whereas she had expected 
them to be superordinates (Rosch et al. 1976). On this basis one might 
expect 'insect' to be a basic level category also. The names given by 
the children to the pictures may be of assistance here, as it is a 
characteristic of basic level category names that they are the ones 
used in such a task. As reported above, 19 children, or 26% of those 
receiving series A with pictorial presentation, called the pictures of 
the bee and the fly by the same name, which strongly suggests that they 
regard them as members of the same basic level category. In addition, 
one child transposed the names, calling the fly 'bee' and the bee 'blue- 
bottle'. This child, and possibly others also, may have seen the task 
as demanding two different names although their most naturally given 
names for the two pictures would have been the same, so the 26% figure 
may be an underestimate. As already noted in connection with Piaget's 
theory, some children, when asked for a similarity between a bee and a 
fly, said that both were bees, flies or some other species. Others, 
like Michael, gave answers to the effect that they were the (same animals'. 
These answers also suggest that the bee and the fly are members of the 
same basic level category for the subjects in question. A few such 
answers were recorded for the fish-seal comparison but not for any other 
problem. No child in P5/6 gave any of the answers considered in this 
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paragraph but there did not seem to be much difference between the other 
groups. It seems likely that the bee-fly problem involves a comparison 
within a basic level category for a considerable number of the subjects 
and one might therefore expect this problem to be distinctively easier 
than all the others. 
The bee-fly comparison was attempted by all 147 subjects and 7C% 
of them gave a similarity in answer, making this indeed the easiest 
problem. The bee-bird and fish-seal comparisons come next: each of 
these was attempted by 11.6 subjects and 60% of them answered with a 
similarity in each case. If P5/6 is excluded from consideration, as 
there is no evidence that this comparison is between members of the 
same basic level category for this group, the gap widens but only to 67% 
versus 54% of the answers being similarities. Only for Ni does there 
seem to be a marked contrast between this problem and the others, 56% of 
the group. answering it with a similarity, as contrasted with 24% for 
both the bee-bird and fish-seal comparisons, and there is no independent 
evidence that this group were more given to regarding the bee and the 
fly as instances of the same basic level category than the other younger 
age groups. There is then support for the hypothesis but it is not very 
strong. 
The second hypothesis drawn from Rosch's theory is of much more 
general applicability. This was to the effect that the children's 
answers would cite properties of basic level prototypes of the items as 
far as possible. 
Some problems, and some answers to them, raise particular diffi- 
culties in assessing the prototypicality or otherwise of the responses. 
Uncertainty as to whether 'bee' and 'fly' are basic level or subordinate 
categories is one instance. Another difficulty is provided 
by answers 
such as Diane's to the bee-book comparison, to the effect 
that they both 
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start with the same letter. There were five such replies, and they 
were accepted as similarities, although they are not similarities 
between the items themselves. 
Prototypicality of similarities. 
If answers citing specific category names and spelling responses 
are excluded there remains a corpus of 5351 similarities given, counting 
parts of compound answers as fractions as for Tables 2: 8. and 2: 9. Alter- 
natively, but no less arbitrarily, if each part is counted as 1 the 
number of similarities rises to 557. Of these, 95, or 18% of the total, 
on the former method of counting, (96 or 17% by the latter method) are 
not true of the prototype of at least one of the items compared. As 
the judgement of prototypicality depended solely on the writer's 
intuitions a list of answers considered non-prototypical is given in 
Appendix 2: 2. 
The number and nature of the non-prototypical similarities 
depended on the presentation condition. On either method of counting, 
11% of similarities given to verbal presentation were non-prototypical 
and twice as many - 22% - of similarities given to pictorial presentation. 
Most of the non-prototypical answers given to pictorial presentation (60 
out of 70) were true of the pictures concerned - generally fine details 
of the pictures and often concerning colour, for instance pointing out 
the yellow stripes on the bee and yellow writing on the cover of the 
book. These answers indicate that the children could use the pictures 
as alternative sources of information to their own prototypes. However 
there were also indications that the prototype could dominate the 
picture. The writer had assumed that a prototypical fish is silvery in 
colour, although the picture used was actually of a goldfish -a fairly 
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typical fish, and probably the one most familiar to the children 
other than those seen on the dinner plate. Several answers however 
indicated that the children were thinking of green fish and some of 
these came from children receiving pictorial presentation with this 
series. Two such children said that the fish and the tree were the 
same colour, one of them specifying green, and another that the fish 
and the (green) crab were the same colour. In the latter case it 
could be that it is the prototypical crab that is orange, rather than 
the prototypical fish being green. In any case, the pictures are not 
being used as the basis of the reply but seem rather to be pointers to 
the child's concepts of the objects portrayed. 
Of the remaining cases, several answers may be true of the child's 
own prototype though not of the writer's estimate of a prototypical 
member of a category. In some instances the property cited is true of 
some members of a category: for example, one child stated that a bee 
and a bird were both yellow, as in the case reported by Claparede. Ether 
answers, such as Alexander's that a fish and a seal both have gills, 
are not true of any member of one of the categories concerned. In two 
cases subjects made it explicit that their answers were only possibly true 
of the objects in question: a comb can be green (like a fish - from a 
child in P2 given verbal presentation) and party hats could sometimes be 
fish-shaped (P3/L, verbal presentation). 
Age differences in prototypicality. 
It was hypothesised that the older children would be more 
likely 
to give non-prototypical answers than the younger ones. The question 
is again complicated by the fact that different children gave 
different 
numbers of similarities, and in answer to different problems. 
The 
proportions of similarities given by the different age groups which 
O8 
were non-prototypical are displayed in Table 2: 11. The numbers of 
subjects who made any non-prototypical responses are giver. in 
Table 2: 12. 
Group 
% non-prototypical 
similarities 
Nl N2 Pi P2 
32 24 32 23 
P3/L P5/6 Total 
19 6 18 
Table 2: 11. Percentages of similarities given by each age group which 
were non-prototypical. 
Ni N2 Pi P2 P3/4 P5/6 Total 
N%N%N%N%N%N%N% 
2 11 9 47 7 26 11 37 12 40 7 30 48 33 
Table 2: 12. Absolute numbers of subjects, and percentages of age group, who 
give non-prototypical similarities. 
These tables suggest that it is actually the younger children who give 
more non-prototypical similarities. As the older children give more 
similarities of any kind than the younger they have more opportunity 
to give non-prototypical ones and this may account for the rise from Nl 
to P3/4 shown in Table 2: 12. The following drop to P5/6 and the drop 
shown with age across all groups within a subject population in Table 
2: 11 cannot be explained by the difference in problems attempted by 
each group, as it is actually the problems later in the two series which 
elicit more non-prototypical responses, as Table 2: 13 shows. 
Problem by position 12356 Total 
in series 
Non-prototypical 6 10 20 40 23 58 18 
similarities 
Table 2: 13. Percentages of similarities which were non-prototypical for 
problems at different positions in the series, summed across series and 
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Non-prototypicality, differences and relations. 
We now come to consider whether answers other than similarities 
were prototypical or not. It was hypothesised that errors would be 
even more likely than similarities to cite properties of basic level 
prototypes though where apparently non-prototypical answers are due 
to a child employing an unusual prototype this may nct be the case. 
In fact only a tiny proportion of the differences given consisted of 
non-prototypical responses: 6 out of 313, or 2%. One of these was 
with pictorial presentation: only four of the beefs legs are visible 
in the picture and it was said to differ from the fly in this respect. 
The instances given with verbal presentation consisted of two cases 
of crabs being said to be unable to swim, one each of a bee and a fly 
being unable to fly and one of a fly being thin. 
The proportion of non-prototypical relations was much more 
similar to that for similarities: 7 out of 41 or 17%. Again only one 
was with pictorial presentation: a response to the fish-birthday party 
comparison.. to the effect that the balloons could be filled with water - 
the most tenuous relation between two items to be offered. One child 
asserted that bees eat flies, four claimed that fish were eaten at 
parties and one that one could go to a party dressed as a fish. 
Binary comparisons and prototypicality. 
Finally, similarities given in answer to binary comparison 
questions can be compared with those offered to simple comparisons as 
to their prototypicality. 31% of similarities offered in response to 
binary comparisons were considered non-prototypical, and they were 
given by 38 different subjects, or 31% of those who answered any 
binary comparison questions. The higher proportion of non-prototypical 
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answers given does not seem tobe due to binary comparisons being 
asked in connection with probleýas later in the two series than 
simple comparisons, on average, as a comparison of Table 2: 1)4 with 
Table 2: 13 shows. 
Position of problem 123456 Total in series 
% Non-prototypical 11 28 28 38 63 33 31 
similarities 
Table 2: 14. Percentages of non-prototypical similarities given in 
answer to binary comparison questions for problems at different 
positions in the series. 
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Discussion. 
This experiment has supported the claims made by Claparede. 
Children do have difficulty in giving siir_ilarities between pairs of 
items, often giving differences (and occasionally, relations) instead. 
A child who can give similarities between very similar items will often 
make such errors when comparing comparatively dissimilar items. Not 
surprisingly, older children perform better at the task than younger 
ones. The binary comparison form of question is easier to answer with 
a similarity than a simple comparison question. The replication of 
Claparedels findings extends to the content of the answers given: 
compare, for example, Michaelis answer to the bee-flower problem, 
'Cos it's got petals and that's like petals' with the response giver. by one 
of Claparede's subjects 'Les petales de la rose resemblent aux alles 
de ltabeille'. However the main purpose of the present experiment was 
to seek understanding of what is happening in Claparede's task, repli- 
cation of his findings being a necessary preliminary. 
The element in this experiment which was not part of Claparede's 
study, the contrast between verbal and pictorial presentation, will be 
considered first. In general pictorial presentation was found to be 
somewhat easier than verbal, though this was not true for all problems. 
Which presentation condition was found easier, and to what extent, was 
not related to the general ability of a child in performing the task, 
so there was no support for the suggestion made by Wohwill (1968a) 
considered in the introduction. It may be that with pictorial presentation 
the child has one fewer stage to go through; he merely has to compare 
two representations whereas with verbal presentation he first has to 
create and hold in mind two representations, be they visual in nature 
or not. It might be argued that a pictorial representation is fixed 
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while a mental one has the advantage that it can be varied t: ntil a 
point of similarity is found, but the evidence that items were con- 
ceived in terms of their basic level prototypes suggests that mental 
representations may also be somewhat fixed. Incidental details in 
the pictures could be cited as similarities and were often chosen for 
the more difficult problems: for instance, four children pointed out 
the similarity between the lines drawn to indicate pages in the book 
and those indicating veins in the beets wings. Even if the represen- 
tations created by the children in the verbal condition were visual 
in nature they might not contain such fine detail, or such details 
might be dismissed as irrelevant in that condition. 
The two final problems, A6 and B6, showed a greater advantage to 
pictorial presentation than most, as this can convert a comparison 
between an object and an event into one between two objects. An un- 
intended advantage was given to pictorial presentation by the mode of 
procedure. As stated in the method section all seven pictures for the 
appropriate series were displayed at once. This was simply for ease 
of administration, but meant that all comparisons in this condition 
could be effectively binary, or involve even more items. Only one 
answer suggested such a strategy: a child in P3/L said of a bee and a 
fly "A fly is quite the same because it's got wings and flowers haven't 
got wings and cantt fly". This was the first problem altogether to be 
administered to this child so she must have thought of this method of 
comparison herself without any prompting due to previous binary com- 
parison questions asked by the experimenter. Most children may not 
have paid any attention to any pictures other than the two to which 
they were specifically directed but the possibility cannot be ruled 
out. 
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The specific content of the answers given by the children, 
whether they mentioned a cor: mon part, a common global physical property 
or whatever, varied very much from problem to problem, as might be 
expected. This variation is a good reason for looking for a more 
general frame of reference than is provided by categories such as 
common part. However, there were problems involved in applying all the 
frames of reference considered, and Vygotsky's distinction between 
spontaneous and scientific concepts could not be applied at all. 
At first sight Piaget's central-peripheral dimension did not seem 
to fit the data but the picture improved greatly when specific cate- 
gory names were excluded. It seems that the distinction does capture a 
real difference in the data, but that it cannot be applied to all the 
answers given. An object's name, or its category membership, is not 
really a property it possesses, and Piaget's distinction did seem to 
apply to true properties. The oldest group was different from all the 
others in that almost all the answers citing properties such as living 
and growing came from that group. No child in P5/6 ever offered a 
specific category name in answer but this group gave more superordinate 
category names than any other. The movement seems to be not from the 
periphery to the centre but from properties, including names, at one 
level, to those at a higher level. Although there was an abrupt change 
on reaching the oldest group the higher level answers were very much 
in a minority even from these children. 
The suggestion that it is levels in a hierarchy of categories 
which are involved brings us to a consideration of how well Rosch's 
theory fitted the results. There was evidence that the bee and the fly 
were members of the same basic level category for some of the subjects 
and that this contributed to the comparison between them being the 
easiest of all the problems. Rosch's basic level fixes the starting 
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point for the ascent to higher levels referred to above. 
host of the similarities which the children gave seemed to be 
prototypical, in Rosch's terms. Indeed, there was some evidence with 
pictorial presentation that the children occasionally answered in 
terms of their prototype for an item even when this meant that their 
reply was not true of the picture in question. Some of the apparently 
non-prototypical similarities offered were false and these and others 
were probably due to aberrant prototypes. Non-prototypical answers 
given with pictorial presentation were sometimes true of the pictures 
and this possibility provides another reason for the pictorial condition 
being found easier than the verbal one. Pictorial presentation was 
consistently easier only for the A series and some answers suggested 
that the goldfish which was the constant picture for the B series was 
not a prototypical fish for at least some subjects. One can speculate 
that the pictures were helpful only when prototypes were represented, 
non-prototypical features then being useful extras, but that a picture 
which as a whole was not prototypical did not aid the children's 
responses. These two types of answer, those due to atypical prototypes 
and those true of the pictures, appeared to account for most of the 
similarities classified as non-prototypical. There seemed to be very 
few answers citing properties which were possibly true of at least some 
members of the category but were not part of the prototype. 
As expected, differences given were almost always prototypical, 
although relations were no more so than similarities. Answers to binary 
comparison questions were less likely to be prototypical than those to 
simple comparisons. Contrary to expectation the older children gave 
fewer non-prototypical responses than the younger ones. It 
had been 
thought that the older children would be better able to conceive of 
items other than in terms of their basic level prototypes and 
therefore 
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would be more likely to give answers of the possibly true variety. 
As has been said there did not seem to be many such answers, and the 
older children tended rather to give more sophisticated prototypical 
answers, such as properties considered to be central in the Piagetian 
classification. False answers came more often from the younger children 
so the picture might be changed somewhat if it were known for certain 
just what is prototypical for a particular child. 
It is now appropriate to attempt an overall view of what happens 
when a child performs Claparede1 s task. The task as set by Claparede, 
that is, presented verbally, will be considered first. 
The evidence suggests that on hearing the names of the items 
the child conceives of them in terms of their basic level prototypes. 
As Rosch (1977) has warned, prototypes are not images. If they were, 
age differences in properties cited would be surprising, and differences 
given although similarities were requested would be unexplained. It is 
rather as though the prototypes were lists of properties, some more 
salient than others. If the basic level prototypes of the items coincide, 
as they would seem to do for the bee and the fly for some subjects, any 
property is a similarity between them and the child can simply mention 
the one which is most salient for him. If the prototypes are different 
the most salient feature may be a difference or a relation and the child 
must resist the temptation to cite that feature. An account of this 
sort, supposing frequent failures to resist the temptation, seems to be 
the only way to explain the results. As noted, most of the children 
who gave differences also gave at least one similarity. It cannot be 
that they believe they have been asked for a difference. It also seems 
unlikely that they understand that they are being asked for a comparison 
but do not know what sort of comparison, or think that the question is 
neutral as between similarity and difference as in that case one might 
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expect more differences to be given to t', _e eas T problems: there are 
after all many and striking differences, as well as similarities, 
between a bee and 'a bird, for instance. Furthermore, some of the 
children who give differences are quite old - seven of them are in P5/6, 
at the age of ten or eleven and it does not seem credible that they do 
not understand the question. Rather it seems that ; ley cannot keep 
hold of the question when the salient points to strike them are differ- 
ences. It was noted in the previous chapter that control has often been 
thought of as one of the main functions of awareness, and it seems to 
be this aspect which is important here. The child's intellectual pro- 
cesses do not seem to be fully under the control of his awareness but 
can at times be taken over, as it were, so that he is forced into an 
error which he would recognise as such if he were in complete control 
of his faculties. 
On the above account differences would always be prototypical, as 
indeed they almost always were, in terms of the writer's prototypes. 
Relations were less often prototypical and it may be that they have two 
sources. A child giving a relation may be seeking some point of contact 
between the two items but be unable to find a genuine similarity. 
Occasionally relations were offered somewhat hesitantly, as if the sub- 
ject were aware that it was not a wholly adequate response. Other 
relations were probably given in the same way as differences, the 
highly prototypical relations between a bee and a flower being cases 
in point. Such relations certainly leap to mind when a bee and a 
flower are mentioned together but they are less striking if one of the 
items is considered alone. That is, it may well be that the context of 
the comparison alters the relative salience of various properties of 
the items. Binary comparison questions may facilitate the giving of 
similarities also by altering the salience of properties. If for 
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instance a child has said that a bee is more like a rabbit than a 
flower this may increase the salience of the properties of animals 
as opposed to plants. However the upshot of a binary comparison 
question was not always that the child chose the item which might be 
expected - he might, as Michael did, choose the flower in the above 
example - and in this case the facilitating effect cannot occur. 
Binary comparison questions were sometimes successful in eliciting 
similarities after 'no responses' had been given to the corresponding 
simple comparison questions, as well as after differences. If they 
work by altering the salience of properties this must mean that there 
is a threshold of salience below which a property is not available to 
awareness. This is plausible in the light of the results: only the 
oldest children seemed to have access to the property 'living' for 
example, yet surely the youngest-, ow that a bee and a fly etc. are 
living. This may seem to be simply to restate Claparede's point that 
very general properties are the last to become available to awareness, 
but the jargon of modern cognitive psychology does seem to give his 
ideas a more concrete form. It is likely that some properties are 
stored in such a way that they cannot come into awareness and that 
others are permanently available to it, and that there is a third cate- 
gory the availability of the members of which depends on some degree 
of salience or level of excitation. 
Claparedets disadaptation mechanism for promoting awareness has 
considerable problems associated with it, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. He may have been led to overemphasise the importance of 
dis- 
adaptation because it arises principally in the presence of 
the un- 
expected or the odd and it is the unusual which is actually 
important. 
It was noted that the habitat of items was given in answer 
(with one 
exception) only to the fish-seal and fish-crab comparisons 
but was 
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given so often for those as to merit inclusion in Tables 2: 8 and 2: 9. 
Aquatic, as opposed to terrestial, habitat can be considered an oddity 
and it therefore seems to have greater salience. 
Most of the above account, given for verbal presentation, holds 
for pictorial presentation also. The pictures were reasonably proto- 
typical and it was suggested that in some cases they were simply used 
as cues to a child's own prototypes. However if a child was unable 
to find a prototypical similarity between the items the pictures did 
enable an answer to be given in terms of non-prototypical details 
portrayed in them. It is thought that this is the main reason for 
pictorial presentation being found easier than verbal presentation. 
Even in cases where prototypical answers were given the pictures seem 
to affect the relative salience of properties of the items. This is 
most evident for the bee-fly comparison. where 'they fly', or answers to 
that effect, accounted for 54% of similarities given with verbal pre- 
sentation and only 11% with pictorial presentation, while 'they have 
wingst accounted for 19% and 41% respectively. The import of the two 
answers is of course very similar, but the wings are directly portrayed 
in the pictures. A similar but less marked variation is found for the 
bee-bird comparison and also for the fish-crab and fish-seal comparisons, 
where motion is again relatively more common with verbal presentation 
and habitat much more common with pictorial presentation. Since habitat 
is not directly portrayed this result is more difficult to explain. 
Finally, it seems appropriate to address a controversy amongst 
workers in cognitive development. If a child apparently shows some 
intellectual ability - the ability to conserve number, to take another's 
point of view or to give a similarity between two items - in some con- 
texts, but in others he makes seemingly illogical errors, should he be 
credited with that ability or not? The Piagetians tend to say 
he should 
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not, but there are others who argue that at least in some cases he 
should be (e. g. Donaldson 1979) Gelman 1972, Flavell and Wohlwill 1969). 
The position is not all-or-none of course; some such illogicalities 
could well be due just to performance factors such as memory span, or 
to the introduction of a second and more difficult task alongside the 
first, while others are not. In the present case a child who gives 
some similarities and some differences seems to have the same ability 
to understand the comparison question as a child who gives similarities 
and no differences, but he cannot be credited with the same degree of 
fully aware control of his intellectual processes. 
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Appendix 2: 1: Sample Protocols 
Lynn 5: 3 
Series A: pictorial presentation 
Bee and fly That's not the same fly. 
(prompt) Just the wings that's the same. S 
bird Just a wee bit the same Iý 
(prompt) (No response) 
rabbit Cos that's a rabbit and that's a fly so that's 
not the same D 
(prompt) (No response) 
bird or rabbit? (No response) 
flower No N 
(prompt) Not the same 
bird or flower? It's not like that or that 
names? rose bird book car rabbit fly fly (bee) 
Series B: verbal presentation 
Fish and crab (No response) N 
(prompt) (No response) 
seal No N 
(prompt) (No response) 
crab or seal? A wee bit like a shark 
(prompt) Not like anything 
cow (No response) N 
(prompt) (No response) 
crab or cow? (No response) 
(identifies pictures correctly) 
, 
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Michael 6: 9 
Series A: pictorial presentation. 
Bee and fly They're both the same animals. S 
bird They can both fly S 
rabbit Don't know 
(prompt) (No response) 
flower I think it - that one goes on flowers. R 
(prompt) (No response) 
rabbit or flower (Flower) Cos it's got petals and that's like 
petals (wings). S 
book Don't know N 
(prompt) (No response) 
rabbit or book? (Rabbit) Because it' sa animal and the other one 
isn't S 
car crash Don't know N 
(prompt) (No response) 
book or car crash (Car crash) I don't know N 
names? book fly flower bird rabbit two cars bee 
Series B: verbal presentation 
Fish and crab (No response) N 
(prompt) Don't know 
seal They both swim S 
cow Nothing N 
(prompt) (No response) 
crab or cow? (Crab) Don't know 
N 
(prompt) Don't know 
tree Nothing r' 
(prompt) (No response) 
cow or tree? Don't 
know 
. ýýý --: Ws crab, cow, 
tree) 
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Diane 7: 8 
Series A: verbal presentation 
Bee and fly Don't know 
(prompt) They fly s 
bird That's a funny one N 
(prompt) I don't know 
rabbit One of them can't fly and the other one can. D 
(prompt) (No response) 
bird or rabbit (Bird) Cos it can fly. S 
flower The bee collects honey 
(prompt) They both got honey S 
book Both begin with 'b' S 
car crash I don't know N 
(prompt) (No response) 
rabbit or car crash (Rabbit) Because a bee's got a little drop fur S 
Series B: pictorial presentation 
Fish and crab Don't know N 
(prompt) (No response) 
seal They both swim under water. S 
cow The cow eats grass, the cow gives milk but the 
fish doesn't 
(prompt) The fish is a little bitty brown. S 
tree Don't know N 
(prompt) (No response) 
crab or tree? (Crab) Because a tree doesn't grow under water. S 
comb That's got a little bit of that. (comb like fin) S 
party That's got kind of yellow candles and that's yellow. S 
names? fish comb cow tree seal -a sealion party crab 
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Alexander 10: 8 
Series A: pictorial presentation. 
Bee and fly They've both got the same kind of wings. 
bird They can both fly 
rabbit They've both got furry stuff 
flower They're coloured. 
book That's, when you open it up it looks as though 
itts got wings. 
car crash They both make a noise 
names? book fly bird two cars rabbit flower bee 
Series B: verbal presentation 
Fish and crab 
seal 
cow 
tree 
comb 
party 
(prompt) 
They both live in the water 
They both have gills 
Both can move 
The leaves have kind of scales 
A comb's got kind of scale things 
You can eat a fish 
(No response) 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
C 
v 
S 
C' 
S 
S 
R 
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Appendix 2: 2 
Non-prototypical similarities. 
The following is a list of all those responses excluding category 
names and the spelling response to the bee-book comparison which were 
offered as similarities in response to simple comparison questions, 
which are not true of prototypical instances of at least one of the 
categories compared. The number of cases of such responses is also 
given. 
Responses 
Bee - fly Stripes 
Same colour (blue) 
Sting 
Bee - bird Colour 
Claws 
- rabbit Colour 
Jump 
- flower Shape 
Colour 
- book Size 
Colour 
- car crash Colour 
Hind legs resemble steering wheel 
Stripes on seat resemble lines on wings 
Fish - crab Crab is larval stage of 
fish 
Shape 
Size 
Colour 
Fins 
Vp Total 
11 
1 
1 
1 10 
1 
10 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
8 
1 
6 
7 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
11 
1 
10 
1 
1 
8 
1 
6 
2 
1 
1 
i 
2 
1 
12 
1 
o; -i 
Fish - crab (cont) Fins same shape as crab's shell 1 1 
Parallel lines on drawings 1 1 
- seal Size 1 1 
Colour 3 1 14 
Gills 1 1 
- cow Colour 2 1 3 
- tree Shape (long) 1 1 
Colour 3 2 
Wrinkled 1 1 
Trunk resembles tail 1 1 
Branches resemble tail 1 1 
Leaves resemble tail 1 1 
Roots resemble tail 1 1 
- comb Size 1 1 
Colour 2 1 3 
Tail 1 1 
- party Shape (long) 1 1 
Colour 1 4 5 
Party hat resembles fin 1 1 
Balloons resemble tail 1 1 
Fish scales resemble pattern on hat 1 1 
Fish scales resemble sections of jelly 1 1 
Party hats could be fish-shaped 1 1 
252 692 95 
U( 
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Chapter 3. Further developments of Claparede's task. 
Introduction. 
The experiment described in the previous chapter substantially 
confirmed Claparede's conclusions. Two points might however be made. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is a matter of inference that children 
find it easier to give similarities than differences so long as 
differences are never asked for directly. Secondly, the finding that 
it is more difficult to give similarities between more dissimilar items 
is not surprising, intuitively, but it could be due partly to per- 
severation. For both series of problems used in the previous experi- 
ment the similarities most commonly given in answer to the first two 
problems (? having wings' and 'flying' for the bee series and 'living 
in water' and 'swimming' for the fish series) were the differences most 
commonly given in response to the third problem. Even when a child 
did not give a difference, if the answer given to the earlier problems 
tended to occur to mind it might have inhibited a correct response. If 
this is the case it might be easier to take the problems in the reverse 
order as an answer which was correct for a more dissimilar pair might 
well be correct for a less dissimilar pair also. 
Accordingly these two modifications, asking for differences as 
well as for similarities and presenting the problems sometimes in order 
of increasing dissimilarity and sometimes the reverse, are introduced 
to the procedure used in the experiment reported in this chapter. Verbal 
presentation only is used, as pictorial presentation was explored 
in the 
previous chapter and it had certain disadvantages, such as 
the necessity 
to choose easily portrayable items, although this 
did not eliminate un- 
certainty as to how the pictures were identified 
by the subjects, and 
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the children's tendency to give trivial similarities or category 
names in response. One other disadvantage of pictorial presentation, 
that events can only be portrayed by portraying the objects parti- 
cipating in them, is irrelevant to the present study as they are not 
included in the problems used. Comparisons involving events were 
found to be extremely difficult and they might well be disconcerting 
if presented first in a series of problems increasing in similarity 
between the items compared. 
Asking for differences raises a difficulty in the phrasing of 
the question. The obvious forms corresponding to those used for 
similarities are 'What's different about A and B? ' and 'Can you tell 
me something that's different about A and B ?f The difficulty with 
this is that it is known that some pre-school children respond to 
tdifferentt much as they do to tsame' (Donaldson and Wales 1970). 
Using 'not the same' in place of 'different' might be thought an 
improvement but 'What's not the same about A and B? ' does not trip off 
the tongue so readily and may raise problems associated with negative 
sentences. Negative sentences are not used naturally without some 
reason (Wason 1965) and questions employing them might appear as trick 
questions. In general, it cannot be assumed that a question using 'not 
the same' is equivalent to one using 'different'. As most of the 
development in handling ClaparedeIs task occurs within the school age 
range it seems better to use this age group and employ the simple form 
of question with 'different'. Although children of this age might be 
expected to interpret 'different' correctly some assessment of their 
understanding will be necessary. 
There are two predictions concerning the results of this experiment 
corresponding to the two modifications introduced. 
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1. Differences are easier to give on demand than similarities. 
There are possible exceptions to this prediction. It was 
suggested in the previous chapter that the tendency to give differences 
when similarities were requested might be a result of comparisons 
being made across basic level categories. If a comparison was between 
two members of the same basic level category it might be easier to 
give a similarity than a difference between them, and a similarity might 
be given in answer even when a difference was requested. In this 
experiment the bee-wasp comparison dropped from Claparede's series 
previously is reinstated and other comparisons between very similar 
items are also used. These comparisons might be within basic level 
categories, at least for the younger subjects. 
2. It is easier to give similarities when problems are presented in 
order of increasing, rather than decreasing, similarity, the reverse 
being true for differences. 
In general the findings of the present experiment are expected to 
be similar to those of the previous one. If it is easiest to give 
similarities between the most similar pairs of items it might be expected 
to be easiest to give differences between the most dissimilar pairs. 
However it seems intuitively to the writer that any comparison, whether 
of similarity or of difference, might be easier when made between 
similar items, so no prediction is made concerning this. The content 
of the children's answers will not be examined at as much length as in 
the previous chapter, but similarities and differences will be com- 
pared. 
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Method. 
Subjects. 
The subjects were 63 children falling into three age groups as 
follows: 
Group No. of subjects 
11 23 
J2 20 
J3 20 
Age range 
4yrs9mo-6yrs3mo 
6 yrs 3 mo -8 yrs 2 mo 
7 yrs 1 mo -8 yrs 10 mo 
Mean age 
5 yrs 8 mo 
6 yrs 10 mo 
7yrs 10mo 
The three groups consist of three classes of an independent 
school. All children present in these classes were tested. A 21st 
subject in J3 was tested but his responses are not included as he was 
not a native English speaker and appeared to have difficulty in under- 
standing the task. 
Materials. 
There were four series of problems, each consisting of comparisons 
of one standard item with six other items. The items follow, the 
standard being given on the left in each case. 
Series A B 
Bee Wasp Orange Lemon 
Fly Apple 
Bird Potato 
Rabbit Daffodil 
Rose Butterfly 
Stone Brush 
C 
Daisy Buttercup 
Bluebell 
Tree 
Mushroom 
Sparrow 
River 
D 
Crab Lobster 
Starfish 
Goldfish 
Dog 
Grass 
Sun 
VJý 
Method. 
Each child was tested individually in a caravan parked in the 
school grounds. All four series of problems were presented to each 
child, similarities being requested for two of them and differences 
for the other two and two being given in order of increasing dis- 
similarity and two the reverse. Both series with one instruction 
('same' or 'different') were presented before either with the other 
instruction and the order of 'increasing' and 'decreasing' conditions 
was kept the same for both instructions, giving rise to four possible 
orders for the various conditions. As there are 24 possible orderings 
of series A-D there are 96 combinations of materials with conditions 
altogether and a different one was chosen at random for each subject. 
Instructions and prompts were given as for the experiment described 
in the previous chapter, with the substitution of 'different' for 
'the samet where appropriate. 
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Results. 
Sample protocols. 
Appendix 3: 1 contains three sample protocols, one from each age 
group, which give some idea of the quality of testing sessions. Colin, 
the youngest child, is one of the poorer performers generally and 
(to anticipate) appears to think that 'different' means 'same'. 
Victoria, in J2, falls at about the median in terms of correct answers 
and William, the oldest subject to be included in the appendix, is one 
of the better performers to be tested. 
Number of problems attempted. 
As with the previous experiment, not all children attempted all 
problems. The mean scores and ranges for numbers of problems attempted 
by the different age groups are given in Table 3: 1. 
Same Different Total 
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range 
J1 11.1 9- 12 11.5 6- 12 22.6 16 - 2L. 
J2 11.7 11 - 12 12.0 12 23.7 23 - 24 
J3 11.7 11 - 12 12.0 12 23.7 23 - 24 
Overall 11.5 11.8 
Table 3: 1. Number of problems attempted. 
23.3 
The number of problems attempted was generally high. In all, 
39 subjects, or 62% of the total, took all 24 problems, this number 
being made up of 12 from Jl (52%), 13 from J2 (65%) and 14 from J3 
(70%). 
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The age effect for number of problems attempted is statistically 
significant only for the ? different' problems: Kruskal-Wallis one-way 
analysis of variance, 'same' problems, H=3.77, df = 2, n. s., 
'different? problems, H=7.30, df = 2, p x. 05. Obviously this is a 
difference between the youngest group and the other two, and a signi- 
ficant result was only obtained because there is no variance within 
the older two groups. 
Of the 24 subjects who did not attempt all 24 problems, 21 took 
more ? different' problems than 'same' ones, one the reverse and two 
took the same number for each. 
Words not known by the subjects. 
Unfortunately there are some problems which were administered to 
the children which were effectively not taken by them because they did 
not know the words for one of the involved items. The numbers of such 
cases are given in Table 3: 2. As can be seen the only serious problem 
arises with series 4 but then it is serious indeed. Over a third of 
all the children, and half of those in Jl, did not know the term 
tlobstert. One child in J2, after not responding throughout series L, 
Jl J2 J3 Total 
Series 1 Rose 1 - -1 
Series 2 Lemon - 1 -1 
Series 3 Bluebell - - 11 
Series 4 Crab - 1 -1 
Lobster 12 8 3 23 
Starfish 3 1 -4 
Table 3: 2. Numbers of children ignorant of certain words. 
was found not to understand the word 'crab'! If instances 
in which a 
term was not understood are also counted as problems not taken, 
the 
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number of subjects attempting all 24 problems is reduced to 30, or 
48% of the total, made up of 7 children in Jl (30%), 10 in J2 (50%) 
and 13 in J3 (65%). 
Number of correct responses by instruction and order of problems. 
As in the previous chapter, the subjects' responses were classi- 
fied as similarities, differences, relations and no responses. The 
effects of the new modifications introduced in this chapter, asking 
for differences as well as similarities and presenting the problems in 
order of both increasing and decreasing similarity will be considered 
first. Figure 3: 1 shows the proportions of the different kinds of 
answer given and indicates that 'different' problems were much easier 
than ? same? ones. Of the 30 subjects taking all 24 problems, 26 
obtained a higher score for the 'different' problems, 3 scored 100% 
on both 'same' and ' different t problems and 1 scored 12/12 for 'same' 
and 11/12 for 'different'. Taking into account all 63 subjects and 
using the proportion of problems attempted which were appropriately 
answered as the measure, 58 children perform better on the 'different' 
problems than on the 'same' ones and in addition to the four exceptions 
noted above, one child scored zero on both types of problem. 
It is clear that 'different' problems are much easier than 'same' 
ones overall but the question of whether or not this is true for the 
most similar pairs is still to be addressed. Figure 3: 2 shows the pro- 
portions of correct responses for the various problems. It seems to 
have been easier to give a similarity than a difference in answer 
to 
two problems, Al (bee-wasp) and Dl (crab-lobster). The 
bee-wasp 
comparison was attempted by almost all subjects. Twenty-eight subjects 
out of the 30 who attempted it as a 'same I problem or 
93% were 
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Figure 3: 2. Percentage correct responses to the different 
problems, for all subjects and for subsample. 
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successful in giving a similarity compared with 26 out of 31, or 8L%, 
as a 'different' problem. The percentage of correct responses is 
higher for similarities in all three age groups but even the difference 
between the totals is not large enough to be statistically significant. 
Fewer children attempted the crab-lobster comparison. In this case 
22 out of 23 or 96% were successful in giving similarities and 15 out 
of 17 or 88% gave differences on request, this difference being 
entirely due to a difference in J3. Only for one other age group/ 
problem combination is there any evidence for similarities being 
easier and there the difference is negligible. Eight out of 13 
children in Jl, or 62%, give similarities between an orange and an 
apple (problem B2) on request compared to 6 out of 10 for differences. 
The question of whether it is easier to take the problems in order 
of increasing or decreasing similarity for each instruction can only be 
assessed using the group of 30 subjects who took all 24 problems as 
those not attempted by the other subjects would be likely to differ in 
difficulty between increasing and decreasing series. Table 3: 3 gives 
the mean number of correct responses (i. e. similarities for 'same' 
problems and differences for ? different' problems) made by this group 
in the different conditions and the results of Wilcoxon matched pairs 
signed - ranks tests on the differences between the conditions. 
(1-tailed) 
Increasing Decreasing NTZp 
dissimilarity dissimilarity 
Same 3.8 4.3 17 32.5 - <" 05 
Different 6. o 5.8 5 0 2.02 <. 05 
Table 3: 3. Mean number of correct responses by condition and results 
of Wilcoxon tests. 
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The usual tables for the Wilcoxon test (e. g. Siegel 1956) require a 
minimum N of 6 while in this case only 5 children failed to score 100% 
on both ? different' series. The method of testing significance for 
large samples, using aZ score, was therefore used as this is said to 
be a good approximation even for small samples (Siegel op. cit. ). It 
does then seem that as predicted it is easier to take Isamet problems 
in order of decreasing dissimilarity and 'different' problems in order 
of increasing dissimilarity. 
Understanding of 'different'. 
At this point the possibility that 'different' problems appear 
to be easier than 'same' ones because of a misunderstanding will be 
considered. As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter young 
children (typically those younger than the ones employed in this study) 
tend to respond to IdifferentI as if it means Isame I. When asked to 
give similarities children quite often give differences, as found by 
Claparede and in this study and the one reported in the previous 
chapter, the extent of this tendency being underestimated by the results 
as presented in this work as some similarities were given after the 
experimenter had rejected differences. It might be that some children, 
hearing a request for something 'different', believe they have been 
asked for something he same' and then give a difference because that 
is their wont when asked for a similarity, and thus there is a case of 
two wrongs apparently making a right. In Appendix 3: 2 to this chapter 
the evidence for the children's understanding of 'different' is con- 
sidered, giving the conclusions shown in Table 3: 4" 
"U 
J1 J2 J3 Total 
Understand 'different' 16 20 19 55 
Treat ' diff erent t as 'same' 3 0 1 4 
Other 4 0 0 4 
23 20 20 63 
Table 3: 4. Numbers of subjects who do and do not understand I different I. 
The children classified as 'other' are those who cannot certainly 
be said to fall into either of the other two categories, and may fall 
into neither of them, because they do not understand 'different' but 
do not treat it as if it meant 'same'. Even if all eight children who 
do not obviously have a correct understanding of 'different' treat it 
as meaning 'same' this is not sufficient to account for the difference 
in difficulty between 'same' and ? different? problems actually obtained. 
We may now consider whether various findings reported in the 
previous chapter are repeated here. 
Age and number of correct responses. 
Firstly, it might be expected that the older children would give 
more correct responses than the younger ones. Figure 3: 1 suggests a 
small age effect for the whole group but not for the subsample of 30 
subjects. The small size of the latter sample makes it more susceptible 
to the influence of individual subjects and it also includes a more 
highly selected group of younger children than of older ones, which 
would be likely to diminish any age effect. In order 
to test for age 
effects, Kruskal-Wallis analyses of variance were performed on 
the 
whole sample, using proportion of attempted problems correctly 
answered 
as the measure, and on two separate subsamples, 
those who had taken all 
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'same' problems and those who had taken all 'different' problems as 
appropriate. Table 3: 5 gives the outcome of these analyses. 
H df p 
Same 36 subjects (11 Jl, 11 J2) 14 J3) 0.91.2 n. s. 
All subjects 7.61 2 <. 05 
Different 46 subjects (13 J1,17 J2,16 J3) 1.17 2 n. s. 
All subjects 2.74 2 n. s. 
Table 3: 5. Results of Kruskal-Wallis analyses of variance for age effects 
on number of correct responses. 
So only for the whole sample and for 'same' problems is there a 
statistically significant age effect. There is probably a ceiling 
effect for 'different' problems and the use of the subsample of 36 
taking all 'same' problems is subject to the difficulties outlined 
above. 
Problems not attempted by all subjects. 
The one significant age effect found is only meaningful if the 
problems taken by the younger children are not, on average, more 
difficult than those taken by the older subjects. This can only be 
assessed if it is known which problems are omitted and how relatively 
difficult they are. The former information is given in Table 3: 6. 
Level of dissimilarity 
1234 56 
Same 91 99 "99 98 94 
80 
Different 58 94 . 99 99 97 
98 
The problems in each series are numbered from 1 
(most similar) to 
6 (most dissimilar) 
Table 3: 6. Percentage of problems at each level of similarity attempted 
by subjects as a whole. 
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For 'same' problems it is, if anything, the more dissimilar 
pairs which are not attempted, though the effects of problems omitted 
because of unknown words and the two different orders of presentation 
make this much less striking than in the previous experiment. For 
'different' problems it tends to be the most similar pairs which are 
not attempted. 
Difficulty of problems by level of similarity. 
Figure 3: 2 shows the proportion of correct responses given to 
the different problems both for the whole sample and for the sub- 
sample of 30 subjects. The latter group performs somewhat better but 
otherwise there is not much difference between the two groups. Spearman 
rank correlation coefficients between the level of similarity and degree 
of difficulty of the problems summed over all 4 series are presented in 
Table 3: 7. The correlations are computed for the subgroup of 30 sub- 
jects to provide a set of coefficients which are comparable with each 
other but also on all subjects who attempt all problems in the approp- 
riate series as a form of check on the representativeness of the former 
sample. The two sets of correlations are similar 
(except for the 
'different; decreasing' condition, where all 30 subjects in the smaller 
sample score 100%) which increases confidence. The more similar pairs 
are easier to find similarities for than the less similar, as expected, 
while for differences it makes no difference. 
Unsurprisingly it seems that the problems more likely to be 
omitted are the more difficult ones, if anything. 
The age effect 
previously reported is then an underestimate rather 
than otherwise as 
the problems taken by the younger children are easier, on average, 
than those taken by the older ones. 
VJ4"1 
30 subjects 
r sp 
Same, decreasing similarity - . 72 4.001 
Same, increasing similarity - . 83 <. 001 
Different, decreasing similarity 0 nos. 
Different, increasing similarity - 0.09 n. s. 
All subjects 
completing series 
rP 
s 
- . 
86 x . 001 
- . 83 (. 001 
. 39 n. s. 
. 07 n. s. 
Tests on 'same' series are 1-tailed, those on 'different' series are 
2-tailed. 
Table 3: 7. Spearman rank correlation coefficients on level of 
similarity and degree of difficulty. 
Differences given when similarities were requested and vice versa. 
The previous experiment found that some children gave both 
similarities and differences in answer to tsamet questions and that, 
not surprisingly, these children gave the similarities in answer to 
the easier problems, that is, the more similar pairs. In this experi- 
ment 30 children gave both similarities and differences in responding 
to ? same' problems and as some did so in both the increasing and the 
decreasing conditions, there are in all 42 series of answers containing 
both similarities and differences. Of these, 22 had all the similarities 
given to more similar pairs than any of the differences, 18 were mixed 
and 2 had all the differences given to the more similar pairs. 
In the present experiment there is of course also the possibility 
of giving similarities in answer to 'different' questions, though such 
answers were less common than the reverse case, even as a proportion of 
errors. Of answers to 'same' questions, 15% of the total and 30% of 
the errors (i. e. the non-similarities) are differences, while only 1.5% 
of the responses and 20% of errors given to I different' questions are 
Oki 
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similarities. Eight subjects each produced one series of answers 
containing both similarities and differences. Five of these had all 
the similarities given to more similar pairs than any of the differences 
and the other three were mixed. This is not statistically significant 
using a 2-tailed sign test and although the direction of the result is 
extremely plausible it was not specifically predicted. 
As only eleven similarities were given when differences were 
requested it is possible to examine them in more detail. Four of 
them were given by one child, who was one of those who did not clearly 
understand 'different' and may have believed similarities were expected. 
The remaining seven were given by seven different children, two in Jl, 
four in J2 and one in J3, all of whom did understand 'different'. Three 
of their similarities were to the same problem: the bee-wasp comparison. 
This is some evidence that this comparison may be within a basic level 
category for some subjects. Six of the seven were given when the pro- 
blems were taken in order of increasing similarity, and four of these 
cases seem to be instances of perseveration, an answer such as 'black 
and yellow stripes' which has previously been a difference being per- 
sisted in even when no longer correct. The one similarity given when 
the problems were presented in order of decreasing similarity was to 
the first 'different' question asked, following the 'same' problems 
and so also hints at perseveration. 
Responses to binary comparisons. 
Claparede reported that binary comparison questions were easier 
to answer than simple ones and the study described in the previous 
chapter supported this. The same is found here, for answers to 'same' 
questions: 31 subjects found the binary comparisons easier and only 18 
Výý 
the simple ones, this difference being statistically significant (sign 
test, Z=1.71, p <. 05). Only eight children answered binary comparison 
'different' questions, and these only answered one to three each, and 
there is no indication whether or not they are simpler than the corres- 
ponding simple questions. 
Relations. 
As in the previous study, a small number of responses fell into 
the category of relations, as shown in Table 3: 8. The subjects who 
give relations in answer to 'different' problems are not among those 
who give them in answer to 'same' problems. Also as in the previous 
study, these answers are not evenly distributed across problems, as 
Table 3: 9 indicates. 
Same Different 
No. of subjects No. of relations No. of subjects No. of relations 
Jl 14 14 13 
J2 7 11 11 
J3 1100 
Total 12 16 2 1ý 
Table 3: 8. Number of subjects giving relations and number of relations 
given. 
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No. of relations 
Problem Same Different Total 
Bee - bird 0 1 1 
Bee - rabbit 1 1 2 
Bee - rose 5 0 5 
Bee - stone 1 1 2 
Orange - butterfly 1 0 1 
Daisy - sparrow 1 0 1 
Daisy - river 14. O 4 
Crab - starfish 1 0 1 
Crab - dog 1 0 1 
Crab - sun 1 1 2 
Total 16 4 20 
Table 3: 9. Number of relations given by problem. 
Analysis by content of answers. 
Tables 3: 10,3: 11 and 3: 12 show the similarities given when 
requested, the differences given when requested and the differences 
given when similarities were requested classified according to 
similar general categories to those used in the previous chapter. 
There were too few similarities given when differences were requested 
to make tabulating them a useful exercise. Similarly the answers 
are not categorised separately for each problem as the numbers of 
responses given to many of the problems are rather small. 
pý ý1 
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J1 No. 
J2 No. 
J3 No. 
Total No. 
Category 
names 
3 
3 
2 
2 
10 
7 
15 
4 
Physical 
properties Motion 
48 6 
L. 7 6 
31.5 12 
28 11 
51.5 19.5 
36 14 
131 37.5 
37 11 
Common Similar 
part part 
25.5 - 
25 - 
28.5 2 
26 2 
22 7 
15 5 
76 9 
21 3 
Habitat Other 
1 18.5 102 
1 18 
17 18 111 
15 16 
17.5 14.5 142 
12 10 
35.5 51 355 
10 14 
Table 3: 10. Content of similarities given when requested. 
If Table 3: 10 is compared with the figures given in Table 2: 8 
for verbal presentation, to which it corresponds, it can be seen that 
physical properties were given more often, and answers citing motion 
and similarity of parts less often, than previously. The difference 
in the motion category is probably due to the different content of the 
problems but reasons for the other differences are not clear. Apparent 
differences between the age groups are difficult to assess because the 
contributions made by particular problems are not consistent. However 
there is no evidence of the decline with age of answers citing physical 
properties which was found previously. 
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Category Physical Different 
names properties Motion parts 
J1 No. 4.5 139.33 16 30.33 
% 2 63 7 14 
J2 No. 8.83 100 19.83 43 
% 4 45 9 19 
J3 No. 20 88 24 38 
% 9 39 11 17 
Total No. 33.33 327.33 59.83 111.33 
% 5 149 9 17 
Habitat Other 
3 28.83 
1 13 
3.5 46.83 
2 21 
7 50 
3 22 
13.5 125.67 
2 19 
Table 3: 11. Content of differences given when requested. 
Category Physical Different 
names properties Motion parts Habitat Other 
il No. - 35.5 1 6 1 10.5 
% - 66 2 11 2 19 
J2 No. 1 31 2.25 18.25 2 20.5 
% 1 41 3 24 3 27 
J3 No. 2 16.5 4 4.5 2 5 
% 6 49 12 13 6 15 
Total No. 3 83 7.25 28.75 5 36 
% 2 51 L1. 18 3 22 
Table 3: 12. Content of differences given when similarities were 
requested. 
In tables 3: 11 and 3: 12 a single category ? different parts' re- 
places 1common part' and 'similar part'. Almost all answers included 
in this category asserted that one item had a part which the other 
222 
222 
227 
671 
54 
75 
34 
163 
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lacked, such as Victoria's 'A mushroom has not got petals' and other 
answers. Most answers comparing the parts of items such as Victoria's 
ýA daisy has got white petals and a buttercup has got yellow' are 
included in the physical properties category but there are a few 
exceptions, for instance a comparison of the crab's claws with the 
sun's beams, which fall under the heading of different parts. 
The proportions of responses falling into the various categories 
in Tables 3: 11 and 3: 12 are very similar. Physical properties stand 
out even more than they do for similarities, half the responses falling 
into this category. Table 3: 11 suggests that for differences these 
answers do decline in importance with age. 
Physical properties further considered. 
As the category of physical properties accounts for such a large 
proportion of the answers given in this study it is worthwhile to 
examine it further. Almost all the answers in this category cited the 
properties colour, shape and size although others such as pattern and 
hardness were also mentioned. Table 3: 13 shows the numbers and pro- 
portions of similarities and differences given on request which refer to 
colour, shape and size. 
Similarities 
Jl J2 J3 Overall 
Colour 20(20) 11(122) 13(182) 
1(152) 18(25) 
14(51) 
Shape 25(26) 
Size 1(1) 
Total ! 6(L 7) 
J1 
314( 7 L. l6) 
19(662) 3(6) 
Differences 
J2 J3 Overall 
27(602) 19(42) 26(1773) 
(9) 8(172) 5(322) 
2(22) 3(4) 2(72) 2L(532) 12(262) 10(222) 15(1022) 
27(302) 33(472) 35(125) 61(1343) 43(96) 36(82) 47(3123) 
Figures given are percentages of responses made by the group in question, 
with the absolute number of responses in parentheses. 
Table 3: 13. Responses citing colour, shape and size. 
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Size is rarely cited as a similarity and shape as a difference 
while colour is quite commonly mentioned as both, but especially as 
a difference. It is surprising that these three properties should 
account for a higher proportion of differences than of similarities 
as a greater variety of differences was offered by the children - 
an average of 9.4 appropriate differences per problem, compared with 
only 6.0 appropriate similarities. This greater variety is probably 
just a result of the larger number of correct responses given to 
'different? problems, but it does highlight the concentration on 
physical properties. 
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Discussion. 
It is clear from the results of this experiment that the 
children find it very much easier to give differences between items 
on request than to give similarities. Indeed, giving differences is 
so easy that the children do so for over 90% of the 'different' 
problems they attempt and this very high level of performance makes 
it difficult for any effects of age, condition (increasing versus 
decreasing similarity) and so on to make themselves felt. Consequently 
it is impossible to determine in any instance whether the lack of an 
effect is due to the near ceiling performance, or whether there would 
be no such effect in any case. 
Two problems, the bee-wasp and crab-lobster comparisons, elicited 
a higher proportion of similarities on request than of differences. 
This is taken as evidence, though certainly not conclusive evidence, 
that these pairs of items are each members of the same basic level 
category for at least some of the subjects. The bee-wasp comparison 
was the only problem to elicit more than one similarity when a difference 
was requested and this strengthens the case that this comparison is 
often within a basic level category. No similarities were given for 
the crab-lobster comparison when presented as a 'different' problem. 
In general differences offered appear to be similar to similarities 
in content, though general physical properties were more commonly 
given as differences. This was especially true for colour and size, 
while shape was more commonly given as a similarity. The differences 
cited did not vary in their content whether given when requested, or 
in error when the question asked for a similarity. 
As for the other manipulation introduced in this chapter it turns 
out that as hypothesised it is easier to give similarities 
between 
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items if the problems are presented in order of increasing similarity 
rather than the reverse, while the converse is true for differences. 
Other than these results, the findings reported in this chapter 
are much the same as those of the previous one and those reported by 
Claparede (1918). Age effects are scarce: it has already been noted 
that if only children who attempt all problems are considered they 
are most highly selected from the younger children whereas if the 
whole sample is employed the younger children's answers are averaged 
over easier problems than those of the older ones, both these tending 
to depress any age effect in the data, and there is also the ceiling 
effect for Idifferentt problems. It only remains to be noted here 
that there is a considerable overlap in age between J2 and J3 and 
this may also have an influence in lessening any difference between the 
groups of different average age. 
The findings of this and the previous experiment enable a descrip- 
tion of what occurs when, -a child is asked to compare two items to be 
attempted. 
Firstly it seems to make a difference whether or not the items 
are instances of the same basic level (b. l. ) category for the child. 
This is suggested by the particular easiness of the bee-fly com- 
parison found in the previous experiment and the findings concerning 
the bee-wasp comparison in this one. As suggested in the previous 
chapter, if a similarity is asked for between two items which are 
members of the same b. l. category then the child will effectively con- 
ceive of them as identical and rather than having to abstract a 
property common to two categories, simply cites a property of one. 
If 
the items to be compared are not instances of the same b. l. category 
then the child does have to find a property common to two items which 
he conceives of differently. That is, he has to unite 
them in some 
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common category, even if it is only defined by the characteristic he 
cites as a similarity. This common category is in no way given to 
him: he must create it. It seems to be more difficult to create such 
a category if the items are more dissimilar: this may well be because 
of the remoteness of it from the basic level, or it could simply be 
because there are fewer similarities and therefore fewer possible 
common categories. 
If the child is asked for a difference between items which he 
conceives of differently, i. e. which are members of different b. 1. 
categories for him the problem is again very easy as the answer arises 
directly from his way of thinking of the items. It is more difficult 
if the items are members of the same b. l. category but it is reasonable 
to suppose that it is still easier than finding a similarity across 
b. l. categories because the appropriate categories are given to him, 
defined by the terms naming the items, and he does not have to create 
them for himself. Since most 'different' comparisons required were 
certainly across b. l. categories it is not surprising that no differences 
in level of difficulty due to degree of dissimilarity were found. 
This account suggests why binary comparisons should be easier 
than simple ones. If a child is asked whether A is more like B or C. 
various properties distinguishing B from C are likely to come to mind. 
He has then only to find a category defined by one of these properties 
of which A is a member. Effectively, binary comparison questions are 
hints as to the common category to be formed between two items. 
Taking the 'same' problems in order of increasing similarity 
rather than the reverse may be easier for a similar reason, at least 
in part. If a child has compared, for instance, a bee and a stone and 
is then asked to find a similarity between a bee and a rose he may be 
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able to use an implicit binary comparison and look for something uniting 
the bee and the rose and distinguishing them both from the stone. This 
is much more likely to succeed than if he were going in the opposite 
direction and, say, looking for something in common between a bee and 
a fly in which both differ from a wasp. In this case, if asked for a 
difference, remembrance of the wasp could enable the child to think of 
some common property between the bee and the wasp, distinguishing them 
from the fly. In general this is less likely to be of help than the 
corresponding process with similarities as it is likely to be easier 
to give a difference directly than by the intervention of a similarity. 
Not every response given by the children in these experiments is 
in conformity with the above account but this should probably not be 
expected. It does not predict any errors for 'different' comparisons 
across b. l. categories, and the few similarities given in such cases 
are quite unaccountable effects of the usual variability of young 
children's performance. 'No responses' to 'different' comparisons may 
be the result of the children having incomplete entries for some of 
their concepts, so that both items in a comparison are never ascribed 
different values for the same property. This is hinted at by answers 
such as Colin's 'Because the starfish is brown and the crab is bigger' 
which occur occasionally in the data. Perhaps his concept of a star- 
fish is marked with a value for colour and not size and vice versa for 
a crab, or only these properties are momentarily accessible. Most 
children attempted to cite a contrast with respect to a single property 
and a child who could not find such a contrast but was unwilling 
to 
offer a compound answer such as Colin's would be 
forced into a 'no 
response'. 
The results suggest a degree of inflexibility in the children's 
thinking. There is a notable tendency to try to use the same property 
10-1, 
e. g. colour, throughout a series of problems and sometimes throughout 
more than one series. This is an economical strategy where effective 
but sometimes leads to error. This phenomenon was given as a reason 
for predicting that it would be easier to take similarity comparisons 
in order of increasing similarity and different comparisons in the 
reverse order, and it may be the only reason why the decreasing order 
is easier for differences. 
The children also seem to be dominated to a considerable degree 
by the properties colour, shape and size. Many of the similarities 
citing these are tenuous, such as that an orange is orange, a lemon is 
yellow and orange and yellow match, or that an orange is round and a 
brush+s handle is round. Shape was mentioned more commonly as a 
similarity than a difference, possibly because it is seen as an 
essential characteristic of an object and the children reasoned that 
if the experimenter believed there to be some similarity between the 
items there must be a similarity of shape. Colour and size, on the 
other hand, are common distinguishing features between objects which 
are basically of the same type (and consequently of the same or 
similar shape). 
This kind of inflexibility and domination by a few properties, 
and the tendency to give differences when similarities are asked for, 
and also, rarely, the converse, suggest that the children are not 
always in active control of their thought processes. These processes 
seem to have a momentum of their own which leads to 
the production of the 
more blatant errors. Learning to direct the contents of 
their own aware- 
ness would not in itself lead the children to perfect performance 
but 
would enable them to avoid the mysterious errors of early childhood. 
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Appendix 3: 1. Sample protocols. 
Colin 5: 6 J1 
Same - decreasing similarit 
Orange Lemon (NR) N 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Apple (NR) N 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Lemon or Apple (Lemon) Because it's sour. (Is an orange sour? ) No. D 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Potato (NR) N 
Apple or Potato (Potato) Because the orange is juicy. (And a potato? ) 
Because the potato is plain 
(Prompt) (NR) 
(Daffodil) (NR, ) 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Lemon or Daffodil? (Daffodil) Because it's plain, because you can't 
eat it. 
Same - increasing similarity 
Daisy River 
(Prompt) 
Sp arrow 
(Prompt) 
River or Sparrow 
(Prompt) 
Mushroom 
(Prompt) 
(NR) 
(ER) 
(KR) 
(NR) 
(Sparrow) (NR) 
(ER) 
(NR) 
(NR) 
D 
N 
D 
N 
N 
N 
N 
0 
-, lýý 
River or Mushroom? 
(Prompt) 
Tree 
(Prompt) 
Sparrow or Tree? 
(Prompt) 
Bluebell 
(Prompt) 
Buttercup 
(Prompt) 
Buttercup or river? 
(prompt) 
(Mushroom) (NR) 
(NR) 
(NR) 
(NR) 
(Tree) Because the tree, of the tree trunk 
is brown. (And a daisy? ) Because the daisy 
is yellow. 
(NR) 
(NR) 
(ER) 
(NR) 
(NR) 
(Buttercup) Because the buttercup is blue. 
(NR) 
N 
rd 
D 
N 
N 
D 
Different - decreasing similarity. 
Bee Wasp Because the bee is smaller and the wasp is 
a wee bit bigger. D 
Fly (NR) N 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Bird Because the bird is big and the bee is small. D 
Rabbit (NR) N 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Fly or rabbit? (Rabbit) I Cos the r abbit is big and the bee 
is small. D 
Rose (NR) N 
Fly or rose? (Rose) Because the rose is big and the bee 
is small. D 
Stone Because the bee is small and the stone is big. D 
lÜ7` 
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Different - increasing similarity. 
Crab Sun 'Cos the crab is small and the sun is bigger 
than the crab. D 
Grass 'Cos the grass is small and the crab is big, 
sometime s. D 
Dog Because the dog is bigger and the crab is smaller. D 
Goldfish The crab is bigger and the goldfish is smaller. D 
Starfish Because the starfish is brown and the crab is 
bigger. D .' 
Lobster Because the lobster's big and the crab is a 
wee bit smaller. D 
iÜ8 
Victoria 6: 11 J2 
Different - increasing similarity. 
Orange Brush The or - the brush has got spikes and an 
orange hasn't. 
Butterfly A butterfly can fly but an orange can't. 
Daffodil A daf -a daffodil's got a stem but a orange 
hasn't. 
Potato Orange is more rounder than that and a potato 
grows up in the ground. 
Apple An apple is green and a orange is orange. 
Lemon A lemon is like that (indicating shape) but an 
orange is completely round. 
Different - decreasing similarity. 
Daisy Buttercup A daisy has got white petals and a buttercup has 
got yellow 
Bluebell A bluebell is more bigger than a daisy. 
Tree A daisy's much more smaller than a tree. 
Mushroom A mushroom has not got petals. 
Sparrow A sparrow can fly but a daisy can't. 
River A river is blue and a daisy isn't. 
Same - increasing similarity. 
Bee Stone (NR) 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Rose (NR) 
(Prompt) (NR) 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
N 
N 
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Stone or rose? (Stone) Cos it's more smaller. (i. e. bee and 
stone are similarly small. ) S 
Rabbit (NR) N 
Rose or rabbit? (Rabbit) Because - (rose) (NR) N 
Bird They can both fly. S 
Fly They can both fly and they're both small. S 
Wasp They both make honey. S 
Same - decreasing similarity 
Crab Lobster Both have got things that they hurt people with. S 
Starfish They've both got eight legs, well they've both 
got lots and lots of legs. S 
Goldfish They both live under water. S 
Dog (NR) N 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Grass (NR) N 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Dog or grass? (Grass) Because it's smaller S 
Sun (NR) N 
(Prompt) (NR) 
Dog or sun? (Dog) 'Cos they both live on the ground. S 
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William 7: 9 J3 
Different - decreasing similarity. 
Orange Lemon An orange is orange and a lemon is yellow. D 
Apple An orange is orange and an apple's green. D 
Potato An orange is orange and a potato is yellow. D 
Daffodil A daffodil's a flower and an orange is a fruit. D 
Butterfly A butterfly is something that flies and an orange 
is a fruit. D 
Brush A brush is s omething you comb your hair with and 
an orange is a fruit. D 
Different - increasing similarity. 
Bee Stone A bee flies, a stone doesn't. 
Rose A bee flies, a flower doesn't. 
Rabbit A bee flies, a rabbit doesn't. 
Bird A bee is smaller than a bird. 
Fly A bee takes honey from flowers and a fly doesn't. 
Wasp A bee takes honey from flowers and a wasp doesn't. 
Same - decreasing similarity. 
Crab Lobster They both live in the sea 
Starfish They both live in the sea. 
Goldfish They both live in the sea. 
Dog A crab's got a body, so has a dog. 
Grass They're both near the sea. 
Sun (NR) 
(Prompt) (VR) 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D- 
D 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
N 
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Same - increasing similarity. 
Daisy River 
Sp arrow 
Mushroom 
Tree 
Bluebell 
Buttercup 
They're lots 
in lots of p: 
They're both 
They're both 
They're both 
They're both 
They're both 
of, they're both, they're both 
Laces. 
small. 
small. 
plants. 
flowers. 
flowers. 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
S 
I 4w 
Appendix 3: 2. Understanding of the term 'different'. 
In order to perform successfully in the task employed in this 
chapter the subjects must understand the instructions and in particular 
the terms 'same' and 'different'. It is assumed that the similarity 
question is understood but such an assumption would seem unwarranted 
in the case of the difference comparison question. Evidence for the 
children's understanding based simply on their scores in the current 
task, rather than the original protocols, is unclear. The experimenter 
prompted subjects who gave differences in answer to similarity questions 
but not to difference questions and vice versa for similarities, and 
this is likely to affect their subsequent behaviour. As it happens, 
each of the subjects also performed one of two further tasks, and the 
evidence from these is more clear cut. As they are reported more 
fully in Chapter 6 these tasks are only briefly described here. 
Judgement task. 
32 subjects attempted the task. On trials considered here they 
were presented with two cards on each of which was a geometric 
figure. 
The two figures might be the same in all of colour, shape and pattern 
or they might be different in all three. On eight trials 
the subject 
was asked whether the two were the same or not and on eight 
trials 
whether they were different or not. Only 20 subjects 
C5 in Jl, 7 in 
J2 and 8 in J3) showed 100% performance in this apparently simple 
task 
and so a lesser criterion of at least 14 out of 
16 correct responses 
was adopted as showing that the child understood 
the terms. The 
results are given in Table 3: 114. 
1 ti 
J1 J2 J3 
At least 14/16 correct 9 9 9 27 
8/8 for 'same' judgements, 
0/8 for ' different ' judgements 2 0 1 3 
Other 2 0 0 2 
13 9 10 32 
Table 3: 14. Numbers of subjects showing different response patterns in 
judgement task. 
The three subjects who score 100% for 'same' judgements but zero 
for 'different' judgements are treating the two sets of questions 
identically - that is, they respond as if 'different' meant 'same'. One of the 
two subjects in the 'other' category scored 8/8 for 'same' and 4. /8 for 
'different and probably does not understand the latter term, and the other 
scored 5/8 for 'same' and 2/8 for 'different' and may have had some 
trouble in understanding the task in general. 
Matching task. 
This task was performed by the remaining 31 subjects. On each 
trial the subject was presented with a card showing six different birds 
and required to select another card either the 'same' as or 'different' 
from it from among eleven further cards. One of these was identical 
to the target, four had four bird pictures in common with it, four had 
two birds in common and two were entirely different. Thus only one 
card of the eleven can definitely be said to be an incorrect choice in 
response to ? different' trials and only two for 'same' trials. There 
were six trials given to each subject for each instruction. A child 
was considered to show a correct understanding of 'different' if he 
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satisfied the following three criteria: he responded on all trials, 
he made no unambiguously wrong response on either 'same' or 'different' 
trials (the probability of satisfying this criterion by chance is . 17) 
and the mean number of birds in common between target and selection 
was at least 1.0 higher for his 'same' choices than his 'different' 
choices. Application of these criteria yields the results shown in 
Table 3: 15. 
Understand 'different' 
Other 
J1 J2 J3 
6 8 10 24 
4 3 07 
10 11 10 31 
0 
Table 3: 15. Numbers of subjects who show different response patterns 
in matching task. 
Of the seven children who are not classified as correct in 
Table 3: 15, one child in J1 fails because she did not respond on every 
trial, two subjects in J1 each chose an identical picture to the 
target in answer to one of the 'different' trials, and the remaining 
children have differences in the mean number of common birds of . 67 in 
3 cases and zero in one case. 
Further evidence for understanding. 
On the basis of these two tasks it seems that of the 63 subjects, 
Si understood 'different', 3 quite clearly did not, and 9 cases are 
uncertain. Further evidence can however be obtained by examining 
the 
full protocols for both Claparede's task and the others used and 
in 
the case of the nine uncertain instances this is not too 
large a job 
1. i 
to be attempted. This procedure throws no light on the two cases 
who were uncertainties following the judgement task, or on two subjects 
who performed the matching task, but it is useful in the remainder. 
One child who chose an identical card as 'different' in the selection 
task justified all her choices in terms of similarity (referring to 
the birds' tails in the one instance where there were no birds in 
common) and her behaviour in Claparede's task is very similar for both 
'same' and Idifferentl problems. She seems then to be treating 
'different' as if it meant 'same'. The child who did not always respond 
in the matching task and three of those whose selections were somewhat 
similar on 'same' and ? different? trials behave quite differently to 
the two types of problem in Claparede's task. Three of these justify 
their choices in the matching task appropriately and the justifications 
given by the fourth are uninformative. It seems reasonable to conclude 
that all of these understand 'different'. The final picture is as 
given in Table 3: 4, reproduced here for completeness. 
J1 J2 J3 Total 
Understand 'different' 16 20 19 55 
Treat ' different ' as 'same 3 0 1 
4 
Other 4 0 0 4 
23 20 20 63 
Table 3: 4. Numbers of subjects who do and do not understand 'different' 
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Section II -Matching for and judgement of similarity and difference and 
their justification. 
Chapter 4. Selection of same and different objects and their justifi- 
cation. 
In the experiments reported in the previous section children 
were required to give similarities, or differences, between objects 
selected for them by the experimenter. In the study to be reported in 
this chapter the children will themselves be asked to select an object 
which is either the same as or different from a target object, and to 
justify that choice. This may be easier than Claparede's task, as 
if the selection decision is made with awareness the basis of that 
decision should be available to be given in a justification. The 
universe of objects from which the selections are made is of course 
still determined by the experimenter, and its structure may be more 
or less congenial to the child's way of thinking of similarity and 
difference. 
Reference has already been made in the previous chapter to a 
paper by Donaldson and Wales (1970) suggesting that young children do 
not distinguish between the terms Isame I and tdifferentI, responding 
to both in a manner appropriate to 'same'. (Donaldson and Wales are 
careful not to say that their subjects think 'different' means 'same', 
although others have put just that interpretation on their results 
e. g. Clark (1973). ) Their study is particularly relevant to the 
experiment to be reported in the present chapter and will be described 
in more detail here. 
In Donaldson and Wales Itask 15 children aged about 3 years 
6 
months were asked to select from a set of objects one which was either 
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'the same in some way' or 'different in some way, from a target 
selected from the whole set by the experimenter. The objects were 
either everyday objects such as eggcups and toothbrushes, or geometric 
forms, there being two sets of each. In one set of each the shape and 
colour of the objects coincided such that the subjects had to make 
their selection from two objects identical to the target and nine that 
were different in both shape and colour. In the other two sets shape 
and colour varied independently so that of the eleven objects available 
two would be the same in shape but different in colour to the target, 
three would be of the same colour but different shape and the remaining 
six different in both colour and shape. The finding was that the 
subjects showed a strong tendency to select an object as similar as 
possible to the target for all sets of stimulus material and both 'same' 
and º diff erent º instructions. 
Donaldson and Wales point out that a common use of 'different' in 
both adult and child language is to refer to another object of the same 
kind as a known object, which is just what their subjects pick out. 
Glucksberg et al. (1976) take up this point, and suggest that the response 
of Donaldson and Wales' subjects was entirely appropriate. They repli- 
cated Donaldson and Wales' results, using slightly younger subjects and 
similar but not identical materials and instructions. They also asked 
their subjects to pick out beads that were either the same colour as or 
a different colour from a target bead, from a set of beads varying only 
in colour, and in this latter task their subjects were almost entirely 
successful. Glucksberg et al. claim that the 'different colour' 
instruction rules out the 'same type, different token' interpretation 
of 'different' and that their subjects, success shows that the difficulty 
lies not in understanding the term 'different' itself, but in under- 
standing the entire construction in which it is used by Donaldson and 
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Wales, in the way they intend. They back this up by showing that a 
small majority of undergraduate subjects interpret the instruction 
(Give me one that's different from this one' as requiring them to 
select another token of the same type, a finding which surprises the 
present writer. 
Glucksberg et al is results suggest that the course of learning 
to understand 'different' may be more complex than is apparent from 
Donaldson and Wales? work. It is unfortunate that they switched 
materials when they changed to the 'different colour' instruction, as 
the possibility remains that the improvement in performance is due not 
to a simpler instruction but to the use of a stimulus set of simpler 
structure. 
Both the Donaldson and Wales and the Glucksberg et al. studies 
were carried out with very young children, and it might be interesting 
to discover the later course of development of understanding of both 
terms. Karmiloff-Smith (1977) has shown that understanding of 'meme' 
by French-speaking children is not adult-like until the school years 
in contexts where the same token is intended. Although such contexts 
are not employed in the present study, this is an indication that we 
cannot assume no further change in interpretation of (same' after the 
age of three. As for 'different', when children stop picking items 
with all properties in common with a target, do they still go for 
objects with most properties common, or do they prefer objects as 
different as possible as offering the greatest contrast to 'same' 
objects? Are their first correct responses the same as later ones in 
this respect? 
In the present study both school and pre-school age children are. 
asked to select 'samet and tdifferent' cards from a number of cards of 
varying degrees of similarity to a target. A card identical to the 
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target is sometimes, but not always, present. Cn some occasions the 
children are asked for cards that are the same or different with 
respect to some particular property, such as colour, and other qualified 
instructions using expressions such as Ia bit the same' are used. The 
children are asked to justify their choices. 
The questions to be asked are these: 
1. Do they distinguish between ? same' and 'different' instructions? 
2. Does their interpretation of either or both of the terms change 
with age? 
3" Do they respond to qualified instructions differently from neutral 
ones? 
The extent to which their responses are influenced by the parti- 
cular properties of the cards is also investigated. 
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Method. 
Subjects. 
102 subjects were tested, falling into five groups as follows: 
Number of subjects Age range ýNIean age 
Nl 19 2yrs 9mo - hyrs 3mo 3yrs 9mo 
N2 19 yr s Limo - Syr s Imo 4yr s 10mo 
P1 27 4yrs llmo - 5yrs 5mo 5yrs 3mo 
P2 30 6yrs 6mo - 6yrs limo 6yrs 9mo 
P3 7 7yrs Imo - 7yrs l lmo 7yrs 9mo 
The children in Ni and N2 were drawn from two playgroups, one 
organised in the psychology department and catering mainly for the 
children of the academic staff, and the other in the local community, 
where the children's background would not be very different from that 
of those in the former group. The division between Ni and N2 was made 
solely on the basis of age. 
The children in P1, P2 and P3 came from a primary school in a 
deprived area. Pl and P2 represent the entire classes, but only a 
few children in P3 were tested because children of that age found the 
task boring. 
These subjects were almost all also used in the experiment reported 
in chapter 2. Two subjects in Ni refused to take part in that experi- 
ment, and one subject in Ni for the previous experiment refused to 
participate in this one. 
kw 
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Figure 4: 1. Example of stimulus card. 
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Materials. 
The materials used were two sets of sixteen cards each. The 
cards were rectangular in shape and had geometric figures drawn on 
them, the sixteen cards representing the sixteen possible combinations 
of four properties, each of which can take two values as shown below. 
Property 
Colour 
Shape 
Values 
Red Blue 
Both slightly dark but otherwise fairly prototypical 
Square e 
3.4 cm side 
Pattern 
Number 
Striped 
Thin, diagonal lines, 
approx 6 mm apart 
One 
Circular 
3.6 cm diameter 
Spotted 
Small spots, about 2 
mm diameter 
Two 
Figure 4: 1 is a full size illustration of one of the cards. 
Procedure. 
The children were tested individually, sitting at a low table 
beside the experimenter in a small room close to their playroom or 
classroom. One set of sixteen cards was laid out unsystematically on 
the table. Half the children received all 'same' instructions before 
all 'different' ones, and the other half received them in the reverse 
order. For the first seven instructions of each kind the experimenter 
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picked up one of the cards from the table to act as a target, while 
for the last instruction a card from the second set was used as 
target. Thus for seven 'same' and seven 'different' instructions the 
cards available consisted of four with three properties in common with 
the target, six with two properties in common, four with only one 
property in common and one card which had the opposite value to the 
target on each property. For the remaining two selections there was a 
card identical to the target available as well as these fifteen possi- 
bilities. The target cards picked from the table were picked 
haphazardly, save that the same card was never picked twice for one 
subject. The targets from the second set were just picked out from an 
envelope and might or might not be the same as another target used with 
that subject. 
The selection instructions were as follows: 
1. Can you find me something that's the same as this? 
r Can you find me something 
that's different from this? 
2. Can you find me something that's a bit the same as this? 
Can you find me something that's a bit different from this? 
3. Can you find me something that's a lot the same as this? 
Can you find me something thatts a lot different from this? 
Can you find me something that's the same colour as this? 
Can you find me something that's a different colour from this? 
5. Can you find something that's the same shape as this? 
Can you find something that's a different shape from this? 
6. Can you find something that's the same pattern as 
this? 
Can you find something that's a different pattern 
from this? 
l2 
7. Can you find something that's got the same number of things as 
this? 
Can you find something that's got a different number of things 
to this? 
8. Can you find something that's the same as this? 
Can you find something that different from this? 
Minor variations in phrasing were sometimes introduced to make 
the interaction seem more natural. The order of instructions from 
1. to 8. was never varied. When a child had made his selection his 
chosen card was placed beside the target and he was asked 'How are 
they the same? l or v How are they d. iff erent? ' At the end of the 
session the child was asked what colour, shape, pattern and number 
were some of the cards to check on his understanding of these terms. 
All sessions were tape-recorded for later transcription. 
Results. 
Not all the children made selections to every instruction. The 
ranges and mean numbers of selections in the different age groups were 
as follows: 
iý ýý 
'Same' 'Different' Overall 
Range I, '1ean Range Kean Range I. _ean 
Ni 1-8 6.9 3-8 7.5 6-16 14.4 
1Z2 0-8 7.4 7-8 7.9 8-16 15.3 
P1 7-8 7.9 8 8. o 15-16 15.9 
P2 7-8 7.9 7-8 8.0 15-16 15.9 
P3 7-8 7.9 8 8.0 15-16 15.9 
Total 0-8 7.6 3-8 7.9 6-16 15.5 
Table 4: 1. Number of selections made. 
Children completing t ask 
Number Percentage 
12 
14 
25 
27 
6 
84 
63 
74 
93 
90 
86 
82 
The number of children who make the full sixteen selections is 
also shown, and makes up 82% of the total subject sample. A Kruskal- 
Wallis analysis of variance results in a significant difference between 
the groups in number of selections made (H = . 
10.61 , df =L, p< . 05) . 
This is obviously due to a difference between the 2 nursery groups and 
the school group as a whole. 
Some children did not make the full number of selections because 
they gave up before completing the task, others simply refused to 
respond to one or more instructions in the course of the session. The 
figures suggest that 'same number? and 'different number' instructions 
were particularly vulnerable to such refusals and neutral instructions 
least likely to lead to them, as shown in Table 4: 2. 
* 
Total Neutral (15) Bit Lot Colour Shape Pattern Number Neutral (16) 
Same 37 145554 11 2 
Different 12 12111231 
Total 49 266666 14 3 
(15) (16): No. of cards available with neutral instructions 
Table 4: 2. Number of selections not made, by instruction. 
*There are more missing selections for 'sam-el instructions 
than for 
'different' ones. 
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Selections. 
Figure 4: 2 shows the mean number of properties in common between 
the target and the children's selections for the different age groups 
and instructions, for the 84 children who completed the task. The 
points in Figure 4: 2A for selections from 15 cards (instructions 1-7) 
are based on results averaged over all seven selections per subject. 
Age effects in similarity of selections. 
As in previous chapters there is a problem in testing for age 
effects in that the group of subjects who complete the task is more 
highly selected from the younger age groups than the older ones, 
whereas if the whole sample is taken into consideration different 
subjects take different problems and the results are not strictly com- 
parable . The results of both forms of analysis on the number of 
properties common between the selections and target are given in Table l: 3. 
84 Ss, instructions 1-7 
All available Ss, 
84 Ss, instruction 
All available Ss, 
1-7 
8 
Same 
Hp 
7.21 ns 
5.14 ns(lOlSs) 
10.41 p <. 05 
8 11.94 p <. 05(l00Ss) 
Different 
Hp 
7.06 ns 
11.36 p4. C5(1C2Ss) 
5.17 ns 
7.39 ns(101Ss) 
Table 4: 3. Kruskal-Wallis analyses of variance for differences between 
groups in mean no. of common properties (instructions 1-7) and no. of 
common properties (instruction 8). Df =4 in all cases. 
Figure 4: 2 suggests that the difference between the groups in 
response to instruction 8 is greater for 'different' than for 'same' 
selections but the variance within the groups is also greater, 
which explains the pattern of results shown in Table 
4: 3. 
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There is a clearly incorrect card - one with no properties in 
common with the target - available for all 'same' selections but such 
a card was chosen only once, by a child in Ni. An identical card was 
available for one I different I selection for each child and was chosen 
by seventeen of the 101 children who made a selection in this situation. 
These seventeen subjects consist of seven from Ni, one from N2, four 
from Pl and five from P2 and their total number is well above what 
would be expected if selections were made at random. 
Similarity of selections and distinction between 'same' and 'different'. 
Figure 4: 2 suggests that selections are more similar to the target 
than would be expected by chance, in response to both (same' and 
different' instructions. It is possible to compute for individual 
children the probability of obtaining selections as extreme as theirs 
by chance. For all 84 children who complete the task the probability 
of selections as similar as the ones they make in response to 'same' 
instructions occuring by chance is less than . 05. Only seven of this 
group, consisting of one child in Ni, two in N2, three in Pl and one in 
P2, make selections in response to 'different' instructions that are 
significantly more dissimilar than chance at the . 05 level. 
Although the children always make rather similar selections, as a 
group they are clearly distinguishing between 'same' and 'different' 
instructions as Figure 4: 2 suggests. 83 subjects make 'same' selections 
in response to instructions 1-7 which have a mean number of properties 
in common with the target higher than for their 'different' selections 
while only 8 subjects do the reverse. For responses to instruction 8 
the figures are 76 and 7 children respectively. 
i2i 
For individual children, sign tests can be carried out on their 
selections to determine, whether they are responding differently to 
'same' and ? different' instructions at a statistically significant 
level. The numbers out of the group of 8L who do chose significantly 
more similar cards in response to 'same' instructions, using a criterion 
of P< . 05 and 1-tailed tests are given in Table Li: 4. 
Ni N2 Pi P2 P3 Total 
Number of subjects 2 8 12 14 3 39 
% of age group 17 57 48 52 50 46 
Table L.: l.. Children who distinguish between 'same' and 'different' in 
the similarity of their selections. 
The difference in numbers between the age groups is not statistically 
significant. (%' = 5.29, df = )., ns. ) 
Responses to qualified instructions. 
It must now be examined whether the children respond to the more 
subtle differences in instructions. All but six of the subjects (96 
in all) respond to all four of the ?a lot the same', ta bit the same 
and corresponding 'different' instructions. Only 19 of these make 
selections with different numbers of properties common to the target to 
the two 'same' instructions and these are evenly divided as to which 
instruction leads to the more similar choice. 26 children make a more 
dissimilar choice to 'lot different' than to 'bit different' compared 
to only 16 for the reverse, but this difference is not statistically 
significant either. 
Responses to instructions qualified with respect to property are 
more difficult to assess as many children apparently did not put the 
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intended interpretations on the terms 'colour', 'shape?, 'pattern? and 
'number'. Only 27 children (1 in Ni, 3 in N2,5 in P1,15 in P2 and 3 
in P3) responded appropriately to all the questions such as 'What 
colour is this? t and made all the relevant selections. Several of the 
pre-school children were restless by the end of the session and 
refused to answer the questions - it seems unlikely that they did not 
know the meaning of 'colour'! 'Pattern' was sometimes interpreted as 
tshape? and unfortunately 'number' was often quite reasonably thought 
to refer to small pencilled numerals put on the cards for the experi- 
menter Is benefit. 
The pattern of results given by the group of 27 children referred 
to is similar to those for the larger groups who show understanding of 
a particular term, though they make rather fewer errors. The group of 
27 alone will be considered in what follows, as it is only for them 
that comparisons between the terms can properly be made. 
Although the members of this group appear to understand the terms 
they still make errors such as selecting a card of a different colour 
when one the same colour is asked for, as shown in Table 1.: 5. The 
numbers of errors are partly determined by the children's underlying 
strategies - for instance, because they tend to choose cards of the 
same shape as the target regardless of instruction, they make more errors 
in responding to the 'different' shape instruction than to the 'same 
shape' one. There are however differences in the frequency of errors 
with colour and shape giving rise to the fewest and number to the most. 
Colour Shape Pattern Number 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Same 1 Ii. 004 15 8 30 
Different 3 11 5 19 5 19 6 22 
Table 14: 5. Numbers and percentages of children responding incorrectly to 
jnstru. tions qualified with respect to property. 
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Whether in spite of the errors the children are significantly 
responding to the instructions can be examined by carrying out bi- 
nomial tests on the number who change in the appropriate direction 
between the first instruction and the one under scrutiny (e. g. choose 
a card of a different colour for the neutral instruction but one of 
the same colour when that is requested) versus the number who change 
in the opposite direction. These tests do not take into account the 
size of the pool of subjects in a position to change in the right 
direction, e. g. those who chose a different colour in response to the 
first instruction in the above example, and are sometimes not applicable 
because this pool is too small for a significant result to be possible. 
The size of this pool is given in all cases in Table L1: 6. 
Colour Shape Pattern Number 
No. No. No. No. 
Change p change p change p change p 
Same 15/16 <. 001 0/0 n. a. 1/2 n. a. 5/9 n. s. 
Different 15/17 <. 001 17/22 < . 001 9/14 < . 01 13/16 <. C5 
No. change: No. of subjects changing response between neutral and specific 
instructions in the right direction / no. of subjects in a position to 
do so. 
n. a.: not applicable. 
Table h: 6. Results of binomial tests on responses to instructions 
qualified with respect to property. 
If Glucksberg et al. (1976) are correct one might expect 'different' 
instructions specified with respect to some property to lead to more 
dissimilar selections than neutral instructions, at least for the 
youngest subjects. Inspection of the results shows no difference for 
lý 
Ni taken alone, mainly because there are very few subjects who show 
that they understand a particular term, respond appropriately to its 
specified instruction and choose cards with different numbers of 
properties in common with the target for different instructions. The 
subjects as a whole do make more dissimilar choices to specified 
instructions than to neutral ones but this is just as true for 'same' 
instructions as for 'different' ones, which Glucksberg et al. would 
not predict. 
Weighting given to different properties in selection. 
Figure 4: 3 shows the percentages of selections made by the 
subjects which have a particular property in common with the target. 
'Same' selections tend to be the same shape as the target for all age 
groups and, increasingly with age, of the same pattern also. Colour 
shows a considerable drop and number a considerable increase between 
the pre-school and school groups, both these properties tending to be 
less important than the former ones. For ? different' selections Ni 
is quite different from the other groups. For these others, 
selections of the same shape as the target show a strong tendency to 
increase with age and those of the same pattern to decrease. The 
children distinguish between their 'same' and ? different' selections 
in terms of pattern more than any other property. 
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Figure Lt: 3" Percentages of selections to neutral instructions 
having particular properties in common with the target for sub- 
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Justifications. 
The children's justifications for their selections were 
divided into four categories, similarities, differences, both, and 
no responses. 'No responses' include 'don't know' and simple 
assertions that two cards are the same or different, as well as 
literal no responses. 'Similarities', 'differences', and 'both' are 
more or less self-explanatory, but it must noted that they include, 
as well as justifications citing the properties intended by the 
experimenter to be considered, a small number citing other properties, 
such as the pencilled numerals already referred to, or slight dirty 
marks on the cards. 
Unfortunately, part of the sessions for two subjects failed to 
be recorded and consequently although there is full information on 
their selections the record of their justifications is incomplete. 
One of these children was among the group of 84 who completed the task 
and so this group is reduced to 83 as far as justifications are con- 
cerned. All that follows is based on this group of 83 except where 
otherwise stated. Figure 4: 4 shows the proportions of the different 
kinds of justifications offered by these 83 subjects. 
'Same' and t different' justifications. 
At first sight Figure 4: 4 suggests that other than for Ni, 
performance is about the same for justifications of ? same' and 
'different' selections - about 70 - 90% correct in both cases. How- 
ever, figure 14: L1. does not take into account the fact that selections 
are always inclined to be similar to the target rather than otherwise. 
If a child simply justifies his choice by citing some random property 
without regard for whether that property constitutes a similarity or 
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Figure 4: 4. Percentages of justifications of different types, 
for sub-sample of 83 subjects. 
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a difference, he is more likely to give a similarity both for same 
and different choices. It is possible to calculate the probability 
of a child with a particular response strategy giving as many 
similarities for t samet justifications, or differences for 'different' 
justifications as they happen to, by chance. This is perhaps best 
illustrated by an example. 
N2: Phillipa, aged 5: 3. 
Same selections: Phillipa's justification for her selection to the 8th 
instruction is a 'no response' and is disregarded. The number of her 
selections of different degrees of similarity to the target, the 
number of properties she cites in justification and the associated 
probability of that justification being a similarity, are as follows: 
No. of props. common with target 
No. of props. cited in justification 3 
14(. 75) 
23(. So) 
All seven justifications are similarities; the probability of this 
43 
occurring by chance is . 75 x "5 1 or . 
04 
Different selections: No. of props. common with target 
No. of props. cited in justification 
1 
2 
1 
0 
1 (. 50) 
23 
3 (. 50) 4 (. 25) 
0 0 
The probabilities are this time the probabilities of giving a difference. 
Phillipa gives seven differences. 
P (eight differences) = . 254 x . 
54 = 0.00024 
P (seven differences) = L(. 253x. 54x. 75) + (. 254x. 54) = 0.00391. 
So the probability of a performance at least as extreme as Phillipa's is 
o. 00L2. 
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This example illustrates the fact that, given the selections the 
children make, they may be giving significantly more differences than 
would be expected by chance with fewer correct responses than would be 
required for similarities. An awkward case is that of subjects who 
always make 'same' selections that are as similar as possible to the 
target and justify them with respect to one property only: these 
have a chance probability of finding eight similarities of 1.00 x . 757 
or 0.13 - that is, even perfect performance would not normally be con- 
sidered significantly better than chance. Adopting two criteria, a 
stringent one of %< . 05 probability of obtaining such a score by chance, 
and a more lax one of %<. l or perfect performance, the numbers of subjects 
who satisfy the criteria are given in Table )4: 7. 
No. of subjects 
out of 83 Same Different 
. 05by chance< .1 or perfect other <. 05 by chance X4.1 by chance other 
Ni 0 3 8 4 1 6 
N2 6 2 6 10 1 3 
Pi 2 9 14 ]14 2 9 
P2 6 6 15 20 0 7 
P3 0 3 3 5 1 0 
114 23 46 53 5 25 
Table 4: 7. Likelihood of I same' and ' different' justification patterns 
Perfect performance on differences always satisfies the . 05 
criterion. Phillipa is of course among those in N2 who satisfy this 
criterion in both cases. Cases where properties other than those of 
colour, shape, pattern and number are offered in justification have to 
be counted as 'no responses? for present purposes. X2 tests can be 
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carried out on the above figures, collapsing the three categories into 
two of most nearly equal size and combining P2 and P3 so as to increase 
expected values. These show no statistically significant differences 
between the groups (same: X2 = 2.24, df = 3, n. s., different :X=6.63 
2 
di = 3, n. s. ) 
Cases where 'different' is treated as 'same'. 
Which, if any, of the 25 subjects who fail even the lax criterion 
for appropriate I different' justifications can be considered to treat 
the term as if it meant 'same'? Eight of these distinguish between 
'same' and 'different' in terms of their selections and can be ex- 
cluded, as can a further four children who give too many 'both' justi- 
fications to be considered as knowing ? different? but never justify a 
'different' selection with a similarity. Of the remaining 13 children, 
five seem to be good candidates. Two seem to be clear cases: one 
turns in identical performances for 'samet and 'different, always 
choosing one of the most similar cards available and justifying it with 
a similarity; the other makes slightly more similar selections for 
different ' than for ' same ' and after not responding for her first 
seven justifications gives similarities to justify her final 'same' 
selection and all her 'different' selections. The other three children 
each justify one 'different' selection with a difference but give six 
or seven similarities in that condition and their performance in the 
two conditions is so similar for both selection and justification that 
it seems reasonable to include them here. The final eight subjects 
behave in a variable or uninformative manner. 
The five subjects who appear to treat 'different' as if it meant 
same' consist of three from Ni, one from N2 and one from Pl. It seems 
likely from an inspection of the results that some of the 19 subjects 
not in the group of 83 here considered make the same error but as 
there is less information available for these children it would be 
more difficult to arrive at a decision concerning them. 
Responses to instructions qualified with respect to property. 
To what extent is a property, say colour, more than usually likely 
to be mentioned when justifying a selection which is the same or 
different with respect to that property? Table 4: 8 shows, for the 
group of 27 subjects who understand all four property terms, the number 
of those who are in a position to change their justification in the 
appropriate direction who actually do so, and the results of binomial 
tests comparing those who change in one direction with those who 
change in the opposite direction. 
There is no tendency for 'different' instructions specified with 
respect to property to result in more differences given in justification 
than neutral instructions. 
Colour 
Same 
No. 
change 
9/23 
Different 17/23 
Shape 
No. 
p change 
n. s. 9/18 
. 001 15/19 
Pattern Number 
No. No. 
p change p change p 
. 05 8/12 n. s. 3/21. n. s. 
4.001 11/16 <. 01 9/22 <-05 
No. change: No. of subjects who mention the appropriate property in 
justifying the specified selection but not the neutral one, out of 
those who do not mention it in the latter case. 
Table 4: 8. Results of binomial tests on responses to instructions 
qualified with respect to property. 
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Weighting given to different properties in justification. 
Assessment of the children's overall tendency to cite particular 
properties in their justifications is difficult, as the situations in 
which they offer justifications vary as a result of their different 
selection strategies. Overall, if one looks at selections in response 
to instructions 1-3 (i. e. neutral with respect to property, and fifteen 
cards available for selection), pattern is mentioned in 54% of justi- 
fications, shape in 29%, colour in 13% and number in 11%. The per- 
centages sum to more than 100 as more than one property is sometimes 
mentioned in the same justification. These figures take no account of 
opportunity. Table 4: 9 gives the number of times a property is 
mentioned correctly as a percentage of the number of times the oppor- 
tunity is available. For instance, pattern is mentioned in 59% of 
justifications of 'same' selections of the same pattern as the target. 
Colour Shape Pattern Number 
Same 13 29 59 8 
Different 30 77 77 27 
Table L: 9. Percentages of appropriate mentions of properties. 
The children vary in the extent to which one property pre- 
dominates in their justifications: some children cite a particular 
property in every one of their answers while for others no single 
property is mentioned in as many as half of their answers. Those who 
do cite one particular property all or most of the time also vary in 
the extent to which this strategy leads them into error. Table 
4: 10 
shows the number of children who cite one particular property 
in at 
least four of their justifications of the six 'neutral' selections, 
and of these, the number who never wrongly cite 
that property (i. e. 
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never give it as a similarity when a difference is asi: ed for or vice 
versa). 
Ni: No. citing a property % of group Nii: No. always citing Nii 
on > 4/6 occasions that property correctly Ni 
Nl 7 64 1 14 
N2 12 86 5 42 
P1 17 77 9 53 
P2 19 70 11 58 
P3 5 83 5 100 
60 75 31 52 
Table 4: 10. Subjects who concentrate on one property in justification. 
The extent to which the children re ly on some particular property 
for their justifications does not vary much with age group but the 
extent to which this strategy leads them into error shows a trend with 
age. AX2 test for the numbers who never make an error, combining Ni 
and N2, and P2 and P3, because of the small numbers, fails to reach 
the usually accepted level of significance (X2 = 5.25 df = 2, < . l), 
but because this does not take into account the consistent trend we 
might be justified in accepting that there is a real difference. It 
seems that the older children have their selections and their justifi- 
cations better coordinated than the younger ones do. 
Simple assertions of similarity and difference 
Finally, a comment about 'no responses' in justification. It 
was mentioned that these include simple assertions that the two cards 
are the same or different without explaining where the similarity or 
difference lay. Two subjects make such assertions for both similarity and 
difference, ten for similarity only and one for difference only. Such 
responses account for 34% and 22% of 'no responses' justifying 'same' and 
r-na rPm ctively. 
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Discussion. 
The present experiment confirms the results reported by 
Donaldson and Wales (1970) in so far as the children do tend to pick 
cards rather similar to the target in response to instructions both to 
select one 'the same' and to select one 'different', and they pick an 
identical card when asked for a different one more often than would be 
expected by chance, while there is only one case of a card with no 
properties in common with the target being selected in response to 
'same' instructions. (The procedure does of course require the children 
to accept the experimenter's definition of the situation - that the 
only similarities and differences that are to count are those of being 
red or blue, square or circular, spotted or striped, and single or 
double. As one subject in particular was inclined to point out, 
'identical' cards may differ in for example the precise arrangement of 
spots, and of course any two cards share a great number of properties, 
though the only similarities offered which were not in the experimenter's 
terms involved reference to what was drawn on the cards, not to the 
cards themselves. ) 
The first question asked in the introduction was whether or not 
the children distinguished between 'same' and 'different' instructions. 
As a group they evidently did, most making more similar 'same' selections 
than 'different' selections and most of their justifications also being 
appropriate. Only five subjects, three of them in the youngest age 
group, seemed clearly to be treating 'different' as if it meant 'same' 
though others for whom there was less information available were 
probably doing so also. As individuals the children in Ni were less 
likely to distinguish between their 'same' and 'different' selections 
in a statistically significant manner than were the older children. 
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The tendency to respond in the same way to 'same? and 'different? is 
then less marked in this study than in that carried out by Donaldson 
and Wales. It should be noted that even the children in Ni were on 
average slightly older than Donaldson and Wales' subjects. 
The next question asked was whether interpretation of the terr: s 
changed with age, over and above the acquisition of the correct inter- 
pretation of t different' . The age groups only differ significantly 
in their 'same' selections when the identical card is present, the 
tendency to pick that card increasing with age from Ni to K2 and from 
P1 to P2 but dropping to P3 (which is of course a very small group). 
Interpreting change from N2 to Pl is difficult because the subjects 
come from different populations. It is unlikely that the difference 
represents a change in interpretation of 'same' with age: indeed 
Karmiloff -Smith (1977) suggests that for French-speaking children at 
least, acceptance of objects which have some but not all properties in 
common as 'the same? increases with age. The fact that selections in 
response to instructions 1-7 also tend, though non-significantly, to 
increase in similarity with age suggests just an increase in precision 
in performing the task, and in the case of the identical card, an 
increasing recognition that on this trial, unlike former ones, there 
is an identical card available. 
A change in 'different' choices on the other hand is only apparent 
when all subjects and instructions 1-7 are considered. The pattern 
is 
very similar to that graphed in Figure 
4: 2 for the subgroup of 81 sub- 
jects, for whom the differences were not significant. The youngest and 
the oldest subjects make the most similar selections, probably 
for 
different reasons: the young subjects' choices are similar 
to the 
target because some of them treat 'different' as if it meant 'same', 
while the older ones make rather similar choices 
because they realise 
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that a card does not have to be very dissimilar to count as 'different'. 
Only a few subjects made significantly dissimilar 'different' choices 
and these were particularly rare in P2 and P3. Taken in conjunction 
with the U-shaped curve for 'different' selections just referred to, 
we do have some slight evidence for the notion that when children 
first understand 'different' they prefer a greater degree of dis- 
similarity than later. It may be a rather sophisticated notion that 
in a set of objects in which none are identical to the target, any 
object which is 'the samet as the target is also 'different' from it. 
(Of course a child who picks a card with three properties in common 
with the target as ' different' may not be aware at that moment that 
such a card is his preferred exemplar of a 'same' card. ) 
Most of the children appear to feel that the best exemplar of 
something 'different' is something only a little dissimilar. This 
ties in with the point made about the ordinary language use of 
'different' in the introduction, but does not go so far as Glucksberg 
et al. 's (1976) interpretation of 'different' as 'another token of the 
same type'. The question of the children's response to instructions 
qualified with respect to property is relevant here. Glucksberg et al. 's 
claim that expressions such as 'different colours are less ambiguous 
and likely to be interpreted as requiring a different type when 
'different' on its own is not so interpreted does not seem to be borne 
out in the present study. There is a tendency to choose more dis- 
similar cards in response to instructions to choose a card different 
with respect to some property than to neutral instructions but it is 
not more marked than for the corresponding 'same' instructions. The 
reason for this change is not clear. Nor is there support for 
G3ucksberg 
et al. 's interpretations from the children's justifications, though 
these are in any case rather remote from the original instructions. of 
_ 
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course the present study differs from Glucksberg et al. 's in a number 
of ways, not least in that the subjects are in general older and tend 
to distinguish 'samet and 'different' anyway, while there are too few 
responses from subjects in Ni for the position with them to be clear. 
The fact that in this study the specific property instructions were 
applied to the same set of materials as the other instructions may 
make a difference and so too might their being embedded in the other 
instructions and not, as in Glucksberg et al. 's experiment, delivered 
afterwards with the change of materials also signalling a different 
task to the children. 
In general the children in the present experiment are not very 
good at responding to instructions that are further specified than 
simply asking for a 'same' or 'different' card. They do not distinguish 
at all between 'a lot the same' and 'a bit the same' or 'a lot different' 
and Ia bit different' . They do show some tendency, both in selection 
and justification, to respond to instructions specified with respect 
to some property, but there are a considerable number of selection 
errors. Some of these may be due to a child who correctly interprets 
a term at the end of the testing session not interpreting it in the 
same way at the time of the instruction but it is unreasonable to 
suppose that this is a complete explanation. 
Donaldson and Wales did at least some of the time ask their 
subjects to justify their choices but they do not report on the results. 
Here it seems that although choices are better for 'same' than for 
? different?, as indicated by the number of clearly incorrect selections, 
justifications are as good for ? different' as for 'same', in terms of 
the absolute number of appropriate ones, and very much better if the 
greater chance likelihood of an appropriate 'same' justification is 
taken into account. That the children are better at 'different? 
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justifications than 'same' ones is very much in line with the findings 
of Chapters 2 and 3. Their performance on' same I justifications is not 
as bad as the performance in giving similarities of the subjects 
employed in those experiments but this could be either because of the 
nature of the objects to be compared or because, as suggested in the 
introduction, in the present study the children are justifying their 
own choices, not those of the experimenter. Claparede (1918) argued 
that in line with his law of awareness similarities are difficult to 
give precisely because children make more early automatic use of 
similarity than of difference. The greater ease of 'same' choices 
found here may reflect this. 
The different properties involved in the stimulus array are clearly 
not equivalent in their influence on the children's selections and 
justifications. All choices, both 'same' and ' different ', tend to be of 
the same shape as the target (94% 1 same' and 77% ' different') while 
'same' choices tend to be the same pattern (83%) and 'different' choices 
a different pattern (56%) than the target. Number is odd in that 
'different' choices are slightly more likely to be of the same number 
than 'same' ones. Colour declines in importance with age while number 
and pattern increase in importance. Given that pattern shows the most 
change between 'same' and 'different' it is not surprising that it is 
the property most cited in justification - it may well be the property 
the children are most aware of in making their selections - but this 
does not explain why shape should commonly be mentioned when justifying 
a 'different' selection. Apart from the dominance of pattern, the 
children seem to give most weight in justification to those properties 
to which they give most weight in selection. These remarks are not 
intended to be generalised to other situations involving the properties 
colour, shape, pattern and number; they may only apply 
to the values 
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and combinations used in the stimulus array under discussion. 
Many of the children adopted a particular property, most usually 
pattern, and cited it in most or all of their justifications, and this 
tended to lead the younger ones into error as they often cited it in- 
appropriately. The fact that some children do behave in this way 
lends weight to the practice used in this chapter of testing the 
children's justification performance against a null hypothesis of their 
settling on some property at random and citing it whether it be a 
similarity or a difference. 
The overall picture we have from this experiment is one of 
children who find it very easy to make similar choices and more 
difficult to make different choices but who find the latter easier to 
justify, suggesting greater awareness of the differences between the 
cards than of the similarities. It is relevant here that the children 
were more likely to move to mentioning the appropriate property in 
justifying a property-specified 'different' selection than for such a 
'same' selection. This difference could arise if the symbols were 
perceived as wholes in making 'same' selections and could not easily be 
analysed so as to make available an isolated property to be cited in 
justification. This is supported by the more frequent occurrence of 
simple assertions that two cards are the same than of assertions that 
they are different. Even if the symbols were analysed into properties 
for justification purposes this process would be disconnected from the 
selection process. If on the other hand different choices were made 
on the basis of properties of the symbol arrived at by analysis they 
might well be more difficult but once made the property or properties 
used as the basis for selection should be available for use in justi- 
fication. 
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Some support for the notion that children do sometimes perceive 
things holistically and sometimes analytically comes from recent work 
on perceptual development by Smith and Kenl er (1977). In work on adult 
perception use is made of a distinction between integral and separable 
dimensions (e. g. Garner 1970). Integral dimensions are those which 
cannot be separately perceived in a stimulus, such as brightness and 
saturation, while separable dimensions such as shape and colour can, 
as the name suggests, be separately perceived. If asked to classify 
objects varying along integral dimensions adults sort on the basis of 
overall similarity while they sort objects varying along separable 
dimensions according to their values on those dimensions. Smith and 
Kemler showed that dimensions which are separable for adults can be 
integral for young children. One of the situations they used will be 
described here. 
Smith and Kemler formed tetrads of cards showing a constant 
irregular shape but varying in size and brightness as shown in Figure 
4: 5. The tetrad can be divided into pairs in two ways: a dimensional 
classification, such that the members of each pair share a value on 
one dimension, and a similarity classification, which maximises the 
overall similarity between the members of a pair although they do not 
share the same value on either dimension. When 5,8 and 10 year old 
children were asked to divide the tetrads into pairs the five year olds 
preferred the similarity classification, the 10 year olds preferred the 
dimensional classification and the eight year olds did not significantly 
favour either type. What is particularly interesting is that having 
made their first division as stated the children were asked if they 
could divide the tetrad another way, and many of those who initially 
opted for the similarity classification managed to produce the dimensional 
one. Smith and Kemler conclude that the primary mode of perception of 
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Figure 4: 5. Dimensional and similarity classifications of stimuli 
varying along 2 dimensions. (From Smith and Kemler 1977) 
these dimensions for the youngest children is integral but that they 
can analyse the dimensions at what they call a more derived or higher 
level mode of processing. Shepp (1978) also showed that for many six 
year olds hue and shape or brightness and shape are integral dimensions. 
Number is unlikely to be integral with the other dimensions used 
in the present study, but it may be that some of the younger subjects 
tend to perceive colour, shape and pattern integrally as their primary 
mode. Being asked for a difference may sometimes switch them into a 
separable mode but they may not be able to do this at will. This 
would explain some of the results. The younger children who concentrate 
on one property in justification often cite it in error, suggesting 
that it may not have been the basis of their selection, while the older 
children seem to have their selections and their justifications better 
coordinated with each other. The younger children may stick to a single 
property because it is the only one they can perceive separately. 
It may be that individuals are aware of separable dimensions in a 
way they are not of integral dimensions - that the awareness can as it 
were get hold of dimensions in a way it cannot of vague overall similarity 
Size or Brightness 
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or difference. This is in line with Wohlwillts (1968b) characterisation 
of perception and conception as differing along three dimensions, two 
of which he describes as follows: 
(i) Redundancy. As one proceeds from perception to conception, the 
amount of redundant information required decreases. 
(ii) Selectivity. As one proceeds from perception to conception, the 
amount of irrelevant information that can be tolerated without 
affecting the response increases. 
In both these cases one could substitute integral perception for 
perception and separable perception for conception. Wohlwill's third 
dimension is contiguity: 
(iii) As one proceeds from perception to conception, the spatial and 
temporal separation over which the total information contained in 
the stimulus can be integrated increases. 
Presumably one cannot have integral dimensions that are very much 
separated either spatially or temporally. Both Smith and Kemler (1977), 
and Shepp (1978) acknowledge their debt to Wohlwill. 
The children's performance in giving 'different' justifications 
3s of course far from perfect and some of the errors may be due to the 
difficulty of perceiving the dimensions separately. 
This account is also helpful in throwing light on the results of 
the earlier chapters. Rosch (e. g. Rosch 1977) has emphasised that 
natural categories are defined by overall similarity relations and not 
in dimensional terms, as Smith and hemler acknowledge. This is likely 
to make the members of natural categories even more difficult to 
analyse into component properties which could be offered as similarities 
between them, as is borne out by the results reported in the previous 
section. 
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Chapter 5. Judgements of 'same' and 'different? and the strategies 
children use to gain information. 
Introduction. 
The task set to subjects in the experiment to be described in 
this chapter is somewhat different from those used in earlier chapters. 
Previously, children have been asked to say what is the same, or what 
is different, about two objects. In the present experiment they will 
simply be asked to say whether or not two objects are the same, or are 
different, as the case may be. 
The design of the experiment is based on one carried out by 
Vurpillot (1968) which will now be described. Vurpillot presented 
subjects aged 2 to 9 years with pairs of cards, each card showing a 
house with six windows. The windows on any one house were all different 
and a pair of houses might have 1,3,5 or 6 pairs of identical windows. 
The subjects' task was to say whether the pairs of houses were the same 
(that is, were the same in all six windows) or not the narre; the word 
(different' was not used. Vurpillot recorded the children's eye move- 
ments in looking at the cards and so obtained measures of haw much 
information the children collected before making their judgements, and 
how efficiently they collected this information. She found that not 
all children were basing their judgements on her definition of 'same 
as having all six windows the same. A considerable number of children, 
especially in the younger age groups, judged two houses to be the same 
if any pair of identical windows was found. Also, a number of children, 
including about half the pre-schoolers, showed no systematic inter- 
pretation by their judgements. There was a tendency for the children to 
base their judgements on too little information - that is, they did not 
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look at a sufficient number of windows. Because of this, they made 
most errors on the pair of cards with only one difference (as this 
difference was likely to be missed) then on the pair with three simi- 
larities and three differences, then on the pair with five differences, 
with the identical pairs being easiest of all. The most efficient way 
to gather the necessary information is to look at one window, then at 
the corresponding window on the other house and so on until enough 
evidence for a judgement has been collected. The older children were 
more likely to collect the appropriate amount of information and also 
gathered it more efficiently than the younger ones. 
The present study differs in a number of ways from that carried 
out by Vurpillot. Firstly, subjects were asked to judge whether pairs 
of cards were different or not, as well as to judge whether some pairs 
were the same or not. Any subject who responds to 'different? in the 
same way as to 'same' (Donaldson and Wales 1970) would obviously make 
fewer correct 'different' judgements. The number of such subjects would 
never be expected to be very great, and would be expected to decline 
with age. 
As mentioned, Vurpillot determined which windows the children 
looked at by means of eye movement recordings. This has some dis- 
advantages, over and above that of requiring sophisticated equipment. 
VurpillotIs subjects did not have their heads clamped but they were 
sometimes restrained by the experimenter and at all times they were 
instructed to keep their heads still and only move their eyes. The 
situation must have been somewhat unnatural and perhaps a little 
intimidating. In the present study the cards were put into folders 
with six windows, one over each picture on the card, and the children 
had to open the windows to see the pictures and arrive at their 
decision. They were instructed to announce their decision as soon as 
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it was reached. This procedure may also modify the children's per- 
formance, either improving it by forcing them to think more about 
what they are doing or depressing it by preventing them from gaining 
incidental information in a casual glance. So, as a control, the 
cards were also just put before the children without their folders 
and they were asked to make their judgements. This was termed the 
open concdtion and the other the closed condition. 
Vurpillot used a wide age range of subjects, from 2 yrs. 11 mo. 
to 9 yrs. 5mo. Her oldest subjects gave near perfect performance 
while the behaviour of the youngest was often uninterpretable. The 
closed condition in the present experiment might be very difficult for 
pre-school age children, and so for these reasons only the middle range 
of Vurpillot's group will be covered here. 
The expected results of this experiment are as follows: 
Older children will perform better than younger ones, on both 'samet 
and 'different' judgements. 
'Same' judgements will be easier than 'different' ones, the gap 
narrowing with age. 
Problems involving identical or completely different pairs will be 
easiest, then from least to most similar pairs for ' same' judgements 
and from least to most different pairs for ? different' judgements. 
There will be a tendency to collect too little information before 
making a judgement, this tendency declining with age. 
The older children will collect the information in a more efficient 
manner than the younger. 
It was thought that there might be a tendency for subjects to 
scan the cards from left to right and from the top down, this 
tendency 
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increasing with longer instruction in reading. A final prediction 
is then that for instances of 'not the same? or 'not different?., 
pairs will be easier if the falsifying information is encountered 
sooner using that scanning strategy, than if it is encountered later. 
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Figure 5: 1. Example of stimulus card. 
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Method. 
Subjects. 
The subjects were 87 children, consisting of all children 
available to be tested from three classes of a local primary school. 
The numbers and ages in the classes were as follows: 
Class Number Age Range Mean Age 
Pi 26 4: 9 - 5: 9 5: 3 
P2 32 5: 9 - 7: 0 6: 4 
P3 29 6: 10- 7: 11 7: 5 
One child in P2, aged 6: 9, was tested in the closed condition 
only, because of his subsequent absence. The mean age for P2 is 
unchanged if he is excluded. 
Stimuli. 
The stimuli were 61, x 4" cards, on which there were six pictures 
of people each about 14 - 1111 high, in three rows of two as shown in 
Figure 5: 1. The pictures were produced from rub-down transfers. A 
description of the experimental cards follows. Three pairs of cards 
were identical, in that each picture on one card was matched by an 
identical one in the same position on the other card, three pairs 
were completely different in that none of the pictures on the one card 
were the same as those on the other; in two pairs one picture only was 
matched by an identical picture in the same position on the other card, 
in two pairs there were three identical and three different pairs of 
pictures and in two pairs of cards there was only one different pair of 
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pictures. In no case was there a picture on one card in a pair the 
same as one on the other, unless they occupied corresponding positions. 
The mixed (non-identical, not wholly different) pairs were put into two 
sets of three, each containing one of each kind of problem. Looking at 
the pictures from left to right and from the top down, different pairs 
are encountered earlier and similar ones later, in Set I than in Set II. 
There were also three pairs of cards which were used as examples, one 
identical pair, one wholly different pair, and a mixed pair, with three 
similar and three different pairs of pictures. The appearance of all 
the cards was such that the presence or absence, and number, of similar 
and dissimilar pairs could not be told at a glance, but each individual 
picture had to be separately fixated. The pictures to be used and the 
location of same and different pairs were determined randomly. 
Procedure. 
Each child was seen individually and given all twelve problems 
in one condition (six with ? same' instructions and six with 'different? 
instructions) in one session. Half the children received the open 
condition first and the other half the closed condition first. All the 
children in any one class were tested in one condition before any of 
them were tested in the second condition so for any particular child 
the two conditions were given on successive days or with one day inter- 
vening. Half the children were given 'same' instructions before 
'different' instructions, the other half the other way round, the order 
being the same in both open and closed conditions. The three identical 
problems and either Set I or Set II were administered with 'same' 
instructions, and the three wholly different pairs and the other set 
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with tdifferentT instructions. A child who received Set I with 'sane' 
instructions in the open condition also did so in the closed condition. 
The six problems in any instruction x condition cell were administered 
in a random order. 
The numbers of children receiving each of the eight different 
testing schedules resulting from the variations described above were 
as given in Table 5: 1. 
Schedule: OSA OSB ODA 0DB CSA CSB CDA CDB 
Pi 4 4 3 2 3 3 3 4 26 
P2 3 4 4 5 4 4 4 3+1# 31+1 
P3 4 3 4 4 14. 4 3 3 29 
11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10+1* 86+1# 
0: open condition first C: closed condition first 
S: 'same' instructions first D: 'different' instructions first 
A: Set I with 'same' and Set II with 'different' 
B: Set II with 'same? and Set I with 'different'. 
*One 
child tested in the closed condition only. 
Table 5; 1. Distribution of testing schedules. 
Due to experimenter error only two children in P1 received 
schedule ODB. 
Before each set of six test problems the subject was shown two 
example problems, the identical pair and the mixed pair for 'same' 
instructions and the completely different pair and the mixed pair for 
'different' instructions. These were used to indicate to the child 
that all six pairs of pictures had to be identical pairs for the cards 
to count as 'same' and all had to be different for them to count as 
? different'. In the closed condition the examples were put into folders 
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and it was explained that the child would have to open the windows. 
Each subject was told that 'sometimes you might have to open all the 
windows and sometimes you might only have to open some of them' and 
he was asked to declare his judgement as soon as he believed he knew 
the right answer. For test pairs the instructions were to say whether 
the two cards were 'just the same or not the same? or 'completely 
different or not different'. The children were not given verbal feed- 
back on their judgements, and their answers were noted as S ('same1, 
D (' differentt) and N ('not same? or 'not different') rather than as V 
or 1. The experimenter replied 'mm-mm' and 'O. K. ' to their responses 
in an encouraging manner. In the closed condition the windows 
opened and the order of opening them were also noted. 
Results. 
Figure 5: 2 shows the number of correct responses made in answer 
to the different instructions and in the different conditions. An 
analysis of variance was carried out on the results of the 86 subjects 
tested in both conditions to test for the effects of age group, 
instruction, condition, schedule and their interactions, with the 
following results: 
F 
Age (Pl v P2 v P3) 16.65 
Schedule 1" %4 
Instruction (Same v different) 51.01 
Condition (Open v closed) 3.82 
df p 
2,62 4.001 
7,62 n. s. 
1,62 ( . 001 
1,62 n. s. 
Table 5: 2. Results of analysis of variance. 
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There were no significant interactions. A pre-planned comparison 
on the means for the different schedules was carried out to test for 
a difference between A and B schedules. This was not significant. 
Differences between types of problem. 
Figure 5: 3 shows the responses made to different kinds of problem 
with Vurpillot's results for comparison. Vurpillot tested for the 
difference between the types by comparing identical pairs with non- 
identical pairs, and then the non-identical pairs with each other, in 
two separate analyses of variance. This has two drawbacks: it does 
not specifically test for order, and the range of values inserted in 
the latter analysis is very limited - just 0,1 or 2 in the present 
case. Here the difference between the types of problem was tested in 
following way: Kendall's S statistic was computed for the ordering of 
proportion correct for the different types of problem for each child, 
summed over open and closed conditions but separately for 'same' and 
'different' instructions. This cannot be statistically significant for 
individual children, since perfect ordering would be required and with 
the range of values available there must at least be a tie. For each 
group a t-test was carried out on the S scores with a null hypothesis 
that mean S was zero. The results, given in Table 5: 3, show that the 
problems were ordered as expected for all groups with 'same' instructions 
and for Pl and P3 with 'different? instructions. 
Same Different 
Mean S t p Mean S t p 
Pi 2.9 7.21 <. 001 2.3 4.22 <. 001 
P2 2.6 10.51 <. 001 0.6 1.02 n. s. 
P3 2.2 6.02 (. 001 2.3 5.29 < . 001 
Table 5: 3. Results of t-tests on order of difficulty of problems. 
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Interpretation of 'same' and 'different' . 
We now move from simply looking at whether the children's judge- 
ments are correct or not to what these judgements, and the evidence 
on which they are based in the closed condition, tell us about how the 
children are interpreting the terms I same' and 'different'. Since the 
adequacy of the evidence collected by the children must be considered 
relative to the interpretation they are using, it will be considered 
in detail afterwards, but a brief digression on the topic of how the 
children collected the information is necessary here. 
A few subjects declared their decisions having opened no windows 
at all, or only one, for some or all problems and could not be prompted 
into gathering further information. Some children opened a window on 
each card but not in corresponding positions - very often, mirror 
image pairs e. g. the top left window on the left hand card and the top 
right window on the right hand card. These pairs will be treated here, 
as the children seemed to treat them, in the same way as differences 
properly obtained. Determining the exact interpretation put on the 
terms depends on the children's responses to mixed evidence: both 
similarities and differences obtained for the same problem. Some 
children never collected mixed evidence, generally because they opened 
only one pair of windows for each problem. 
To return to the subject of the interpretations themselves, 
Vurpillot found two interpretations of 'same', one requiring all pairs 
of windows to be the same and the other only requiring one similarity, 
and she classified all other responses as uninterpretable. Vurpillot's 
two categories will be used here, and called tall same' and 'any same 
respectively. Cases where the children never collected mixed evidence, 
but gave positive responses to similarities and negative ones to 
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differences will be called 'same (unmixed)'. Then there is a group 
of children who although they say that some cases of mixed evidence 
are 'the same' and others are not, do so systematically: there is 
always a higher proportion of similarities in the former case than the 
latter. This response pattern will be called 'same (mixed)'. There 
are two remaining categories: those whose judgements on the basis of 
the evidence collected are inconsistent, and those who collect no 
evidence. There are corresponding categories for ? different' and in 
principle either ? same' or 'different' interpretations could be put 
on either term. The interpretations put on 'same' and 'different' in 
the closed condition are given in Tables 5: 4 and 5: 5 respectively. 
Same (unmixed) 
All same 
Any same 
Same (mixed) 
Total systematic 
Inconsistent 
No evidence 
P1 P2 P3 Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
8 31 13 41 10 34 31 36 
2 8 5 16 12 41 19 22 
5 19 0 0 2 7 78 
5 19 3 9 2 7 10 11 
20 77 21 66 26 90 67 77 
5 19 4 13 3 10 12 14 
1 4 7 22 0 0 89 
26 32 29 87 
Table 5: 1i. Interpretations of 'samet, closed condition. 
The interpretations defined as correct, 'all same' and fall 
differente respectively, increase with age. There are many more 
inconsistent patterns of response for 'different' than for 'same', 
particularly among the older children. 
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P1 P2 P3 Total 
No. % No. % No. % Teo. % 
Different (unmixed) 8 31 9 28 3 1C 2C 23 
A11 different 0 0 2 6 8 28 10 11 
Any different 9 35 C 0 4 14 13 15 
Different (mixed) 0 0 2 6 14 1.4 6 7 
Total different 17 65 13 41 19 66 49 56 
Same (unmixed) 2 8 1 3 1 3 4 5 
All same C 0 2 6 0 0 2 2 
Any same 0 0 2 6 0 0 2 2 
Total same 2 8 5 16 1 3 8 9 
Inconsistent 6 23 9 28 9 31 24 28 
No evidence 1 4 5 16 0 0 6 7 
26 32 29 87 
Table 5: 5. Interpretations of ? different', closed condition. 
Although it is not possible to tell just which pictures are used 
as evidence in the open condition, and therefore it is not possible to 
distinguish with any certainty between fall same' and 'any same' or 
between fall different' and 'any different', it is possible to get some 
idea of the interpretation the children are using and classify this as 
fsamet, 'different' or ? other'. In this case they are classified as 
'same' if five out of six of their responses correspond to either 'all 
same' or ? any same' if all pictures are taken into account. This laxer 
criterion seems justified as it is unlikely that all pictures are 
considered. The results of this procedure, for the 86 children tested 
in the open condition are given in Tables 5: 6 and 5: 7. 
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P1 P2 P3 Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Same 21 81 29 94 29 100 79 92 
Different 1 4 0 0 00 11 
Other L. 15 2 6 00 67 
26 31 29 86 
Table 5: 6. Interpretations of 'same' , open condition. 
Pi P2 P3 Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Same 6 23 8 26 3 10 17 20 
Different 13 50 15 48 25 86 53 62 
Other 7 27 8 26 13 16 19 
26 31 29 86 
Table 5: 7. Interpretations of 'different', o pen condition. 
As with the closed condition, the number of cases not assigned 
to a systematic interpretation is higher for 'different' instructions 
than for 'same' ones. In this condition one child treats 'same' as 
if it means 'different', as well as vice vers a; he received 'different' 
instructions first. The results of cross-tabulating the two sets of 
figures are given in Tables 5: 8 and 5: 9. 
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Closed interpretation: Same Inconsistent and no evidence 
Open interpretation: 
Same 63 16 79 
Different 0 1 1 
Other 3 3 6 
66 20 86 
Table 5: 8. Interpretations of 'same' in both conditions. 
Closed interpretation: Same 
Open interpretation: 
Same 6 
Different 0 
Other 2 
8 
DIFFERENT 
Different Inconsistent and no evidence 
65 17 
38 15 53 
59 16 
49 29 
Table 5: 9. Interpretations of 'different' in both conditions. 
86 
Although only six subjects (7%) ' treat 'different' as if it 
means 'same' in both conditions, nineteen children altogether (22%) do 
so in at least one condition. The former number is made up of one 
child in Pl, four in P2 and one in P3, while the total consists of 
seven children in Pl (27%), 9 in P2 (29%) and 3 in P3 (10%). 
No. of windows opened. 
Figure 5: 4 shows the numbers of children opening different 
numbers of windows, summed across all problems in the closed condition. 
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No. of 
P1 
subjects 
15 
12 
9 
6 
3 
0 
0-24 -48 -72 -96 -120 -144 
No. of 
P2 subjects 
15 
12 
9 
6 
0 
0-24 -48 -72 -9E -120 -144 
No. of 
P3 
subjects 
15 
12 
9 
6 
3 
0 
0-24 -48 -72 -9G -120 -144 
No. of windows opened 
Figure 5: 4. Numbers of subjects opening varying numbers of ýrir_. do, s. 
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A bimodal distribution is indicated, most children either opening 48 
or fewer windows in total, or more than 96 windows. Those in Pl and 
especially in P2 tend to fall into the former category; those in 3 
are more likely to fall into the latter. A child employing the 
correct definitions - 'all same' and fall different', and collecting 
the appropriate amount of information, will have to open all six 
windows on each card for the identical and completely different pairs, 
and on average, 1.17 pairs of windows when there are five pieces of 
falsifying information, 1.75 pairs when there are three similarities 
and three differences, and 3.5 pairs when there is only one piece of 
falsifying information -a total of 48.84 pairs or 97.68 windows. A 
child using 'any same' and 'any different' definitions will have to 
open the same number in total for the mixed problems, but only one 
pair of windows for each of the identical and completely different 
problems, making 18.84 pairs or 37.68 windows. Af air number of children 
must be opening too few windows to be sure of making correct judgements, 
even as assessed by the latter definitions. The difference between the 
three groups in the number of windows opened is statistically signi- 
ficant: Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance, H=9.37, df = 2, p <. 01. 
Significantly more windows are opened in response to 'different' than 
'same' instructions: Wilcoxon matched pairs signed ranks test, Z=2.19, 
p<. 05., 2-tailed - this is odd in the light of the greater frequency of 
the 'any different' interpretation relative to 'any same'. 
As previously mentioned, some children did not open even one pair 
of windows for each problem. There were eight of these altogether (one 
in Pl and seven in P2) although two of them opened enough pairs of 
windows in response to 'different' instructions to give an indication 
of which interpretation of 'different' was guiding their judgement. A 
number of other children opened mirror image pairs or other pairs of 
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windows which did not correspond (called mismatches below). This 
practice could be obscured where a lot of windows are opened - if a 
child opens all windows he could be thinking in terms of six mirror 
image pairs! - and so it may be that more of the older children, who 
open a greater number of windows, make such errors than is apparent. 
Mirror image pairs 
Pi 8 
P2 6 
P3 1 
15 
riismatches Both 
11 10 
017 
214 
33 21 
Table 5: 10 . Numbers of children opening unmatched pairs of windows. 
Table 5: 10 gives the numbers of children who opened any pairs of 
these kinds; most of them also opened matched pairs on some problems. 
The absolute number of windows opened tells us only a little 
about the children's information gathering performance. This can be 
assessed according to two criteria: Do they collect the right amount 
of information ?, and Do they collect it efficiently? The two are not 
independent: a child who opens all windows on one card before any on 
the other for each problem is always going to collect too much 
information, but if he is going to open all windows on both cards 
regardless of what he discovers then opening all those on one first is 
quite efficient. 
Do they collect the right amount of information? 
A child who is to collect the appropriate amount of evidence must 
collect some for each problem, and different amounts for different 
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problems. I" any of the subjects did not do this, as Table 5: 11 shows. 
Children who varied the number of windows they opened by not opening 
a pair for some problems but doing so for others are included with 
those who do not vary as their variation could not be systematic. 
Same Different 
Vary Not vary Vary Not vary 
P1 10 16 8 18 26 
P2 10 22 9 23 32 
P3 22 7 18 11 29 
Total 42 45 35 52 87 
Table 5: 11. Numbers of children who do and do not vary the number of 
windows opened. 
The differences between the age groups in the number who vary in 
the amount of information they collect are statistically significant, 
both for 'same' and 'different' instructions (same, X2 = 13.53, df = 2, 
p (. 01; different iß. 
2 
= 8.66, df = 2, p <. 05). This is mainly a 
difference between P3, many of whose members show variation, and the 
other two groups: there is actually a smaller proportion of children in 
P2 who vary than in P1. 
A child may vary the amount of evidence he collects without this 
variation being systematic and dependent on what he has discovered. 
Included in the 'vary? totals are eight children for 'same' and four 
for 'different' who collect only unmixed evidence - that is, they un- 
covered either only similarities or only differences for any individual 
problem but different numbers for different problems, so there can be 
no system to their variation. Where a child's judgements are inconsistent 
on the basis of the evidence he has collected it is ir1possible to assess 
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whether there was any system to his gathering of information. The 
exact criteria used by the children classed as Isamel (mixed) and 
'different' (mixed) are not clear so that while in some cases the 
amount of information collected is obviously inappropriate, in others 
it is impossible to tell. 
There remain 22 cases for 'same? instructions and 21 for 
different' who employ 'all' or 'any' definitions and vary the amount 
of evidence they collect. Only seven children appear in the lists for 
both 'same' and 'different'. Looking at which windows they open and 
the order in which they open them makes it possible to assess whether 
they stop before they have gained enough information to make a decision, 
at that point, or after it. At this point only pairs of windows 
opened are being considered - opening the same two windows on each card 
is treated as equivalent to the less efficient strategy of opening all 
six windows on one card and two on the other. In response to 'samet 
instructions only one child performs optimally, stopping at the right 
point on all six problems; he also does so to 'different' instructions 
as do two further children, one of whom collects the appropriate 
amount of evidence for five tsamet problems, the other for only two 
'same' problems. All three are, not surprisingly, in P3. 
It appeared when looking in detail at the subjects' protocols 
that some of them did not vary in the amount of evidence they collected 
because they were trying to relate it to the nature of that evidence 
but because they switched between different information gathering 
strategies in the course of a session. This could well be why such a 
small number varied the amount of evidence they collected in response 
to both sets of instructions. 
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Do they collect the information efficiently? 
In order to gain the appropriate amount of information by opening 
the minimum number of windows, the children should make paired com- 
parisons, as Vurpillot calls them: they should open one window on one 
card, then the corresponding window on the other card, and so on. How- 
ever, if a child is going to open a set number of windows per problem 
regardless of what is discovered, as so many of them do, it does not 
matter in what order these are opened. Simply from the point of view 
of the motor actions involved it is probably most efficient to open all 
one is going to on one card, followed by all on the other. Even for 
those children who open different numbers of windows for different pro- 
blems it may be that to minimise the time taken, rather than the amount 
of information collected, to arrive at a decision the best strategy is 
a mixed one - say, to open two windows on one card followed by the 
corresponding two on the other, and so on. All these possibilities: 
paired comparisons, opening a number on one followed by a number on the 
other, and the latter repeated, did occur, along with a few cases where 
the children seemed just to skip about the cards in an unsystematic 
fashion. 
Those subjects who did not vary the amount of evidence they 
collected for different problems tended to use the efficient (in motor 
terms) strategy of opening all the windows to be opened (often just 
one) on one card and then all those on the other. 27 of the 28 
children who opened the same number of windows for all 12 problems did 
so, all nine who did not vary the number opened for 'same' problems 
only, and ten of the 16 subjects who did not vary for 'different' 
problems only. (Eight subjects who opened no pairs for some problems 
are excluded from consideration here. ) 
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The children who did vary the amount of information collected 
tended to vary the way in which they collected it also, often to a quite 
considerable extent. How far this variation was haphazard, and how far 
the result of deliberate attempts to try out different strategies, is 
impossible to tell. Paired comparisons, which suggest an understanding 
of the structure of the problems, were fairly rare, except for the 
special case of only one pair of windows being opened for a problem. 
Only twenty-five children made more than one paired comparison for any 
problem, and only twelve did so for six or more problems. One child 
used paired comparisons (one only for each of five problems) for all 
twelve problems. She was one of only five children who varied the 
amount of evidence collected but collected it in the same way for all 
twelve problems. Three subjects opened all six windows on one card 
followed by varying numbers on the other and one opened all she was 
going to on one followed by the same number on the other. Three subjects 
who varied the amount of evidence collected for 'same' problems only, 
and four for 'different' problems only, also used consistent strategies 
in gathering the information for the six problems in question. 
Information collected and A and B schedules. 
Finally, a note about A and B schedules. If subjects were to open 
the windows from left to right and from the top down they would collect 
the necessary information more quickly with A schedules than with B 
schedules. Those subjects who varied the amount of information collected 
and received A schedules opened a mean of 3L.. 6 windows while those who 
received B schedules opened 44.0 windows on average. This difference 
is statistically significant (Mann-Whitney U= 102.5, P< . 05 1-tailed). 
This is an indication both of a tendency to use this strategy and of a 
tendency to relate the stopping point to the evidence collected. 
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Discussion 
First of all the results of this study will be compared with 
those found by Vurpillot. On the whole they are similar: there are the 
same interpretations of 'samet as tall same' and 'any same', the 
former increasing with age, and the same ordering of difficulty for 
the different kinds of problem. In both studies there is a tendency 
for the children not to collect enough information before making 
their judgements and for the younger children to be less inclined to 
vary the amount of information collected according to the type of 
problem presented than the older ones. 
These similarities and also the small and statistically non- 
significant differences between the open and closed conditions in the 
present study inspire confidence that the closed condition did not 
critically alter the children's information gathering strategies. In 
so far as there were differences between the two conditions, the older 
groups found the open condition slightly easier and Pl the closed con- 
dition. It may be that both the possibilities mentioned in the intro- 
duction - incidental noting of pictures in the open condition and more 
thoughtful behaviour in the closed condition - were operating, but to 
different degrees for children of different ages. 
One difference between Vurpillot's study and the present one is 
that the children here opened fewer windows than the number fixated 
by Vurpillot's subjects - about five per problem compared to about eight 
per problem for her subjects. Vurpillot does not report on the dis- 
tribution of number of windows fixated but it seems unlikely that many 
of her subjects fixated only one pair of windows per problem - certainly 
she does not seem to have experienced the difficulties which led to 
the use of the (same (unmixed) I category here. Also, since she analysed 
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the scores using an analysis of variance it seems unlikely that the 
distribution was bimodal, as found in this chapter. 
From the point of view of the present work the most important 
results are those comparing 'same? with 'different' instructions. 
'Different' was, as expected, more difficult than 'same'. The overall 
difference in number of correct responses is contributed to by two 
different interpretations of 'different'., as 'any different' and as 
'same'. The two together make for the greater flatness of the curves 
in Figure 5: 3B compared to those in Figure 5: 3A, and result in there 
being no difference between the different kinds of problem in the 
number of correct responses made by children in P2. 
The 'any different' interpretation will be considered first. The 
example problems which were shown to the children in some detail were 
intended to make clear to them that all six pairs of windows had to be 
the same for the pair of cards to count as (same' and all six had to 
be different for them to count as 'different'. The 'completely 
different' interpretation may however be more difficult than the 'just 
the same' one for two reasons. Firstly, the use of 'same' to mean 
'identical' is quite common in ordinary language, while the use of 
'different' to mean 'different in all relevant aspects' is not common 
and many children may have adhered to a more natural interpretation of 
? different? as 'having some relevant difference'. The other possible 
reason for the greater difficulty of 'different' is indicated by the 
paraphrases given above. Two objects which are 'just the same' are 
identical in all readily observable attributes save location; two 
objects are never 'completely different': difference is always rela- 
tive to some notion of which attributes are relevant and which are 
not. 
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It was expected that a few children would interpret 'different' 
as meaning Isamel but it turned out to be more common than anticipated. 
Several children showed this interpretation in only one of the testing 
sessions and some of these interpreted the term as 'different' in the 
other session. This means that the numbers found here must be a 
conservative estimate of the number of children who would ever interpret 
'different' as 'same'. It was noted that a greater number of children 
gave inconsistent responses to 'different' instructions than to 'same' 
ones: some children may have been shifting from one interpretation to 
the other within a single session. 
One respect in which the children's performance was better on 
'different' problems than on 'same' ones was that they opened a greater 
number of windows. This could have been because they realised that it 
was appropriate, or they may simply have felt a need for more information 
when they were uncertain about their responses. 
The number of children treating 'different' as 'same' is greater 
than that found in either Chapter 3 or Chapter 4 and this is only 
partly due to there being two testing sessions in which such an inter- 
pretation may be evinced. They are, of course, a different group of 
subjects, but there is no reason to expect them to be poorer performers. 
Their general background is intermediate between those of the subjects 
used in those experiments. There seems to be little in the task which 
would encourage the interpretation of I different' as 'same?. Possibly 
it requires less thought simply to judge whether two objects are 
different or not rather than to select a different object or say what 
is different about two objects and the results might be the con- 
sequence of carelessness. This would also account for the greater 
preponderance of this interpretation in the open condition than in the 
closed condition. 
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Chapter 6. Further experiments on the selection and judgement of 
'same' and 'different' items. 
Introduction. 
So far in this section two experiments have been described, 
involving two rather different tasks. In the experiment described in 
Chapter 4 the subjects had to select from an array an item -a card 
with one or two geometric figures drawn on it - that was either the 
same as, or different from, a target item, and then they had to justify 
these choices. In the experiment described in Chapter 5 all the sub- 
jects had to do was to judge whether two items were the same or not, 
or were different or not. Described in this way, the second task seems 
much simpler but of course it was made more complicated by requiring 
the subjects in one condition to open little card windows to see parts 
of the items and by the complex nature of the stimulus items themselves - 
each consisting of six pictures and each of these individual pictures 
being more complex than the geometric figures used in Chapter )'s 
selection task. All the relevant aspects of one of those geometric 
figures can be taken in at a glance, but this is not true of the sets 
of human figures used in the judgement task. A corollary of this is 
that a subject can pick out a 'same' or 'different' item without 
referring back to the target geometric figure whereas he may have to 
look back and forth several times to judge whether two of the sets of 
human figures are the same or different. 
The stimulus set in Chapter 4 was constructed by taking all the 
possible combinations of two values for each of four properties, all 
the values employed probably soon becoming apparent to the subjects. 
For Chapter 5's stimulus set locations take the place of properties 
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and particular figures the place of values of properties. Even this 
comparison is not exact as the values of one property cannot be the 
same as those of another - only colour can be red or blue! - while 
it is possible, and was indeed the case, that a figure appearing in 
one position on one card could be in a different position on another 
card (though such a situation never arose within a pair of cards). 
In all there were 18 different figures used, and four of these could 
face either to the right or to the left, making twenty-two variations 
altogether. It is extremely unlikely that any child was ever aware 
of just what was the range of figures available. 
It was found that a higher proportion of children in the e xperiment 
described in the previous chapter treated (different' as if it meant 
'same' than in the earlier experiments, and it was suggested that this 
might be because the experiment was so simple. A possible argument is 
that when the meaning of a term is first acquired it can only be used 
consciously but is later routinised and available for relatively auto- 
matic use. The judgement task may be so simple that it is performed 
automatically and some children are led to make judgements in terms 
of 'different' interpreted as 'same' because of this, because only 
this meaning, acquired earlier, is available to lower levels of 
functioning. It was noted that the children were more likely to treat 
'different? as 'same' in the open than in the closed condition in the 
previous experiment. As the open condition should be the easier of 
the two this is consistent with the above line of argument. 
It cannot be ruled out however that the difference arises, not 
because the judgement task is easier than the selection task, but 
because it is more difficult - more difficult by virtue of 
the nature 
of the stimulus materials involved. In this case the argument would 
again be that the more recently acquired interpretation of 
'different' 
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as ? different' is only available when the child is paying conscious 
attention to the word, and that he may not do this if great demands 
are made on his attention from elsewhere. 
Either of these explanations assumes that it is possible for 
one and the same child to interpret 'different' as if it meant 'same' 
on some occasions but to interpret it correctly on others. This 
appeared to be happening in the experiment reported in Chapter 5, some 
children apparently changing their interpretation of the term from one 
condition to the next. 
An obvious test of the alternative explanations that the rate of 
this particular error was high in the previous experiment because of 
the easiness of the task or because of the difficulty of dealing with 
the stimulus materials, is to separate task from materials, and see 
what the effects are of children attempting a judgement task with 
simple stimuli or a selection task with complex materials. The two 
experiments to be described in the present chapter are attempts to do 
just this. 
The sets of cards used in Chapter his selection task are suitable 
for use in a judgement task. It should however be noted that one of 
the properties of the geometric figures, number, differs from the 
others: colour, shape, and pattern, in that it is not a property of a 
single figure. Because of this difference it is excluded from the 
experiment to be described in this chapter and only those cards with 
a single geometric figure are used. This maximises the contrast 
between this stimulus set and the one used in the previous experiment, 
one consisting of pictures, the other of groups of six pictures. 
In 
this case it is possible to have pairs of cards with 
3,2,1 or 0 
properties in common, compared with the 6,5,3,1 or 0 pictures 
in 
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common possible for the cards used in the previous chapter. That is, 
there are only two kinds of 'mixed' pairs available, in addition to 
identical and completely different pairs. In this experiment, unlike 
the previous one, identical and completely different pairs are used 
as negative exemplars of 'different' and 'same', as well as as positive 
exemplars of the opposite terms. It was argued in the previous chapter, 
following Vurpillot (1968) that differences in difficulty between 
problems of different types were due to differences in likelihood that 
a judgement based on too little information would be wrong. This 
argument would not predict any difference in difficulty between identical 
and completely different pairs in the same condition. 
Unfortunately, the sets of cards used in the judgement task in 
Chapter 5 are not suitable for use in a selection task. Such a task 
requires an array of cards structured as a whole, while those cards 
were constructed as a series of pairs, with no regard for the relations 
between cards which were members of different pairs. If used for a 
selection task the number of cards with a given number of pictures in 
common with a target would vary depending on the target and the 
presence of mirror images and identical figures in different locations 
would further confuse the issue. Accordingly a new set of cards is 
used in the present experiment, each of these also having six individual 
pictures on it, and such that for any target card there is the possi- 
bility of choosing cards with 6,41 2 or 0 pictures in common with it. 
Some of the results of these experiments have already been 
presented in the appendix to Chapter 3, as the subjects employed there 
on Claparýde's task all participated in one or other of the present 
experiments and the results were used to shed some further light on 
the outcome of the main experiment of that chapter. It seemed unwise 
to make those subjects carry out both the tasks of the present chapter 
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as that would mean them each participating in three experiments. The 
experiment reported in Chapter 4 included pre-school-age subjects; 
that in Chapter 5 did not as it was thought to be too difficult for 
them. Pre-school subjects are used in the present experiments, most 
of them taking part in both so as to investigate whether their per- 
formance differs from one to the other. Following this introduction, 
the two experiments are reported and then this comparison between the 
two for the youngest subjects is made, and finally there is a general 
discussion. 
The two main points at issue are, will either of these experi- 
ments show the same level of systematic misunderstanding of 'different' 
as ? same' as found in Chapter 5? (and if so, will it be the experi- 
ment using the same task or that involving the same kind of stimulus 
materials? ) and will any of the children who participate in both 
experiments treat I different I as I different I in one of them and as 
'same' in the other? 
It is also of interest whether other findings of Chapters 4 and 
5 are replicated in these experiments. Improvement with age and 
better performance with Isame I than with 'different' instructions, in 
selection and judgement though not necessarily in justification, are 
expected. Other findings of Chapter 4 concerned the similarity of 
both 'same' and 'different' selections to the target, the tendency for 
children in the middle of the age range to make the most dissimilar 
'different, choices, the varying influence of the different properties 
and the differing proportions of different kinds of justification given 
for tsamet and 'different' selections. Chapter 5 found differences in 
difficulty between different kinds of problem, and a tendency to judge 
pairs to be different when there was any point of difference. 
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Expt. 1. Judgements of sameness and difference of geometric figures. 
Method. 
Subjects. 
There were four groups of subjects totalling 45 in all, made 
up as follows: 
Group Number Age range Mean Age 
P 13 3 yrs 0mo -4 yrs 7mo 3: 9 
11 13 5 yrs 1 mo -6 yrs 1 mo 5: 8 
J2 9 6 yrs 6mo -7yrs 6mo 6: 11 
J3 10 7 yrs 1 mo -8 yrs 6 mo 7: 9 
Group P was drawn from the psychology department playgroup. Groups J1, 
J2 and J3 were drawn from the three classes of an independent school 
involved in the experiment described in Chapter 3. Every alternate 
subject to be tested in that study participated in this one. 
Materials. 
The materials used were the sets of cards with geometric figures 
drawn on them described in Chapter 4, save that only those cards 
depicting single figures were used. 
Procedure. 
The children were tested individually, seated beside the experi- 
menter at a table, on which the cards were placed. The school children 
performed the task immediately after Claparede's task; the playgroup 
children carried out this task a few days before taking part in the 
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other experiment to be described in this chapter. 
Each child was tested on 12 'same' problems and 12 'different' 
problems, half the subjects receiving all 'same? problems before the 
'different? ones and half in the reverse order. The 'same' problems 
consisted of six pairs of identical cards, two pairs of cards showing 
geometric figures with two properties in common, two pairs with one 
common property and two pairs with no properties in common. The 
'different' problems consisted of two pairs of identical cards, two 
pairs with two common properties, two pairs with one common property 
and six pairs with no properties in common. Each group of twelve pro- 
blems was arranged in two blocks of six, each block containing three 
identical or completely different pairs, as appropriate, and one each 
of the other kinds. Apart from this constraint the order of problems 
was random and the cards making up the pairs were also determined ran- 
dourly. Before each group of twelve problems the child was shown two 
example problems, an identical pair and one with just one common property 
before + same ' problems, and a completely different pair and one with 
two common properties before 'different' problems. These examples were 
used to stress to the child that the figures had to be the same in all 
three properties to count as fsamef and different in all three pro- 
perties to count as 'different'. For test problems the instructions 
were 'Are these two just the same or not the same? ' and 'Are these 
two completely different or not different? t as appropriate. Occasionally 
a child would change his mind about his judgement. In these instances 
the final decision was accepted. Sessions were tape-recorded and any 
remarks made by the subjects which related to the task were later 
transcribed. 
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Results. 
Age and number of correct judgements. 
Figure 6: 1 shows the number of correct 'same' and ? different' 
judgements made by the different age groups. Kruskal-Wallis analyses 
of variance to test for the effects of age group were performed on the 
'same' scores, the 'different' scores and on the differences between 
these two scores for each subject, the last to test for an interaction. 
None gave statistically significant results (Same, H=0.52, n. s.; 
Different, H=7.37, n. s.; Same - Different, H=4 . 15, n. s. ). 
Performance on 'same' judgements is high throughout and Figure 6: 1 would 
lead one to expect a non-significant outcome. The result for 'different 
judgments has a chance probability of ß. U1 and given that in no case 
does an older group perform less well than a younger one, and that no 
account is taken of this order information in the analysis it might be 
accepted that there is a real difference between the groups. 
Responses to different types of problem. 
Figure 6: 2 shows the proportions of different kinds of judgement 
for different kinds of problem. The different types of problem do 
not exactly match the different types used in the previous experiment. 
In that case pairs of identical cards were used only with 'same' 
instructions and pairs of completely different cards only with 'different' 
instructions, there being three kinds of 'mixed' problem used with both 
instructions. In this case there are only two kinds of 'mixed' problem, 
those with one and two common properties and identical and completely 
different pairs of cards are used with both 'same' and 'different' 
instructions. The rationale given for there being differences in 
difficulty between the 'mixed' problems and between these and the identical 
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and completely different pairs would not lead one to expect any 
difference between these last two types when used in the same con- 
dition, and so they are grouped together for the purpose of testing 
for differences between problems of different types. Table 6: 1 gives 
the percentages of correct responses for the different types. 
Same Different 
No. of common 3+03+0 
properties: 30 combined 1230 combined 12 
% correct 97 97 97 89 70 81 75 77 )4 50 
Table 6: 1. Percentages of correct responses to different types of 
rod blem. 
Differences between the types of problem were tested for statis- 
tically in the same way as in the previous chapter. Kendall's S 
statistic was computed for each child as a measure of the extent to 
which his proportions correct for the different kinds of problem fell 
in the expected order, and t-tests were then carried out for each age 
group to test the null hypothesis that the mean value of S was zero. 
The results of this procedure are given in Table 6: 2. 
Same Different 
Mean S t p(1-tailed) Mean S t p(1-tailed) 
p 1.08 3.35 <. 01 0.77 1.39 n. s. 
Jl 0.77 1.96 <. 05 0.16 0.71 n. s. 
J2 1.00 2.83 c. 05 1.89 5.76 <. 001 
J3 0 0 n. s. 1.00 1.59 n. s. 
Table 6: 2. Tests for differences between types of problem. 
As can be seen, for 'same' judgements there were significant 
differences between the types of problem for all groups except J3 but 
only for J2 for 'different' judgements. 
190 
Interpretations of 'same' and t different '. 
The children's judgement patterns give an indication of the 
interpretations of 'same' and 'different' they are using and these 
will now be considered. The procedure in this experiment corresponds 
to the open condition in the study reported in the previous chapter, 
in that the pairs of cards were put before the children without any 
covers. However, in this case if a child looks directly at a card at 
all, he will see all three properties, whereas in the former case it 
was necessary to fixate each picture individually. It should be the 
case that the evidence on which a judgement is based always consists 
of all the evidence - the values on each of the three properties for 
both cards - but just because the child must see all the information 
does not mean that he attends to each property, or considers it in 
arriving at his judgement. For this reason, criteria of less than 100% 
of judgements consistent with a particular definition were adopted in 
deciding the interpretations used by the subjects. In principle any 
definition may be used for either term. The children's responses were 
classified as follows: 
All same All properties have to be the same for the pair of cards to 
be judged Isamet or 'different' - the correct interpretation 
for 'same'. Criterion: at least 11 out of 12 judgements 
consistent with this interpretation. 
Any same A pair of cards is judged 'same' or 'different' if they 
have the same value on any of the three properties. 
Criterion: at least 11 out of 12 judgements consistent with 
this interpretation. 
Other same Interpreting 'same' or 'different' as 'same' in some sense 
but further definition not possible. Criterion: at least 
7 out of 8 judgements of identical and completely different 
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pairs consistent with interpretation as 'same', but not 
falling under either of the above categories. 
All different 
Any different As corresponding 'same' definitions, mutatis mutandis. 
Other different 
Other Fewer than 7 out of 8 judgements of identical and completely 
different pairs consistent with either 'same' or 'different' 
interpretations. 
The results of this classification for 'same' interpretations are 
given in Table 6: 3. 
P J1 J2 J3 Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
All same 8 62 10 77 6 67 7 70 31 69 
Any same 2 15 2 15 0 0 0 0 49 
Other same 2 15 1 8 3 33 1 10 7 16 
Other 1 8 0 0 0 0 2 20 37 
13 13 9 10 115 
Table 6: 3. Interpretations of 'same'. 
There is no clear pattern to the fall same' scores in the 
different age groups but only in the two younger groups are there any 
'any same' cases. Oddly, a higher proportion of the two older groups 
fall into the 'other same' and 'other? categories. 
The three children classified as 'other' can be looked at more 
closely. The youngest of these, a child in P, judged all pairs of cards 
to besamet. She is not simply a yea-sayer, as she did not behave in 
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this way when making 'different' judgements. She may be basing her 
judgements on some very general property - for instance, that the 
cards are the same because both members of each pair show geometric 
figures. It seems clear that the two older children, in J3, are at 
the opposite extreme. Their only errors are on identical pairs, one 
judging two of them and the other five of them, to be 'not the same'. 
Remarks they made spontaneously during testing indicate that their 
judgements were based on genuine, but, to the experimenter, irrelevant 
differences. 
The interpretations the children appeared to be using for 
different' are as given in Table 6: 4. 
P J1 J2 J3 Total 
N%N%N%N%N% 
All different 002 15 2 22 4 40 8 18 
Any different 4 31 2 15 5 56 5 50 16 36 
Other different 3 23 3 23 2 22 008 18 
Total different 7 SL 7 54 9 100 9 90 32 71 
All same 2 15 2 15 0 0 1 10 5 . 11 
Any same 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Other same 1 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 
Total same 4 31 2 15 0 0 1 10 7 16 
Other 2 15 4 31 00 00 6 13 
13 13 9 10 45 
Table 6: 1.. Interpretations of 'different'. 
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The correct tall different' interpretation slowly increases in 
popularity with age but is never as common as 'any different'. The 
various 'other' classifications - ? other same', 'other different' and 
'other' are more numerous than for 'same' interpretations but are this 
time more common in the two younger age groups. 
The three 'other' cases for interpretations of 'same' were all 
thought likely on closer inspection to be treating the term as 
meaning 'same' in some sense, although they did not satisfy the criteria 
set up. Similarly, it may be that four of the six 'other' cases for 
tdifferentl may in some way be treating the term as meaning 'different'. 
Corresponding to the child who declared all twelve pairs to be 'same' 
in that condition, one of the children in Jl declared all twelve pairs 
to be 'not different'. She scored 11 out of 12 correct for ? same' 
(and was therefore classified as 'all same') so she is not just giving 
a negative response to each problem. As with the other child, she may 
be basing her answers on some general similarity, such as being geometric 
figures, which prevent her from acknowledging the pairs to be 'completely 
different'. Three other cases, 1 in P and 2 in J1, score 6 out of 8 
for the identical and completely different pairs and varied numbers 
for the other problems. This just fails to meet the criterion and could 
be due to carelessness. In the summary of this experiment in the 
appendix to Chapter 3, both of these subjects in J1 were accepted as 
understanding 'different'. 
The remaining two ? other' cases for different, one in P and one 
in J1, defy explanation. The response patterns for these subjects are 
identical and evenly divided between right and wrong answers for all 
types of problem: one correct and one incorrect judgement for the pairs 
with three, two and one common properties, and three right and three 
wrong for the completely different pairs. 
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Cross-tabulating the findings for the interpretations given to 
tsame' and 'different' results in Table 6: 5. No child appears in the 
'other - other' cell in this table. This is in line with the suggestion 
that the subjects classified as 'other' for 'same' do actually under- 
stand the term, as if they did not, one might expect them not to 
understand 'different? either. 
Interpretations Interpretations of 'same' 
of ' diff erent ': Same Other 
Same 7 0 7 
Different 29 3 32 
Other 6 0 6 
42 3 45 
Table 6; 5. Cross-tabulation of interpretations of 'same' and 
1 diff erent '. 
Effect of different properties on responses. 
Next we come to consider the influence of the different properties, 
colour, shape and pattern, on the children's responses. The percentages 
of correct responses, i. e. 'not the same' and 'not different', when those 
pairs with only one or two properties in common had a particular pro- 
perty in common, are given in Table 6: 6. 
i9 
Same 
Colour Shape Pattern 
One common property 100 74 96 
Two common properties 85 59 68 
Different 
Colour Shape Pattern 
39 43 44 
44 65 50 
The figures for 'two common properties' are derived from the 
following percentages: 
Same 
Properties common: Colour Colour Pattern 
and and and 
Shape Pattern Shape 
77 91 47 
Different 
Colour Colour Pattern 
and and and 
Shape Pattern Shape 
58 34 71 
Table 6: 6. Correct responses by common properties. 
All three percentages for 'different' problems with one property 
common are rather similar. Otherwise the pattern is consistent: pairs 
of the same shape are most likely to be judged 'same' or 'not different', 
pairs of the same colour are most likely to be judged 'not the same' 
or ? differentt and pairs of the same pattern are intermediate. 
Spontaneous remarks. 
Although the children were not asked to justify their judgements 
some of them did so spontaneously, or made other remarks about the 
pairs of cards. The corpus of spontaneous remarks will be considered 
here. 
Most of the remarks were straightforward justifications e. g. a 
child judges a red striped circle and a blue spotted square to be 'not 
the same' and goes on IThat's a round and that's a square and that's 
got stripes and that's got spots'. Because these justifications are 
not available for all subjects they will not be considered further. 
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One child in P who is classified as treating 'different' as 
'same' clearly uses the term with this meaning. She says of two blue 
spotted squares That one's a square and that one's a square, they 
are different' and of a blue spotted square and a blue spotted circle, 
'Those arenºt different, that onets a square and that one's a ball'. 
Another child in P, the one who declared all 'same' pairs to be the 
same, makes some puzzling remarks. After confidently making her 
judgement she several times went on to say that one of a pair of cards 
was the same and the other was not, or that one was different and the 
other was not. She was classified as understanding 'different' on 
the basis of her judgement pattern (though she fell into the 'other 
different' category) and one was inclined to say that she understood 
'same' also but these remarks indicate that her understanding of the 
terms is at best imperfect. It will be necessary to refer to this 
child again and the initials KT will be used to identify her. 
A child in J2 provides an ingenious justification for judging a 
red striped circle and a blue spotted square to be the same. Before 
making her judgement she said 'Well the lines there and the lines 
there', pointing to the outline of the square and the stripes on the 
circle. She was prompted to give a judgement and after doing so she 
said 'Because that's round and those are round', referring this time 
to the outline of the circle and the spots on the square. This child 
made only one other error in her 'same' judgements, in that she judged 
two spotted circles, one red and one blue, to be the same, adding after- 
wards 'Cos, but this one is red and this one's blue'. There are three 
other children among those who contribute to the spontaneous remarks 
corpus (one each in P. in Jl and in J2) whose only error is judging 
two figures of the same shape and pattern, but not colour, to be the 
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same and each of these comments on the fact that there are different 
colours. The clearest case is the child in J2 who says 'They are 
same but they've got the different colours'. This type of problem, 
with only colour not common, was the only ? same' problem to elicit 
fewer than 50% correct responses. For some children at least, it 
is not that they have either not noticed or not remembered the 
different colours, but that they think them unimportant. 
There are two other children who comment on differences in cards 
which they have judged to be the same. One of these is wrong on both 
problems with two common properties. For one pair it is, once again, 
colour which is not common and for the other pair it is shape; in both 
cases she comments on the differences. The remaining child incorrectly 
judges three pairs of cards to be the same, two of which have only 
shape in common and one both colour and shape and in one of the former 
cases she comments that only one card has dots. So altogether the 
instances where the children judge a pair of cards to be the same but 
then remark on differences between them amount to five for differences 
in colour and one each for differences in pattern and shape. 
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Expt. 2. Selection and justification of same and different items 
using complex stimuli. 
Method. 
Subjects. 
There were 43 subjects divided into four groups as follows: 
Group Number Age range 
P 11 3 yrs 0 mo -L yrs 8 mo 
11 10 4 yrs 9 mo -6 yrs 3 mo 
J2 11 6 yrs 3 mo -8 yrs 2 mo 
J3 11 7 yrs )4mo -8yrs 11mo 
ýýean Age 
3 yrs 11 mo 
5 yrs 7 mo 
6 yrs 10 mo 
8 yrs 1 mo 
Two children, one in P aged 3 yrs 7 mo and one in J1 aged 4 yrs 
9 mo did not complete the task. If they are excluded the mean age of 
P is unchanged but that of Jl becomes 5 yrs 8 mo. 
The children in group P were drawn from the psychology department 
playgroup and ten of them participated in experiment 1 also. The J 
groups consist of those children who acted as subjects for the experi- 
ment reported in Chapter 3 who did not take part in experiment 1. It 
was noted in Chapter 3 that one child was tested but his responses 
not included in any analysis because his understanding of English did 
not seem adequate to the task. He seemed quite able to cope with the 
selection task and so he is included here - at 8 yrs 11 months he was 
the oldest subject to be tested. 
Materials. 
The materials consisted of two identical sets of six cards, each 
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card having on it six coloured pictures of birds, in two rows of three, 
produced by rub-down transfers. Figure 6: 3 shows an example. The cards 
measured 12 cm x8 cm, the individual pictures occupying most of their 
allotted) cm x4 cm space along at least one dimension. There were in 
all twelve different bird pictures and they were assigned to different 
cards in such a way that for any one card the remainder of the set of 
twelve consisted of one identical card, four cards with four of the same 
birds on, four cards with two of the same birds on, and two completely 
different cards. 
Procedure. 
Each child was seen individually, seated beside the experimenter. 
The school children performed the task immediately after ClaparedeIs 
task, the playgroup children a few days after Expt. 1, for those who 
took part in that experiment. 
All twelve cards were laid out on a table in front of the child in 
a haphazard manner. Half the children made 'same' selections first and 
the other half 'different' selections first, all those of one kind being 
made before any of the other kind. The experimenter picked up a card 
from the table and asked 'Can you find me one that's the same as (different 
from) this? ' and when a selection had been made 'How are they the same 
(different)? ' Each of the six different cards was used as a target for 
both same and different selections, the experimenter picking up the cards 
in a pre-determined random order. 
If a child later rejected a card he had picked out only the choice 
he eventually accepted was taken account of in analysis. All sessions 
were tape-recorded for later transcription and the experimenter made notes 
as to which birds were pointed to by the children where this was neces- 
sary to clarify their justifications. 
Prompts were used where a child did not make a selection or a justi- 
fication, or where the justification offered would be considered a 'no 
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200 
ý. +i 
,, 
,. 
r-. ,- 
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Results. 
Selections. 
All children save two made all twelve selections requested. one 
child in P refused to make one 'different' choice and one in Ji made 
only two 'same' selections. 
Effect of age on similarity of selections. 
Figure 6: 4 shows the mean number of pictures in common between 
target and selection for the different age groups in response to the 
two instructions. These figures are based on the results for 41 
subjects for each instruction, the two children mentioned above being 
dropped. Kruskal-Wallis analyses of variance were carried out on the 
mean number of common pictures for each child, for 'same' selections, 
'different' selections and the difference between these two, to test 
for age effects and in the last case, for an age by instruction inter- 
action. None gave statistically significant results, although the 
last two came close to it. ('Same', H=2.05, n. s., 'Different'. 
H=7.33, n. s., 'Same' - 'Different', H=7.28, n. s., d. f. =3 
throughout. ) 
Effect of instruction. 
Figure 6: 4 clearly indicates a difference in the number of 
common pictures between 'same' and 'different' choices. In all, 39 
children had a higher mean number of common pictures for their 'same' 
selections than their 'different' selections and for only one child 
(in P) was the reverse true. 'Same' selections seem to 
be more similar 
to the target than would be expected by chance, while 'different' 
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selections, although dissimilar to the target rather than otherwise, 
are little different from chance. 
As in Chapter 14. it is possible to discover whether an 
individual's selections are significantly more similar to, or more 
dissimilar from, the target than would be expected by chance. The 
results of this procedure are given in Table 6: 7. 
Sane No. of subjects whose 'same' selections 
are significantly similar to target P L-05- % of group 
P4 36 
il 4 Lao 
J2 4 36 
J3 7 64 
Total 19 45 
Different No. of subjects whose 'different' selections 
are significantly dissimilar from target P<. ()5. % of group 
P00 
11 3 30 
J2 2 18 
J3 3 27 
Total 8 19 
Table 6: 7. Subjects who make significantly similar or dissimilar 
selections. 
The numbers of such subjects are more than twice as great for 
'same' selections as for IdifferentT ones. 
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It is also possible to test whether an individual child is dis- 
tinguishing between his 'same' and 'different' selections in the no. 
of pictures common to target and chosen card. Sign tests on their 
selections have the results given in Table 6: 8. 
No. of subjects whose ? same' and 'different' 
P J1 J2 
365 
J3 Total 
selections are different, p <. 05 
of group 
7 21 
30 67 45 64 51 
Table 6: 8. Subjects whose ? same' and 'different' selections differ 
significantly. 
About half the subjects distinguish between their selections in 
this way. 
There may of course be nothing wrong with a child's selections, 
even if neither his 'same' nor his 'different' selections are different 
from what would be expected by chance, or different from each other. 
The only absolutely wrong choices are those of an identical card as 
Tdifferentt or a completely different one as 'same'. The latter error 
was made by only one child, in P (at 3 yrs 1 mo, the second youngest 
to be tested), and by her only once. She also chose an identical card 
as 'different', as did two other children in P and two in J1. 
Justifications. 
The children's justifications of their selections were categorised 
as similarities, differences, both and no responses as in Chapter 
1i. 
In a few cases a child did not respond verbally to the request 
for a 
justification, but simply pointed to pictures on the two cards. These 
cases are counted as similarities or differences depending on whether 
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the birds pointed to were the same or different. The similarities 
and differences offered included references to the colour, shape and 
posture of the birds, as well as to the presence or absence of 
particular birds and general statements such as 'They have the same 
birds on' or 'Not the same birds'. These last kinds of statement 
were included as similarities or differences but assertions such as 
'They are the same' or 'They are different' were, as for previous 
experiments, counted as no responses. This is because they could be 
an automatic response to the experimenter's request and say nothing 
about the selection made, whereas a reference to 'birds' is related to 
the selection. 
Figure 6: 5 shows the proportions of different categories of 
justifications offered by children in the different age groups. Justi- 
fications mentioning both similarity and difference are more common 
for 'different' selections than for 'same' ones, but 'no responses' are 
less common. Kruskal-Wallis analyses of variance show that the number of 
differences justifying 'different' selections increases with age 
(H = 8.67, d. f .=3, p <-05,42 Ss) but the number of similarities 
justifying 'same' selections does not increase to a statistically 
significant extent (H = 6.06, d. f. = 3, n. s. , 42: Ss). 
Overall, 79% of ? same? justifications and 76% of ' di. ff erent 
justifications are appropriate and the difference between them is not 
statistically significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, 
N= 2L, T= 133 n. s. ). 
In Chapter 4 the probabilities of individual subjects' justi- 
fication performances being given by chance, given their selections, 
were calculated. One of the assumptions of this analysis was that 
justifications must consist of mentions of the properties involved 
in the experiment. In the present experiment the range of justifications 
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Figure 6: 5. Percentages of justifications of different types. 
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offered was wide and such a procedure would be inappropriate. It can 
however be noted that since 'same' selections tended to be more 
similar to the target than 'different' selections were dissimilar from 
it, a child would be more likely to give an appropriate 'samet justi- 
fication by chance than he would be to give an appropriate 'different' 
justification. 
Two children, one in J2 and one in J3, gave differences in 
justification of 'same' selections while six children, four in P, one 
in Jl and one in J3 justified 'different' selections by similarities. 
The latter group includes the child who refused to make one 'different' 
selection. 
One child made an unqualified assertion that two cards were 
different and he and three others made similar assertions that two 
cards were the same. The differences between ? same' and 'different' in 
this respect does not account for the total difference in the number 
of 'no responses'. 
Interpretations of 'same' and 'different'. 
A child is held to understand either of the terms ? samet and 
'different' if he makes no absolutely wrong selections or justifications 
(i. e. a completely different card for a 'same' selection or an iden- 
tical card for a 'different' one; a difference as a 'same' justification 
or a similarity as a 'different? one) for that term and if he either 
distinguishes between his 'same' and 'different' selections or gives at 
least five out of six appropriate justifications for the term in 
question. The numbers of children who understand the terms, as assessed 
by these criteria, are given in Table 6: 9. 
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Understand 'same' Understand 'different' Understand both 
N % N % N % Total N 
P 8 8o 4 1i. a 4 140 lc 
11 8 89 6 67 6 67 9 
J2 9 82 9 82 8 73 11 
J3 10 91 9 82 8 73 11 
Total 35 85 28 68 26 63 41 
Table 6: 9. Children who understand ? same? and 'different'. 
The children who did not make all selections are excluded from 
Table 6: 9. Of these, the child in P whose 'same' selections were com- 
plete did not satisfy the criteria for understanding that term while 
the child in Jl whose record for 'different' was complete did understand 
it. 
Of the eight children who fail the criteria for understanding 
'same', three, including the child with an incomplete record, appear 
on balance to understand it correctly. Four children have quite 
uninformative performances. The remaining child justifies four of his 
selections with differences (and two with similarities) but these 
differences are different from those he used to justify 'different 
selections in that they refer to the absence of certain birds whereas 
the latter refer to differences in colour between the birds. Although 
his performance is odd, it does not seem to show a systematic mis- 
understanding of 's ame '. 
Of the fourteen children who fail the criteria for understanding 
tdifferentt seven seem to be interpreting it correctly most of the 
time, and one has a quite uninformative record. There remain six cases 
of possible systematic misunderstanding. These include the child 
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whose 'different' record is not complete but since she made five 
'different' selections there is quite a lot of evidence to go on. 
Criteria for a child treating ' different f as if it meant ' same I 
corresponding to those for understanding the term correctly would be 
that the child would have to make no completely different selections 
or give any differences in justification, and at least five of the 
justifications would have to be similarities. No child meets these 
criteria. One child in J1 fails only because she makes a completely 
different choice (as well as an identical one). All her 'different' 
selections are justified by similarities, the completely different 
card being justified by saying that birds in corresponding positions 
on the two cards both have tails. The child with an incomplete record 
seems an even clearer case. All her five selections were of cards 
with four pictures in common with the target, making them slightly 
more similar to the target than her }same' selections, on average. 
For the missing selection she selects three cards and then rejects 
them, saying 'not the same' as she rejects two of them. Three of her 
justifications are similarities and the other two are simple assertions 
that the two cards are the same. Such assertions - 'they are the same' 
and just 'same' do not have the same status in response to a question 
about difference as they do in response to 'How are they the same? ' 
as they cannot simply be an echo of the experimenter. 
The evidence concerning the remaining four children is not as 
strong, though on balance they seem to be treating 'different' as if 
it meant 'same'. One of these is the child who chose a completely 
different card as 'same'; she never makes such a selection as 'different' 
but chooses one identical card and her only justification which is not 
a 'no response' is a similarity. Her responses to 'same' and 'different' 
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are in general very similar, but it is not clear that she understands 
either term. Another child, (KT)., makes no wrong selections, and 
indeed chooses one completely different card, but justifies each of 
her selections by a similarity, an assertion that the two are the 
same, or a 'no response'. Another, also in P like the previous two, 
chooses two identical cards and no completely different ones and 
offers a mixture of similarities, differences and both in justification. 
The other child in this group is in Jl. He chooses one identical card 
and two completely different ones, and his justifications are either 
differences or fall into the 'both' category. One justification 
counted as a difference is 'Because that bird isn't different to that 
bird', pointing to a cock sparrow and a robin. This seemed to be 
intended as a difference and he has either made a slip of the tongue 
or he is using 'different' with the meaning 'same'. 
A fairly conservative position to adopt on the children's inter- 
pretations of 'different' would be to say that 29 children interpreted 
it correctly, 2 interpreted it as 'same' and no firm decision could 
be reached on the remaining 12 cases. The two 'same' cases represent 
5% of the subjects, one school child representing 3% of the school 
groups. Even if the four doubtful cases were included, there would be 
only ]J of the whole group and 6% of the school children who seem to 
interpret (different? as 'same'. 
Cross-classifying the interpretations given to 'same' and 
'different' yields Table 6: 10. 
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Interpretation of 'same' 
Same Other 
Same 1 (1) 2 
Interpretation 
of Idifferentt Different 26 2+ (1) 29 
Other 84 12 
35 8 43 
Figures in brackets represent subjects who did not make all selections. 
Table 6: 10. Cross-classification of interpretations given to 'same' 
and 'different'. 
Interpretations of ' same ' and 'different' by subjects participating 
in both experiments 1 and 2. 
Subjects. 
There were ten subjects, aged 3 yrs 0 months to 4 yrs 8 months, 
mean age 3 yrs 10 months (ages taken at time of experiment 2) who 
took part in both experiments 1 and 2. Other children who appear in 
the P groups for these experiments were unwilling or absent when 
wanted for the other experiment. 
Procedure. 
Experiment 2 was carried out with these subjects a few days 
after experiment 1. 
Results. 
Although it is interpretations of tdifferentt that are of the 
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most interest, the position with 'salve' can also be considered. Cross- 
classification of the results of the two experiments gives the following 
picture for 'same? interpretations: 
Category for expt. 2: Category for expt. 1: Same Other 
Same 707 
Other 213 
91 10 
Table 6: 11. Interpretations of 'same' in experiments 1 and 2. 
The criterion used in experiment 2 seems to have been stricter 
than that used in experiment 1. The one case to be classified as 
'other' in the first experiment is also so classified in the second. 
The cross classification for 'different' is given in Table 6: 12. 
Category for expt. 1: 
Category for 
expt. 2 Same Different Other 
Same 1 0 0 1 
Different 0 4 0 4 
Other 1 3 1 5 
2 7 1 10 
Table 6: 12. Interpretations of 'different' in experiments 1 and 2. 
There are no clear instances of a child treating 'different' as 
'same' in one experiment and as 'different' in the other. 
The one 
clear case of a child treating I different I as I same I 
found in this 
group in the second experiment was one of the four cases 
found in the 
first. Of the other three cases found in the first experiment two 
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did not take part in the second one and one was classified as 
'other' although it was thought likely that she was treating 'different, 
as ? same'. This was the child who did not show clear understanding 
of 'same' or ' Jiff erent' in that experiment. 
There were two other children in P who, although not clear cases, 
seemed on balance to be interpreting 'different' as 'same? in experi- 
ment 2. One of these did not participate in experiment 1, the other 
was classified as understanding ' Jiff erent' then, and therefore comes 
closest of all the subjects to completely changing her interpretation 
from one experiment to the other. 
This subject is the one referred to as KT, and her performance 
will be summarised here. In the first experiment she declared all 
pairs to be the same in the ? same' condition and although her 'different' 
judgements suggested correct understanding she made some odd remarks 
to the effect that one member of a pair was the same, or different, 
while the other was not. In the second experiment she never made a 
completely wrong choice and made a choice of the appropriate extreme 
once in each condition (an identical card as 'same' and a completely 
different one as 'different'). Most of her justifications were no 
responses, the others were similarities, one for a 'same' selection 
and the other three for ? different' selections. The overall picture 
is one of confusion. The child's general manner in testing was one 
of willingness to carry out the task but unwillingness to devote a 
great deal of attention to it. She may be interpreting 'different' as 
'different' on one occasion and as tsamet on the other but one would 
not wish to push this claim strongly. 
It is not surprising that no clear instances of variation from 
one experiment to the other have been found, as there were only ten 
subjects in all and only two of these clearly adopted the 'same' 
inter- 
pretation in either experiment. 
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Discussion. 
A principal point of interest for this chapter is the pro- 
portion of subjects who appear to be treating 'different' as if it 
meant 'same' in the different experiments. These proportions are 
summarised in Table 6: 13. 
Pre-schoolers School children 
No. % of group No. % of group 
Chapter Ii., selection task Ii. 16 1 2 
Chapter 5, judgement task, 
open condition - - 17 20 
Chapter 5, judgement task, 
closed condition - - 8 9 
This chapter, 
1st experiment, judgement task 4 31 3 9 
This chapter, 
2nd experiment, selection task 1 9 1 3 
Table 6: 13. Numbers and percentages of children who treat 'different' 
as if it means 'same'. 
These figures seem to support the claim that the high proportion 
of this error found in the previous chapter was due to the task used, 
as the judgement task in the present chapter results in more system- 
atic misunderstanding than the selection task, although the rate of 
error is only as high as found in the closed condition in Chapter 5 
while the procedure corresponds to the open condition. 
However the position is not as clear-cut as this. None of the 
children consigned to the 'other' category for their use of 'different' 
in this chapter's first experiment seemed more likely to be inter- 
preting (different' as Isame ' than as IdifferentI, although two were 
equally balanced, while four ? other' cases in the second experiment 
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did seem closer to an interpretation as Isamet than as 'different'. 
If these subjects were included in the figures given above, those 
figures would rise to 4. or 36%, for pre-school children and 2, or 6%, 
for school children. Such a practice would be rather lax, but this 
does serve to illustrate the problem that the percentages obtained 
are in part a result of the criteria used and in most cases there is 
a degree of arbitrariness in setting the criteria. On balance the 
writer would still argue that systematic misunderstanding was higher 
in the judgement task than in the selection task, but with less 
certainty than the figures in the above table would seem to warrant. 
Two further comments about these figures can be made before 
proceeding to the next point. The first is that, except in the 
experiment reported in the previous chapter, the absolute number of 
subjects who make the error is very low, especially among the school 
children, and so the percentages must be unreliable. The second is a 
reminder that the figures drawn from Chapter 4 are based only on those 
subjects who completed the task, who made up 66% of the pre-schoolers 
and 91% of the school children. It is not unreasonable to suggest 
that the children who did not complete the task were in general poorer 
performers and would be more likely to show misunderstanding of 
? different? than the other subjects. If this is so, the figures, 
particularly for pre-schoolers, are underestimates. 
The second main aim of this chapter was to see if any subjects 
could be found who showed correct understanding of I different T in one 
experiment but treated it as if it meant (same? in the other, thus 
replicating Chapter 5? s finding that some subjects used the incorrect 
interpretation in either the open or closed condition but the correct 
interpretation in the other condition. It may have been over-optimistic 
to expect such a finding with only ten subjects taking part in both 
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experiments and there were no clear cases. There was however one 
subject who seemed to understand the term correctly in the first 
experiment and was classified as t others for I different? in the 
second experiment, though her behaviour seemed closer to an inter- 
pretation as 'same' than as 'different'. Her performance as a 
whole suggested a degree of confusion about both the terms t same' 
and 'different' and it may be that she opted sometimes for one and 
sometimes for the other interpretation of 'different' possibly even 
within the course of a testing session. 
A number of other findings of the previous experiments were 
replicated in the experiments reported in this chapter, some more 
completely than others. 
First, and perhaps least interestingly, the effects of age. The 
selection task reported in Chapter L. showed a mixture of significant 
and non-significant changes with age in the number of properties common 
to selection and target while the current experiment found no statis- 
tically significant changes, though the results come close to sig- 
nifican. ce. In both experiments only one wholly incorrect (same? 
selection was made, by one of the youngest subjects in both cases. 
More incorrect 'different' selections were made and these declined with 
age in both experiments. Chapter 5 reported a statistically signifi- 
cant difference due to age in the number of correct judgements while 
this chapter did not, though there was reason to accept that there was 
a genuine difference with age in the number of correct 'different' 
judgements. Both the correct interpretations tall same' and tall 
different' were found to increase with age in Chapter 5; only 'all 
different' did so in the present chapter. 
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Some differences between responses to 'same' and 'different' 
instructions were found in all experiments. In both selection 
experiments 'same' selections were significantly more similar to the 
target than 'different' ones, but both 'same' and 'different 
selections were more similar to the target in Chapter la's experiment 
than in the present one. In the former case, cards as similar as 
possible to the target were chosen on over 80% of occasions compared 
to less than 50% of occasions for the later experiment. 'Different' 
selections were more similar to the target than random selections 
from the cards in the former case but not in the latter. Chapter L. 
reported that children in the middle of the age range made 'different' 
selections that were more dissimilar from the target than those made 
by either older or younger children; this was not replicated in the 
present chapter. 
The one point at which differences between the responses to 
tsame? and 'different' instructions seem to be lacking is in the 
number of appropriate justifications, which seemed to be much the 
same for both 'same' and 'different' selections, in both of the 
experiments under consideration. However it was shown in Chapter lý 
that performance in 'different' justifications could be considered to 
be better than for 'same' justifications because the likelihood of an 
appropriate justification being given by chance was much lower for 
differentf than for +same' selections. The same is true of the present 
experiment, though to a lesser extent because of the changed nature 
of the selections, mentioned above. Although the numbers of approp- 
riate justifications are about the same for both t same I and ' different' 
selections the proportions of other kinds of justification vary. In 
both experiments there were more similarities justifying 'different' 
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selections than differences justifying tsame' selections, and more 
'both' justifications for 'different' selections while 'no responses' 
were more common when justification of a 'same' selection was requested. 
There were also more unqualified assertions that two cards were the 
same than that they were different. 
The number of correct responses was significantly greater for 
'same' judgements than for 'different' judgements in both judgement 
experiments. There are two reasons for this: interpretation of 
'different' as if it meant 'samet (the results concerning which have 
been discussed in some detail above) while only one child in one 
condition in one experiment seemed to treat 'same' as if it meant 
different', and the greater prevalence of the 'any different' inter- 
pretation of ' different t compared to the 'any same' interpretation of 
'same'. A consequence of these incorrect interpretations is that in 
both experiments more age groups show statistically significant differ- 
ences in the number of correct responses between different types of 
t same' problem than between different types of 'different' problem. 
As mentioned, the 'any different" interpretation was more common than 
the Zany same' one in both experiments but the absolute frequencies 
varied, as Table 6: 14 shows. 
Percentages of subjects who interpreted: 
'same' as: 'different' as: 
All Any 
Chapter 5 All same 22% Any same 8% different 11% different 1S% 
This chapter, it it 69% if it 6% 25% if 38% 
school children 
Table 6: 14. Interpretations of ? same' and 'different' in judgement 
experiments. 
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There are lower proportions of 'all same? and 'any same' , and 
of º all different l and º any different l combined in the results from 
Chapter 5 because there were more cases where it was not possible to 
decide between the two interpretations in that experiment. However 
the startling feature about the relative proportions of the 'all' and 
'any' interpretations is the great increase in the correct fall same' 
interpretation found in the experiment reported in this chapter. The 
relative proportions for 'different' interpretations are not very 
different from those found previously. 
In Chapter 4 an argument was put forward suggesting that the 
children's performance may have been the result of them sometimes 
perceiving the stimuli in a separable fashion and sometimes in an 
integral fashion, in the terms of Garner (1970). If this is so some 
differences in results in the experiments reported in the present 
chapter from those found previously would be expected, because of the 
different stimulus materials used. The cards used in Chapter 5 and 
in the second experiment of the present chapter must facilitate 
separable perception, consisting as they do of a number of separate 
pictures, those pictures not requiring further analysis, while the 
geometric figures used in the other experiments could well be per- 
ceived integrally. 
The differences reported above will now be discussed in the 
light of this argument. 
The degree of similarity between two objects perceived integrally 
is something which is immediately perceptually experienced while if 
two objects are separably perceived their degree of similarity may be 
something which is partly worked out cognitively - reckoning up the 
points of similarity and those of difference. This is in line with 
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Wohlwill's (1968b) comments about the differences between perception 
and cognition. The experience of identity is a special case. Even 
for an adult, that is, for the writer, a pair of identical geometric 
figure cards stands out strongly while there is not this effect for 
a pair of identical cards from either of the other two sets of 
materials. For a child who perceives the geometric figures in an 
integral fashion this contrast must be greater. 
On this account it is easy to see why 'same' selections are 
more similar to the target when the stimuli are geometric figures 
than when they are sets of pictures. In the former case the task is 
performed perceptually and the closest match is easy to pick out. 
(The closest match is not always chosen: in some cases it may be the 
most similar card within a narrow field of view that is chosen, in 
other cases it may be that the child has not got the target in view or 
a clear image of it in his mind. A child who does not perceive these 
figures integrally may also sometimes pick a less similar card. ) In 
the latter case assessing similarity is a much slower process and it 
is not surprising if the children often settle on a card which, they 
have established, has some pictures in common with the target before 
completing the comparisons and so often pick cards which are not 
identical. 
As for 'different' selections, it was argued in Chapter 4 that 
being asked for a difference may tend to switch some children, at 
least, into a separable mode of functioning. If the children find 
separable perception of the geometric figures difficult, it may be 
that only one or perhaps two of the dimensions are perceived sep- 
arably, the others remaining integral with each other. A child in 
this position may then look for a card which is different in that one, 
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or those two, respects only. A child performing the selection task 
in this chapter, with the cards of birds perceived separably, would 
function in much the same way for 'different' selections as for 
'same' selections. This accounts for 'different' selections being 
more similar to the target in the former experiment than in the 
latter one, but it does not explain why in the later experiment Isame ' 
selections should be more different from chance than 'different? 
selections. The explanation for this is indicated by the results of 
the judgement experiments. When instructed to use 'all same' and 
fall different' interpretations of the terms subject favoured 'all 
same' over f any same' but f any different' over 'all different'. If 
they show the same tendency when not given any explicit instructions, 
as it seems intuitively very likely they would, the results in question 
are accounted for. 
It was argued in Chapter 4 that separable perception, and con- 
sequent selection partly by cognitive means, should facilitate approp- 
riate justification, because the basis of selection, having been in 
awareness, should remain available for justification purposes. This 
would lead one to predict improved justification performance in the 
experiment reported in this chapter over the previous one, particularly 
for 'same? selections. On the other hand, because of the differences 
in the nature of the selections, appropriate 'same' justifications 
would be more likely by chance in the previous experiment, but 
appropriate 'different' justifications would be more likely in this 
experiment. In fact there were higher proportions of appropriate 
justifications for both 'same' and 'different' selections in the present 
experiment than in the earlier one, although the differences are not 
very great. In Chapter 4,72% of 'same' selections were justified by 
similarities and 71% of 'different' selections by differences. In the 
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present case the corresponding figures are 79% and 76% respectively. 
There are more dramatic differences in the proportions of the other 
kinds of justifications, especially for 'same' selections. 'No 
responsest are more common among the justifications recorded in the 
present experiment while for 'same' selections differences and lbothl 
cases combined have dropped from 18% of the total to 3%, and for 
'different' selections the numbers of similarities and 'both' cases 
combined have dropped from 22% to 16%. The drop in inappropriate 
similarities and differences and in 'both' cases would be expected on 
the proposed account; the increase in the number of 'no responses' 
would not be expected. 
The difference in stimulus materials can also account for the 
increased prevalence of the fall same' interpretation of 'same' evid- 
enced in the judgement experiments. With the geometric figures, judge- 
ment has only to follow perceptual experience which, as has already 
been stated, is quite different for identical pairs and for pairs of 
cards that are not the same in all respects. In the experiment 
reported in Chapter 5 not only is there no great perceptual difference 
between identical pairs and others but checking whether or not a 
pair of cards have all pictures in common takes some time, so it is 
not very surprising if many subjects opted for interpretations such as 
'any same' which required less work on their part. For 'different' 
selections an interpretation as 'any different' is logically just the 
reverse of tall same' but it may not be recognised as such by the 
subjects. Those using this interpretation may instantly reject iden- 
tical pairs, but check further on all other pairs to establish that 
there is a difference between them. Use of the 'all different' inter- 
pretation would always require further work after any rejection of 
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the identical pairs. Such an explanation is necessary to account for 
the fact that the 'any different' interpretation is only slightly 
more popular, relative to the fall different' one, in the present 
experiment than in the previous experiment. 
Differences in the number of correct judgements between different 
types of problem were predicted in the judgement experiments on the 
basis of the likelihood of a correct judgement being made when not all 
the information available (pictures or properties) was taken into con- 
sideration. There would be no difference between identical and 
completely different pairs in the experiment reported in this chapter, 
on this basis. However, the argument given above would predict that 
identical pairs would be easier, at least for 'different? judgements 
as the identical pairs can be rejected perceptually while the judge- 
ment of completely different pairs requires cognitive processing 
which is more vulnerable to error. Whether or not any difference 
would arise with 'same' judgements depends on whether all non-identical 
pairs are rejected automatically or whether some further scrutiny is 
made before accepting or rejecting them. In practice, two children 
found identical pairs easier than completely different ones and 
three children found the reverse for 'same f judgements, while eleven 
children found the identical pairs easier and only one the completely 
different pairs for ? differentt judgements. Performance on 'same' 
Judgements was so high, with all but five of the subjects scoring 
100% on the pairs under consideration that the position with them is 
best regarded as inconclusive. For tdifferentT judgements however, 
identical pairs do seem to be easier. 
Finally, the influence of the properties, colour, shape and 
pattern in the judgement experiment described in this chapter will be 
considered. 
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In this experiment, if two geometric figures were the same 
shape they were very likely to be regarded as the same or not 
different but they were much less likely to be so regarded if they 
were the same colour, with pattern being intermediate. This is 
supported by the children's spontaneous remarks, several of them 
saying, effectively, 'These are the same things, although they're 
different colours' while such comments were volunteered by only one 
child for each of shape and pattern. When the same geometric figures 
were used in the experiment reported in Chapter 4 the children showed 
a strong tendency to pick figures of the same shape regardless of 
whether they were selecting ones that were the same or different, while 
it was pattern that was most likely to be used as the vehicle of 
similarity and difference: that is, 'same' choices tended to be the 
same pattern and 'different' choices a different pattern from the target. 
Pattern was also the property most often cited in justification, 
followed by shape. 
It may be that the children regard shape as defining what an 
object really is, with colour and pattern being incidental. This is 
surely true of adults also - we think that a blue and white striped 
teapot is a teapot which happens to have blue and white stripes, not 
a blue and white striped object that is teapot-shaped. This seems a 
reasonable way of looking at things because the importance of objects 
lies in their function and among superficial physical characteristics 
shape is the best indicator of function. The children's selections 
of figures of the same shape as 'different' may indicate that their 
preferred exemplar of something different is a different object of 
the same type, not an object of a different type. 
It is not clear why the children should react differently to 
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colour and pattern. It may be that pattern differs fror: colour 
because in the physical world few things, other than clothes and 
furnishings, are regularly patterned so that the children are more 
used to differences in colour, and to regarding them as irrelevant, 
than they are to variations in pattern. (Texture and irregular 
colour variation are of course important in the physical world but 
regular pattern is often made by arrangements of things, such as 
bricks in a wall, rather than being a property of the things themselves. ) 
Colour appeared to be of more importance in the experiments 
reported in the previous section, where it was often mentioned in the 
children's answers. Two reasons suggest themselves for this; firstly, 
just because colour is typically an inessential characteristic and 
varies even among objects designated by the scare name it can be mani- 
pulated by the child: he can say that an orange and a butterfly are 
the same colour because of the variety of colours in which butterflies 
come. Secondly, individual objects are generally seen as having a 
single overall shape and size, though of course they are composed of 
parts of different shapes and sizes and the children occasionally made 
use of this, but they are of several colours. Thus a daisy can be the 
same colour as a buttercup (yellow centre, petals), a bluebell (green 
stems), a tree (green stem, leaves) and a mushroom (white petals, cap). 
Finally, it should be noted that those results of the experiments 
using the geometric figures relating to the properties of colour, 
shape and pattern may be due to the particular colours, shapes and 
patterns used and may not be freely generalisable to other instances. 
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Section III-The meaning of t different '. 
Chapter 7. Does ? different t ever mean 'same" ? 
A persistent finding reported in this work is that some children 
treat the word 'different? as if it means 'same', a result first found 
by Donaldson and Wales (1970). Donaldson and Wales report other 
similar findings by their research group, of which the one which has 
had the greatest impact is that most three year olds treat the word 
'less' as if it means 'more', the outcome of an experiment fully 
described by Donaldson and Balfour (1968). Other writers have suggested 
that children might behave as they do in Donaldson and Balfour's 
experiment - for instance, might pick out from a pair of apple trees 
the one with the greater number of apples when asked 'Which tree has 
less apples? ' - without actually being under the misapprehension that 
'less' means 'more'. Clark (1970) proposes a partial lexical entry 
hypothesis: that the children knew that 'less' refers to quantity and 
because of a response bias they picked the greater quantity (possibly, 
Clark suggests, because a large quantity is a better Pxemplar of 
quantity than a small one). Carey (1978a) reports two experiments to 
test such a hypothesis - that the results are a consequence of an 
in- 
correct or incomplete lexical entry combined with a response bias - 
against an alternative hypothesis that the word 'less' plays no part at 
all, the response being determined by the sentence frame and the non- 
linguistic context. Carey found that almost all children who treated 
'less' as if it meant 'more' responded in the same way to a 
nonsense 
syllable, thus supporting the latter hypothesis. 
If the children who responded to 'less' as if it meant 'more' 
were treating the word no differently from a nonsense word, 
the same 
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could be true of children who respond to 'different' as if it means 
(same+. This chapter reports an experiment to test these two hypotheses, 
that the children making this particular error have an incorrect lexical 
entry for 'different' and that they have no lexical entry for it at all, 
by comparing their responses to 'different' with those to a nonsense 
word. 
In the course of earlier experiments reported in this work the 
writer noted some spontaneous remarks made by the subjects in which 
they themselves used the word 'different' as if it meant 'same'. When 
the experimenter was demonstrating the examples for Chapter 5 and said 
of two cards that they were different (they had no two pictures in 
common) one child objected 'But they're not different t. It has already 
been reported in Chapter 6 that one subject said of two identical 
geometric figures 'That one's a square and that one's a square, they are 
different' and of two different figures 'Those aren't different, that 
one's a square and that one's a ball', and that in the bird matching 
experiment a child commented of a robin and a cock sparrow 'That bird 
isn't different to that bird'. These remarks suggest that for those 
children at least, tdi. fferent? really does mean 'same'. It is possible 
to respond to an instruction containing a term without assigning any 
meaning to that term, but to use a word himself a speaker must assign 
some meaning to it and there is no compulsion on these children to use 
'different' if they are uncertain about it. 
This evidence that some children have a lexical entry for 'different' 
more appropriate to 'same' does not rule out the possibility 
that others 
respond to the term in like manner although they have no 
lexical entry 
for it whatever. All the experiments so far reported clearly 
involved 
comparisons of some sort and the use of the probably 
known word 'same, 
may have encouraged some subjects to attribute the same meaning 
to 
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tdifferentt, or indeed to respond to 'different' correctly without 
actually knowing the meaning of the word, simply by realising that 
comparisons of difference as well as of similarity were possible in 
the situation. In the experiment to be described in this chapter the 
children are asked to pick out objects which are the same, different, 
red, and 'prebble' (the nonsense word used). 'Red? is included, 
following a suggestion by Robin Campbell, so that any tendency to treat 
an unknown word as having the same or a related meaning to a known word 
will not necessarily lead the children to assign the meanings 'same' or 
'different' to 'prebblet. Children in this age group may not fully 
understand tredt but they are likely to know that it is a colour term 
(Bartlett 1977). To the same end, those of the critical objects (items 
of clothing) which are not red are what the writer would describe as 
kingfisher green, that is, an unfamiliar and non-prototypical shade, so 
that a possible referent for an unknown word is clearly available, 
especially for children pursuing an 'odd colour - odd word' strategy, 
as found by Carey (1978b). These precautions should reduce the likeli- 
hood that both 'different' and 'prebble' are treated as if they mean 
'same', but for different reasons: 'different' because of an incorrect 
lexical entry and ' prebble' because of response bias. 
It is hypothesised that some evidence of genuine misinterpretation 
of ' different' as meaning I same' will be found, though systematic 
responding to the nonsense word is also a possibility. 
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Method. 
Subjects. 
The subjects were 31 children drawn from two playgroups, one run 
by the Students? Association in the university, mainly for students, 
children but with some children of members of staff also attending, 
and the other in the local community, catering largely for middle 
class children. (This latter group has been described in connection 
with other experiments, but the subjects participating in the present 
experiment had not previously been employed in others. ) The age 
range of the subjects was 2 years 9 months to 4 years 1 month and the 
mean age was 3 years 6 months. 
Materials. 
The materials consisted of six coloured cut-out cardboard figures 
of boys and girls, approximately 19-21 cm. in height. The figures were 
dressed in outdoor clothing, each wearing a coat or jacket with both 
pockets and buttons, gloves and shoes. Two colours only, pillarbox red 
and kingfisher green, were used for these four critical items of 
clothing, as shown in Table 7: 1. 
Figure nos 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Shoes Green Both Both Both Red Green 
Gloves Both Red Both Green Both Red 
Pockets Green Green Green Both Both Both 
Buttons Both Both Red Red Red Both 
Table 7: 1. Colours of critical items of clothing. 
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If all pieces of a particular critical item of clothing on a 
figure were of the same colour - if both gloves were red, or all 
buttons were green, for example - that item was termed the (same' 
while if both colours were used the item was termed ? different'. An 
individual shoe, glove, pocket or button was always of one colour only. 
It can be seen that each figure has two items of clothing which are 
the same and two which are different, and each item of clothing is 
the same on three figures and different on the other t_-iwee. 
Procedure. 
Each child was tested individually, seated beside the experimenter 
at a table in a room close to his or her playroom. The six figures 
were laid out on a table in front of the subject who was encouraged to 
talk about them. At this stage the experimenter asked each child if 
there was anything funny about the figures. This was a largely un- 
successful attempt to elicit remarks about the non-matching items of 
clothing. The child was then asked 'Can you show me one whose shoes 
(gloves, pockets, buttons) are the same (different, red, prebble)? 
This form of question was repeated for all sixteen possible combinations 
of item of clothing and critical term, the questions being asked in a 
different pre-determined random order for each child. The experimenter 
noted down the child's selections. Following Carey's (1978a) procedure, 
a child who questioned the meaning of tprebblel was told that it 
meant 'different'. The sessions were tape-recorded so that any remarks 
made by the children which were relevant to the task could later be 
transcribed. 
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Results. 
Only one child, aged 3: 11, asked what 'prebble' irLeant and was 
consequently told that it meant 'different'. 
Refusals to respond. 
A number of children refused to respond to some instructions. 
Table 7: 2 shows the number of subjects who failed to respond to each 
critical term a particular number of times. 
No. of refusals : None 1 2 3 4 
Same 23 I. 3 1 0 
Different 28 1 0 2 C 
Prebble 19 3 4 3 2 
Red 23 6 0 2 0 
Table 7: 2. No. of subjects refusing to respond. 
" Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests comparing the number 
of refusals to respond to each term with those for each other term 
give the results shown in Table 7: 3. 
N T p(2-tailed) 
Same - different 6 2.5 n. s. 
Same - prebble 11 10.5 l. o5 
Same - red 7 12 n. s. 
Different - prebble 11 2.5 < . 
01 
Different - red 7 
4 n. s. 
Prebble - red 15 22 <"05 
Table 7: 3. Results of statistical tests on refusals to respond. 
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There were significantly more refusals to respond to instructions 
involving 'prebble' than to any of the other terms, while the other 
terms do not differ significantly from each other in this respect. 1- 
tailed tests would have been appropriate for comparisons involving 
'prebble' (and would not have made any difference to the significance 
levels obtained) but the results of 2-tailed tests are given so that 
all comparisons are made on the same basis. 
Although ' prebble' elicited more refusals than any of the real 
words, 18 subjects, or 58% of the total, were not given a meaning for 
it but still responded to all four instructions including the word. 
Distribution of responses over 'same' and 'different' items. 
Most subjects picked out more than one of the figures in response 
to each question. Taking all responses to all four instructions per 
term into account, Figure 7: 1 shows the numbers of subjects who chose 
different proportions of 'same' items in response to the instructions 
involving Isame I, if' and IprebbleI. Two subj ects who made no 
responses to 'prebble' are omitted from Figure 7: 1: c. Overall the 
pattern of response is rather poor. It might have been expected that 
most subjects would have selected all, or almost all, 'same' items in 
response to 'same' instructions but only a minority do so. Responses 
to both 'different' and 'prebble', especially the latter, are bunched 
around a level suggesting random responding. The subjects at the 
bottom end of the distribution for tprebble& include the child who was 
told that 'prebble' meant 'different', and responded appropriately. In 
total the children chose 'same' items 68% of the time in response to 
same, instructions, on 46% of occasions for 'different' instructions 
and 43% of occasions for 'prebble' instructions. 
ýýý 
No. of 
A. Same 
subjects 
1 
0-20 -40 -G0 -80 -100 
No. of 
B. Different 
subjects 
0-20 -40 -GO -80 -100 
No. of 
C. Prebble 
subjects 
0-20 -40 -CO -8 -100 
Percentage of selections which are 'same' pairs. 
Figure 7: 1. Numbers of subjects making different percentages of 
? same' selections. 
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The overall distribution of responses, rather than just the 
numbers of 'same' and 'different' items chosen, is important. 
Although Figure 7: 1 suggests that it is not so, it could be the case 
that there was no tendency to pick either 'same' or 'different' items 
in particular in response to 'different' and 'prebble' for different 
reasons for the two terms: some subjects could pick all 'sane' items 
and some all 'different' ones in response to 'different', while all 
might pick a mixture for 'prebble'. Kolmogorov-Smirnov 1-sample tests 
were carried out on the distributions shown in Figure 7: 1, using the 
same intervals, to determine whether those distributions were sig- 
nificantly different from chance. Only that for 'same' was found to 
be so ('same' D=0.31 p/, . 01,2-tailed; 'different! D=0.10 n. s., 
'prebble' D=0.16 n. s. ). (As the children contributed various numbers 
of responses to these distributions the theoretical distributions were 
worked out by calculating the distribution for a child making each 
particular number of responses and then summing these appropriately for 
each instruction. ) 
Although the distributions for neither 'different' nor 'prebble' 
are significantly different from chance they might still differ from 
each other. If they did so simply because some subjects responded 
correctly to 'different' this would be uninteresting, but the 
likely 
presence of some such subjects makes testing any possible difference 
difficult. It was decided to test it by determining whether 
the 
children show more extreme patterns of response 
(that is, tend to make 
selections of one kind only - 'same' or 'different' 
items) for 
'different' than for 'prebble' instructions. The critical subjects are 
those who tend to choose 'same' items in response 
to 'different' 
instructions. For those 16 subjects who chose 50% or more 'same' 
items 
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in response to 'different' instructions the probability of their 
obtaining a pattern of response as extreme as their actual one was 
calculated for both 'different' and 'prebble' responses. A Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test was then carried out on these pro- 
babilities and showed that the responses to 'different? were signifi- 
cantly less likely than those to 'prebble': N= 15, T= 26, Z=1.93, 
p 4.05,1-tailed. These children therefore have a greater tendency 
to apparently interpret 'different' as 'same' than they have to interpret 
'prebblet as either 'same' or 'different'. 
It might be thought that some bias could arise if these particular 
16 children were peculiar in their 'prebble' response patterns. The 
same procedure was carried out for the remaining 15 subjects, who chose 
more than 50% 'different' items in response to 'different' instructions. 
The chance probabilities of these subjects' response patterns were 
also significantly lower for 'different' responses than for 'prebble' 
ones, (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, N= 1)4, T= 25, Z=1.73, 
p 4.05,1-tailed). So regardless of whether the children tended to 
choose 'same' or 'different' items as 'different', they were more likely 
to choose items of one kind only than they were in response to 'prebble' 
instructions. 
Interpretations of the terms. 
It is obvious from Figure 7: 1 that extreme response patterns are 
few, and it has been shown that they are too few for the distributions 
for 'different' and 'prebble' to be significantly different from chance. 
Of those children who made at least four selections for the term in 
question, only six chose 100% 'same' items for 'same', four chose 
100% 
'different' and one 100% 'same' items for 'different' and none chose 
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100% items of one type for 'prebble' . Some criterion for saying that 
a child is attributing a particular meaning to a term must be adopted. 
The criterion chosen is that the probability of the child's actual 
response pattern for a term being obtained by chance is less than . 1. 
Thus if a child makes only four selections in response to 'same' 
instructions all four must be of 'same? items for him to count as 
understanding 'same I but if he makes eight selections then seven of 
them being of 'same' items is sufficient. The numbers of subjects 
interpreting the various terms as either 'same' or 'different' by this 
criterion are given in Table 7: 4. 
Interpretation: Same 
Different 
Term: Same Different Prebble 
11 40 
052 
Table 7: L. Numbers of subjects who interpret the critical terms as 
'same' or 'different'. 
One of the two tprebble' cases is the child who was told that 
? prebblet meant 'different'. The numbers involved are still small - 
too small for the difference between 'different' and 'prebble' in inter- 
pretation as 'same' to be statistically significant, though it is 
clearly in the expected direction. Fifteen children contribute to the 
above figures and their patterns of response for all three terms are 
given in Table 7: 5. 
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Interpretation of T' O. of 
Same Different Prebble subjects Key 
S D D 1 S: interprets as meaning 
ý sar et S D X 3 
D: interprets as meaning 
X D X 1 'different' 
S S ' 1 X: neither of the above. 
'X S X 3 
S x x 5 
S X D 1 
15 
Table 7: 5. Patterns of response of individual subjects. 
The child who produces the SDD pattern is the one who was told 
that IprebbleI meant 'different'. This and SDX are the patterns to 
be expected from the best performers - correct interpretations for 
'same' and 'different' but no interpretation ascribed to a nonsense 
word. XDI is similar, but odd in that one might expect a child who 
understood 'different' to understand 'same' also. SSI and XS 'are 
the corresponding patterns to be expected from children who really do 
think that t different' means 'same' and do not ascribe such a meaning 
to a nonsense word. It is worth noting that there are three cases of 
I31 to only one of SS 'X. The single most common pattern, contributed 
by five subjects, is S 11, indicating children who understand 'same' 
but have no lexical entry or strong response bias for either of the 
other terms. Finally, one child shows the pattern S 'X D. and this is 
the only case to support the notion that response bias may give the 
impression of a meaning assigned to one of the terms when the child 
has 
in fact no lexical entry for that term. 
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Responses to 'reds. 
The overall performance of the children as so far reported is 
so poor that it seems worthwhile to consider the results for 'red' to 
see whether they are similarly bad. 'Red' of course differs from 
same' and 'different' in that the probability of a selection being 
right by chance is different - 25% if all red items only are con- 
sidered, or 75% if both red and 'different' items are included. Only 
one subject picked out 100% all red items, refusing to make a selection 
in response to the 'red pockets' instruction since the pockets are 
always either all green or mixed. This was the same child who questioned 
the meaning of 'prebble'. However, the other children were not entirely 
indifferent to the merits of all red items as the selections overall 
consisted of 43% red items, 47% 'different' and 9% green items. Also, 
all six children who refused to respond to just one 'red' instruction 
did so on tred pockets' but with the exception already mentioned all 
of them had previously picked a 'different' item in response to 
another 'red' question. 
'Different' items are considered a correct response to 'red' 
instructions but even with this lax criterion only 16 children made 100% 
correct selections. Because the chance level of success for 'red' is so 
high, no child who fails to score 100% correct satisfies the .1 
criterion used for f same' ,' different I and 'prebble I. It is likely 
that some of the others do understand the term, despite their errors, 
as their responses are not evenly distributed about chance level. Ten 
subjects score between 75 and 100%, one scores exactly 75% and four 
less than 75%. There is no firm evidence of any child treating 'red' 
as meaning green. Three children chose no red items in response to 
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'red' instructions; one of these made only one selection (green), 
another only two selections (both green) and the third chose 
different' items for all six of her selections. 
The overlap between the 16 children who made 100% correct 
selections for 'red? and the 15 who showed a consistent interpretation 
for 'same' or 'different' is considerable, 12 subjects appearing in 
both groups. This point will be taken up in the discussion. 
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Discussion. 
The children's performance in this experiment was really quite 
strikingly poor and the reasons for this must first be discussed. 
The children were very young, having a mean age of 3 years 6 
months, and five of the 31 subjects were two year-olds. The older 
subjects in the group performed better than the younger ones but the 
difference is not very marked: the 19 subjects who were classified as 
showing understanding of at least one of the terms 'same', 'different' 
and 'red' had an age range of 2 years 10 months to 14 years 1 month 
and a mean age of 3 years 7 months, while the remaining 12 subjects had 
an age range of 2 years 9 months to ii. years and a mean age of 3 years 
months. 
The subject population was not particularly different from those 
used in previous experiments: one of the playgroups utilised in the 
present experiment had been used before, though the participating sub- 
jects were different individuals, and while the university students' 
playgroup had not previously been employed there seemed to be no 
difference in performance between subjects from the two groups. 
Any attempt to explain the poor results on the basis of the make- 
up (including age) of the subject population could in any case be 
only partially successful, as it remains necessary to show what it is 
about the task set which causes such difficulty. 
It could simply be the critical terms used. A starting point for 
this chapter is of course that many children in the age group in 
question do not understand 'different'. In previous experiments almost 
all children seemed to understand tsame' but it could be that for some 
subjects, especially the younger ones, their understanding was only 
partial, aided by cues from the stimulus arrays used in those experiments. 
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However this experiment also found apparent understanding of 'red' to 
be lower than expected, and that it tended to be the same subjects 
who showed understanding of 'red' as of 'same' and 'different'. 
(Those subjects who interpreted 'different' as meaning 'same' are here 
considered to be showing a partial understanding of the term. ) This 
suggests either considerable uniformity in vocabulary development or 
that it is not the terms themselves that are at the root of the problem. 
If it is not these terms taken in isolation which cause the 
difficulty, it could be the whole construction in which they are used 
e. g. 'Can you show me one whose shoes are the same? ' This instruction 
is clearly ambiguous: whose shoes are the same as what? The child is 
required to supply the interpretation Isan. e'as each other' for himself. 
It was because it was realised that this might be a difficulty that an 
attempt was made to draw the children's attention to the similarities 
and differences in the items of clothing in the course of introducing 
them to the task. This had to be done fairly unobtrusively so as not 
to bias them towards interpreting 'prebble' as 'same' or 'different'. 
The ambiguous form of the question with 'same' and 'different' is of 
course a necessary consequence of using the same form with 'red' as 
with 'same' and 'different' and keeping the possible interpretations 
of 'prebble' open. The instruction with 'red' is not ambiguous but 
performance here, though better than with same', was still very poor. 
Difficulty in understanding the instructions does not therefore seem 
to be a likely explanation for more than a small part of the results. 
It may be that the problem lies in the stimulus materials. This 
experiment used complex pictorial stimuli from which the relevant 
details had to be abstracted, unlike the pictures of people and birds 
used in the experiments reported in Chapters 5 and 6 which could be 
considered as wholes. The experiments using geometric figures required 
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properties of these to be abstracted, but these figures were very 
simple. The only comparably complex stimuli requiring analysis used 
in the course of this work are those used for Claparede's task in 
Chapter 2. That task was also found to be difficult, especially by 
the younger children. An argument has been put forward in previous 
chapters suggesting that children as young as those employed in the 
present experiment may have difficulty in perceiving aspects of a 
stimulus separately from the whole. The simple fact that it is odd 
to have, for example, differently coloured gloves, may also have led 
to difficulty although, as previously noted, the children did not 
spontaneously remark on this oddity. 
The writer does not feel that an adequate explanation for the 
difficulty about half the subjects experienced in performing the task 
has been found, but it must be accepted as an unfortunate fact, 
effectively reducing the amount of data from which conclusions can 
sensibly be drawn. 
Such conclusions as can be drawn must now be considered. It was 
hypothesised that some children would show a tendency to treat 'different' 
as 'same' which would not be shown for 'prebblet. The difficulty in 
testing this hypothesis was that such a tendency might not be shown by 
the sample as a whole, because of the inclusion of children who under- 
stand 'different' correctly, while to look at the tendency to pick 
'same? items in response to 'different' and 'prebble' only among those 
who pick at least 50% 'same' items as 'different' would clearly be 
biased in favour of the hypothesis. The hypothesis was tested, and 
found to be supported, by showing that the children who tended to 
pick 'same' items in response to 'different' instructions had more 
statistically unlikely response patterns for their 'different' responses 
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than for their 'prebble' responses, regardless of whether they made 
more 'same' or more 'differentI selections for fprebblet. The same 
was true for those subjects who picked 'different? items as 'different'. 
Only a few children had response patterns that were very different 
from chance for any of the terms. Eleven children had response 
patterns which satisfied the criterion for understanding 'same', none 
treating 'same' as 'different'. Five children apparently understood 
'different' and four treated it as if it meant 'same'. Two 
children treated ' prebble' as 'different', one of them having been 
told that that was what it meant. Although these results are too few, 
taken on their own, to establish that young children are more likely 
to assign the meaning 'same' to 'different' that they are to a nonsense 
word, neither do they provide any direct evidence that a nonsense word 
1 
would ever be treated as if it meant 'same . Only one child appeared 
to assign a consistent interpretation to a nonsense word and he seemed 
to interpret it as IdifferentI. Four of the five children who under- 
stood 'different' also understood tsame', while three of the four who 
interpreted 'different' as 'same' apparently did not understand 'same', 
suggesting that true understanding of the terms may go hand in hand 
more often than has been evident from previous experiments. There may 
be a period of uncertainty initially combined with a tendency to treat 
both terms as meaning ' samne' followed by realisation of their different 
meanings either simultaneously or in rapid succession. It is worth 
noting that the one child who treated 'prebble' as 'different' without 
being told that that was what it meant, apparently understood 'same' 
but supplied no consistent interpretation of 'different' as either 
'same' or 'different'. This child may have thought that since he had 
been asked about things which were the same, Idifferent' was a likely 
meaning for one of the terms he did not know, but opted for the wrong 
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one. It is possible that some apparently correct interpretations of 
kdifferentI in this and previous experiments are due to the same 
reasoning, though this is speculative. 
It is surprising that there were not more objections to 'prebble'. 
A child of this age must often hear words he does not understand and 
could not question each one but one might have expected a query when 
the child was required to follow an instruction containing an unknown 
term. The tendency simply not to respond rather than to voice an 
objection may reflect an inability on the part of the subjects to 
analyse their own failure to understand and locate it in one word. 
Most children however, did respond, without question. None-c-lieless, 
the fact that refusals to respond to ºprebbleº were significantly more 
common than to the other terms and in particular the very low rate of 
such refusals for 'different' suggests that 'different' was recognised 
as a real word by most subjects. 
The paucity of consistent results obtained from this experiment 
dictates caution in their interpretation. However, they do seem to 
show a tendency to treat 'different' as meaning 'same' not shown for a 
nonsense word. The possibility that a nonsense word might appear to 
be assigned a consistent meaning was also shown, but only by one child. 
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Section IV. Conclusions. 
Chapter 8. General discussion and conclusions. 
Throughout this thesis there have been two themes: the nature 
of similarity and difference, and the nature of awareness, the two 
themes meeting in considering the degree to which the children showed 
their awareness of similarities and differences in the various 
situations. Underlying their cognitive understanding of these relations 
has been their linguistic understanding of the words 'same f and 
'different' themselves which has always had to be taken into account. 
This final chapter presents a further consideration of the two themes 
and relates them to the experimental findings. Before commencing this 
it seems appropriate to summarise the conclusions of earlier chapters, 
which at once stimulate and constrain the speculations of this 
chapter. 
Summary of findings. 
Section I is based on Claparede's 1918 paper 'La conscience de 
la ressemblance et de la difference chez 1'enfant'. Although Chapter 
1 gave various objections to his theory, his findings were amply 
supported in Chapters 2 and 3: many of the children, especially the 
younger ones, had difficulty in giving similarities between two items 
and they sometimes gave differences instead, more often doing so when 
the items to be compared were more dissimilar. Binary comparisons, 
e. g. 'Is a bee more like a fly or a bird? ', led to better answers 
than simple comparisons. Any point of contact between the two items 
was sometimes given instead of a true similarity, these answers 
being 
called relations here. Chapter 3 showed conclusively that 
differences 
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are easier to give than similarities, as Clapaxede had plausibly 
asserted, but had not definitely shown, and showed also that although 
it is easier to take the problems in an order which makes errors due 
to perseveration less likely, such errors do not wholly account for 
the greater difficulty of giving similarities between more dissimilar 
pairs. The degree of dissimilarity did not significantly affect the 
difficulty of giving differences. 
It had been expected that Claparede's findings would be repli- 
cated and it was hoped that some further insight would be reached 
into what was happening when a child attempted his task. Clapai4de 
gives reasons why differences should be easier than similarities but 
these are not always convincing and he does not explain why differences 
should be given when similarities were requested, or why binary com- 
parisons should be easier than simple ones. Of the theories explored 
in Chapter 2, Rosch's theory of the nature of categories was found to 
be the most helpful. Although this is not a theory of awareness and 
Rosch has denied (e. g. Rosch 1978) that it is a processing theory her 
findings suggest that our awareness of objects is most naturally in 
terms of their basic level category membership and in terms of proto- 
types for those categories. Adults can conceive of objects in other 
terms but take longer or make more errors in doing so. Rosch's 
theory provided a way of conceptualising what the children were doing 
in carrying out Claparedets task. It was suggested that giving a 
similarity between two objects required the child to form a category 
containing the two and giving a difference required putting them in 
two different categories even if those categories are defined only by 
the similarity or difference offered. If the appropriate categories 
are natural basic level ones the child will automatically think in 
these terms without extra effort. Since most pairs of objects to be 
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compared were members of two different basic level categories it was 
almost always going to be easier to give differences between them 
than similarities for this if for no other reason. 
If an appropriate answer cannot be given in terns of basic 
level categories, some other category or categories must be used. 
Forming a category uniting two objects which are members of different 
basic level categories is more difficult than forming two subordinate 
categories for members of the same basic level category as in the 
latter case the names of the items suggest the appropriate categories. 
Similarly, binary comparisons are easier than simple ones because 
they suggest the categories to be formed and taking similarity problems 
in order of increasing similarity rather than the reverse can also 
give hints as to the appropriate category. 
The children normally answered in terms of the prototypes of the 
categories they were using, whether these categories were appropriate 
or not. Pictures of the items, when used, provided a source of non- 
prototypical answers. It appeared that not all properties of the 
prototypes were equivalent, some being more salient or accessible than 
others, this saliency being affected by the context of the comparison. 
Colour, shape and size seemed to be salient properties, accounting 
for a high proportion of answers. 
The children sometimes seemed to be tempted into making errors 
by particularly salient properties. They also showed a tendency to 
try to give the same kind of answer to successive problems in a series 
even when this led them into error. It appeared that they were not 
fully in control of their own cognitive processes and lacked the 
flexibility that would come with such control. 
Section II looked at children's ability to judge whether or not 
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two things were the same or different, according to definitions 
imposed by the experimenter, and to select objects which were the 
same as or different from a target and justify their choices. The 
effects of different kinds of stimulus materials were investigated 
and the role of awareness was not forgotten. 
The first experiment in the section produced the findings that 
when asked to select from among cards showing geometric figures the 
children tended to choose cards which had more properties in common 
with the target than different from it as both ? same' and 'different' 
and that tsamet selections were significantly more similar to the 
target both than tdifferentt selections and than would be expected by 
chance. The absolute number of appropriate justifications was about 
the same for both 'same' and 'different' selections indicating that 
those for 'different' selections were much better when considered 
relative to chance. About half the children concentrated on one 
property of the figures in justifying their selections and this often 
led the younger ones into the errors of giving similarities when 
differences were required or vice versa. It seemed as though 'same' 
selections might be made holistically and 'different' ones analytically, 
which was suggestive of Garner's (1970) distinction between integral 
and separable perception. Separable perception, that is, perception 
in terms of dimensions, would facilitate justification because 
particular dimensions of comparison would be present to awareness. 
It was suggested that separable perception might be more common among 
the older children and that it might be promoted by looking for 
differences rather than for similarities. 
The second experiment reported in Section II (Chapter 5) looked 
at children's judgements as to whether two cards showing six pictures 
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each were the same or not, or different or not, and at the evidence 
the subjects collected before making these judgements. 'Same' 
judgements (i. e. judgements whether the two cards were 'the same' or 
'not the same') were more often correct than 'different' judgements 
but this could have been due in part to the definition of 'same' 
imposed by the experimenter being more natural to the children than 
that for 'different'. Overall there was a tendency for the children 
to collect too little evidence for their judgements to be soundly 
based but the older children were more likely to collect more information 
than was necessary. The general undercollection of information was 
less marked for fdifferentt than for 'same' judgements. Only one 
child performed optimally in gathering evidence for his 'same' judge- 
ments and he and two others did so for 'different' judgements. The 
reasons for this poor performance were not altogether clear but the 
hint that information gathering performance was better for 'different' 
judgements than for 'same' ones is consistent with the notion that 
dealing with differences encourages awareness. 
A higher proportion of children treating 'different' as if it 
meant 'same' was found in the experiment just described than in the 
first experiment in Section II, and a few subjects were found who 
made this error in one condition but used the word correctly in the 
other condition. This suggests that some form of regression to an 
earlier error is possible under certain conditions and hints at a 
deficiency in access or monitoring functions. Chapter 6, the last in 
Section II, reported on an investigation as to whether this difference 
between the two earlier experiments was due to the difference in task 
or in stimulus materials employed in them. The findings supported 
the view that it was the judgement task which led to the higher 
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proportion of this error but other results pointed to the effects of 
the stimulus materials. The distinction between integral and separable 
perception was again brought in to explain these latter findings. 
Sections I and II are principally concerned with the children's 
appreciation of similarity and difference as such but their understanding 
of the words ' same t and I diff erent I is obviously relevant. Findings 
concerning this understanding will be considered here, along with the 
one experiment reported in Section III. 
Understanding of 'swine' appeared to be very good throughout 
Sections I and II. However, one child in one condition in the experi- 
ment reported in Chapter 5 appeared to treat 'same' as if it meant 
'different? as well as vice versa, and some children contributing to 
Chapter 6 did not clearly show that they understood 'same'. Also 
there is always the possibility that the design of the experiments led 
to the appearance of complete understanding when this was not actually 
present. 
Comprehension of 'different' however was clearly not perfect. 
In all the experiments in which the term was used a small proportion 
of the subjects appeared to interpret it as if it meant 'same'. As 
noted above the size of this proportion seemed to depend on the cir- 
cumstances of testing. The experiment reported in Section III was 
designed to investigate whether the interpretation of the previous 
results as the children believing that 'different' means 'samet is 
correct, or whether the appearance of that belief results from a com- 
bination of total non-comprehension of 'different' and some response 
bias. This was done by comparing responses to 'different' with 
responses to a nonsense word. 'Different' was recognised as a real 
word by the subjects: the nonsense word elicited significantly more 
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refusals to respond than any of the three real words used in the 
experiment and while the real words did not differ significantly frog: 
each other in this respect 'different' actually called forth the 
fewest refusals. The children were more likely to respond to 'different' 
as if it meant 'same' than they were to the nonsense word. There was 
little evidence of systematic responding to the nonsense word but one 
child appeared to treat it as meaning 'different'. 
Response to tsamet in this last experiment was poor. While 
this was thought to be due partly to the nature of the stimulus 
materials it may indicate that the previous apparent high levels of 
understanding were aided by the structure of the experimental situations. 
It seems then that children have some difficulty with both the terms 
'same' and 'different' in their early years. These difficulties, 
especially the interpretation of 'different? as 'same', may be universal 
at an age somewhat earlier than that of the youngest subjects to be 
tested in the course of this work. Some children may acquire a firm 
understanding of both terms at about the same time. This is suggested 
by the finding of Chapter 7 that children who correctly understood 
'different' typically showed understanding of 'same' while those who 
treated 'different' as 'same' typically did not understand 'same' 
itself. However, it seems that difficulty with 'different' may con- 
tinue for a longer period: certainly it was only with 'different' that 
there was clear evidence of problems in the school years. 
The issue of the children oscillating between two interpretations 
of I different I, as t same t and as ' different t will be returned to when 
the general theme of awareness is considered. 
2ýý 
Similarity and difference. 
At this point some further consideration of the nature of 
similarity and difference is appropriate. From a logical point of 
view these two relations would seem to be simply compiementaries of 
each other. This does not seem to be so from a psychological aspect, 
however. It has been shown (Tversky 1977) that even adults, when 
asked to judge similarity and difference, do not treat them as 
straightforward compiementaries and there is ample evidence in this thesis 
that children do not do so. 
The notion that subjects tended to assess similarity in a rather 
holistic fashion and difference in a much more analytic way was 
suggested by the results of the experiments in Section II. In these 
experiments the children's judgements and selections were necessarily 
based on their perceptions of the stimulus material and Garner's dis- 
Unction between integral and separable perception seemed an appropriate 
explanatory concept. An account based on perception can be generalised 
to conception (for instance, performing Claparede's task, presented 
verbally), if the latter is thought of as proceeding through the 
medium of images. This may however be a trap one should not fall into: 
it is easy to think of Claparede's task in terms of comparing images 
of prototypes but Rosch has made it clear (e. g. Rosch 1978) that proto- 
types are not images or imagable entities. This is most obvious with 
prototypes for superordinate categories. If it is desired to give 
the same kind of explanation for the results of Claparede's task as 
for those of the perceptually-based experiments some more general 
notion is required. It may be that similarity tends not only to be 
perceived, but also to be conceived in an integral fashion and 
difference tends to be conceived in a separable fashion. 
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Garner (19Th. ) insists that integrality and separability are 
stimulus properties, so his theory is necessarily limited to per- 
ception. However, he himself noted that subjects were occasionally 
able to choose whether to handle certain kinds of material in an 
integral or separable fashion and as described in Section II several 
investigators have shown a developmental change from integral to 
separable perception. These results indicate that some distinction 
in mode of processing must be located in the organism, and such a dis- 
Unction may be more general, not limited to perception alone. 
Garner (1970) proposes as a limiting definition of integrality that 
'two dimensions are integral if in order for a level on one dimension 
to be realised, there must be a dimensional level specified for the 
other? but Shepp (1978) suggests that the colour of a door drawn on a 
card can be integral with the shape of a window in the door for young 
children, which clearly does not conform to the definition. This also 
suggests that workers in developmental psychology may have got hold 
of a distinction which is related to but not identical with the dis- 
Unction between integral and separable properties. 
Brooks (1978) offers a distinction between analytical and 
analogical modes of processing which may be a candidate for a general 
theory of cognitive function similar to Garnerts perceptual theory. 
Brooks is concerned with category formation and judgements of category 
membership, and contrasts cases where these proceed by analysing 
instances into their component properties with those where they occur 
by analogy to particular instances taken as wholes. The relationship 
of this distinction to the way in which the treatment of similarity 
and difference has been contrasted above is obvious. Brooks gives a 
number of arguments in support of his case that analogy is both a 
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common and an efficient process for handling complex material in 
natural situations. He relates his analytic/analogical distinction 
to that between integral and separable dimensions by noting that 
analogy will be particularly appropriate in cases where similarity 
relations are primary, i. e. those which favour integral perception, 
although he believes that analogical processes are used much more 
widely than this. He makes no claims about the course of development 
of the two processes but from a passing remark that children learn to 
read tat an age not well-suited to analysis' it may be assumed that 
he believes analysis to develop later than analogy. 
The results reported in this thesis are consistent with the 
idea that older children are more likely to use analytic processes 
than younger ones and that there is some tendency for subjects to use 
analogical processes when dealing with similarity and analytic ones 
when dealing with difference. The latter point requires further con- 
sideration on two counts. Firstly, is it correct to assume, as it 
has been so far, that the observed differences are due to the nature 
of similarity and difference as such, or might they simply be a con- 
sequence of the kinds of things the subjects have been asked to 
compare? Secondly, if there really is such a contrast between simi- 
laxity and difference, is it possible to find any explanation of why 
this should be so? 
The objects which have been compared have been quite various. 
In Claparede's task the items compared were almost always members of 
different basic level categories and it has been suggested that this 
alone would make it easier to give differences between them than 
similarities. However this explanation does not hold for the figures 
of humans and birds used in Section II and its application to the 
ý. 
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geometric figures used in that section is uncertain. The contrast 
between similarity and difference for the subjects was most marked 
in Claparede's task but persisted in some degree in the other 
experiments and so does not seem to be an artefact of the stimulus 
materials employed. 
It seems than that there is a genuine difference in the way in 
which similarity and difference are handled and an explanation for 
this must be sought. To this end it is worth considering situations 
in which objects are naturally compared. As Claparede points out, 
most natural comparisons are made unconsciously, but it is comparison 
with awareness with which we are concerned here. The most common 
situation in which comparisons are made is in deciding which of two 
or more objects is most suitable for some purpose. The objects and 
purposes are of course enormously varied: they may be tools to open a 
crate, dresses to create an impression at a party or theories to 
explain a set of data. What all such situations have in common is 
that there is, necessarily, some similarity between the items to be 
compared in that they are all potentially capable of serving the 
purpose in question. This similarity is simply assumed as the basis 
of comparison and the objects are then explicitly compared for their 
differences. Not only is it differences of which we are required to 
take cognisance in such a situation but the differences are likely to 
be individual properties of a relatively superficial nature while the 
similarity is more fundamental and more complex. When two objects are 
capable of serving the same purpose the similarities between them which 
make this so may be quite numerous. Taking the example of opening a 
crate suggested above, potential levers must all have a certain strength, 
have certain aspects of shape enabling them to be inserted under the 
lid and manipulated, must not be too heavy to handle and so on. 
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Differences between possible levers, such as that one is longer than 
another, are much more likely to be simply specifiable in terms of 
individual proporties. 
There are of course situations in which we look for similarity. 
If hammering is required and no hammer is available we look for some- 
thing else that will serve the purpose and here again the similarity 
between the objects compared is more fundamental than any differences. 
Situations in which we look for similarities which are relatively 
superficial, such as choosing curtains to match a carpet, are probably 
quite rare. So it seems that looking for differences is more common 
than looking for similarities in naturally occuring conscious com- 
parisons and that the similarities which are looked for in these 
situations are more fundamental and more complex than the differences 
which are sought. In this case the result reported from the selection. 
experiments that items selected as being 'different' were of about 
average similarity to the target (in one experiment) or greater than 
average similarity (in the other) rather than being markedly different 
from the target, is not surprising, since the subjects would have been 
accustomed to looking for differences only between things which are 
basically somewhat similar. 
It does then seem that there is a real difference between simi- 
larity and difference in the way in which they are normally used which 
makes analogy a more appropriate process to deal with similarity and 
analysis more appropriate to deal with difference in most cases. 
How- 
ever, as the children's analytic abilities develop with age 
they should 
become better able to analyse the mass of properties which 
forms the 
basis of similarity between two items into at least some of 
its com- 
ponent parts. Some properties will be easier to analyse out 
than 
others, because they are more superficial or 
detachable from the overall 
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mass. This point is reminiscent of Piagetts (1977) claim that 
awareness proceeds from the periphery to the centre, the suggestion 
being that it is analysis which proceeds from the periphery to the 
centre. 
Although naturally occuring comparisons of similarity are not 
likely to be such as to favour analysis the materials used in the 
course of this work have varied in this respect. At one extreme are 
the geometric figures which it would be natural to an adult to handle 
in terms of their individual properties rather than overall similarity 
relations. The individual figures of humans and birds used in Section 
II did not require analysis in order to perform the tasks. It is 
not surprising that it was found to be easier to give similarities for 
these materials than it was in performing Claparede's task. 
The account being proposed here offers an explanation of the 
differences in the way the children used different physical properties. 
In Chapter 3 it was found that the children often mentioned the pro- 
perties colour, shape and size in giving similarities and differences 
between objects. Shape was the most popular as a similarity, followed 
by colour, and colour, followed by size was most popular as a 
difference. Similarly, in dealing with the geometric figures in Section 
II the children tended to select items of the same shape as both 'same' 
and t different 1 while 'different' selections tended to differ from the 
target in pattern. In judging the same figures a common shape led to 
the most judgements of Isame I and 'not different' while a common colour 
led to the fewest such judgements, some children indicating by their 
comments that they did not consider a difference in colour important 
enough to prevent a judgement that two figures were 'the same'. It 
is likely that, even when dealing with individual properties, the 
children would think in terms of superficial properties as differences 
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and fundamental ones as similarities. As suggested in other chapters 
shape seems the most fundamental of these physical properties. Of 
all individual properties it is the one which comes closest to 
representing the complex essence of things which is the basis of 
overall similarity. 
Implicit in what has been said above is the notion that analytic 
processing favours awareness of the basis of comparison while ana- 
logical processing does not. This raust be developed and made explicit. 
It is in the nature of analogical processes that they do not actually 
identify a specific basis of comparison. Analogy works simply by 
overall resemblance without picking out any particular point of simi- 
larity and therefore no such specific point can be available to 
awareness. It is true that there is less awareness with analogical 
than with analytic processing but -this is due to the nature of the 
processes, not to any deficiency in the functioning of awareness in 
the children. 
Awareness. 
This brings us to the second main theme of this thesis, which 
is awareness. Some findings have suggested explanations in terms of 
the concepts used by workers in artificial intelligence and human 
information processing - concepts such as control, access and monitoring. 
Some consideration of what has been said about awareness by writers 
in 
these fields might consequently be relevant. 
Shallice (1978) aims specifically to provide an account of 
awareness in these terms and so his theory will be presented 
here. It 
has much in common with the views of other writers in the area 
(e. g. 
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Lindsay and Norman 1977, Tandler 1975, Sloman 1978) and it is in- 
appropriate to discuss and evaluate the differences here. 
Shallice sees awareness as necessary in order to avoid conflicts: 
since certain activities, both physical and cognitive, are inco::, - 
patible with each other, some mechanism is required to prevent the 
attempt to carry out such activities simultaneously. While there 
does not seem to be any logical necessity for awareness in order for 
this function to be performed it may in practice be the mechanism used 
by human beings and some other organisms to avoid such conflict. 
In Shallicets theory our activity, physical or otherwise, is 
controlled by action systems which are analogous to computer programs. 
These action systems can be at many levels: controlling finger move- 
ments in writing, deciding what words to write, deciding whether to 
write a letter of resignation or a proposal of marriage at all. More 
than one action system can operate at once - it is possible to walk 
and talk at the same time, for instance, but there is always one action 
system which is dominant and which has control of all the apparatus 
(e. g. muscles, memory stores) which it needs. Any lower level action 
system which is able to operate simultaneously with the dominant 
action system is free to do so. 
Shallice identifies awareness with the input to the dominant 
action system. Awareness can therefore be at a number of levels, but 
no higher level action system can function simultaneously without 
awareness. The dominant action system at any moment is the one which 
is most salient. Salience in this sense is said by Shallice to be a 
product of importance and feasibility but he does not specify how the 
organism arrives at importance and feasibility quotients or combines 
them. The dominant action system can be selected by a higher level 
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system as a subroutine, control being passed back when the lower level 
system has completed its task. In such cases we are aware of the 
activity of the lower level system as being willed. A higher level 
system must be able to ascribe importance, and consequently salience, 
to a lower level system, although Shallice does not state this. 
Certain inputs from the environment, such as the telephone ringing, 
can also select the dominant action system. Such a provision is 
obviously necessary to prevent the organism ignoring important, 
possibly life-threatening, events when absorbed in other activities. 
Some of the findings in this thesis can be viewed as indicating 
failings in awareness on the part of the subjects. There is no reason 
to suppose that development of the functions of awareness is complete 
in the young child, any more than is his intellectual or physical 
development. Such failings will now be considered, using Shallice's 
model as a guide to the working of awareness. 
On Shall-ice's model, awareness will only function properly if 
the appropriate action system is dominant, yet it is difficult to 
see how this could be ensured. Also, higher level action systems, 
when dominant, must be able to call in appropriate subroutines, and 
control must be passed back to the higher level system at the approp- 
riate moment. Some of the reported deficiencies could be explained 
along these lines. 
For example, there were a number of instances suggesting per- 
severation. In Claparede's task a subject would often give the same 
answer to several successive comparisons, even when this led to a 
reversal error (giving a difference when a similarity was requested 
or vice versa). Sometimes exactly the same answer was not given, 
but a child would stick to one kind of answer for several comparisons, 
261 
always answering in terms of colour, for example. Similarly, the 
children would often use a single property in justifying most or all 
of their selections of geometric figures, and there were many cases, 
especially among the younger children, in which this led to reversal 
errors. It seems that for these subjects a once appropriate dominant 
action system retains its dominance when no longer appropriate. 
The children performing Claparede's task appeared to find it 
difficult to conceive of items other than in terms of their basic 
level prototypes. This suggests that prototypes have a very high 
degree of salience, which is consistent with Rosch's findings for 
adults. -It may be that prototypes have a permanently high importance 
quotient but that young children are unable to modify their feasibility 
levels appropriately. The children contributing to Chapter 2 appeared 
able to use the pictures as alternatives to prototypes, suggesting 
that perceptual information may acquire sufficient salience to become 
dominant though even here there were a few instances in which the 
prototype apparently retained dominance. 
Not all reversal errors can be explained by perseveration. It 
seems that the request for a comparison of either similarity or 
difference activates, or causes to become salient, action systems which 
look for comparisons of both sorts. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that 
reversal errors arose when a point of comparison of the wrong sort 
was particularly salient. A property that was salient in this sense 
would be salient in the sense used by Shallice also. Introspection 
suggests that such salient properties might well become dominant, that 
is, occur to mind, for adults also but would not be given in error 
because control would be referred back to a higher level system before 
an utterance was produced. 
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In the judgement experiments many children did not accept the 
definitions of the critical terms laid down for them by the experi- 
menter and made clear (it is hoped) by examples. This was especially 
true for 'different' for which the required definition was admittedly 
less natural than that for 'same'. It does not seem likely that the 
subjects were unable to understand these definitions, rather that 
they were unable to employ them on demand. Individual word meanings 
are typically employed without awareness but when a definition is 
imposed from outside in this way awareness may be necessary. Being 
given the definitions should build into the dominant action system 
the requirement that when the terms 'same' and 'different' are used 
they are to be interpreted in accordance with those definitions, 
which would be called in as subroutines. This would be similar to 
the experience of a dominant action system as willed, which Shallice 
describes, but the process evidently fails in most of the subjects and 
their own more usual definitions are employed instead. The fact that 
a majority even of the oldest age group of subjects is involved 
suggests that this kind of linkage between action systems at different 
levels may be particularly difficult. 
l-iost subjects failed to collect the appropriate amount of evidence 
for their judgements in the experiment reported in Chapter 5. This 
could arise in a number of ways. If the children are not employing 
any particular interpretation of 'same' and t different' with awareness 
they cannot collect information appropriate to such a definition, 
though the requirement to collect evidence should encourage them to 
think about their definitions. They could be aware of the definition 
they are using but simply unable to reason out the connection between 
that and the evidence. However there were a number of cases in 
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which the children collected the appropriate amount of information 
on a fair proportion of trials but not on all. Some such cases could 
have arisen by chance but it seems unlikely that they all did. This 
suggests that deciding on the information to be collected was effort- 
ful and that they were unable to sustain the effort. In terms of 
ShalliceIs model it would be the feasibility of the appropriate 
action system which was affected. 
One more finding will be considered here. This is that some 
children appeared to have both 'same' and 'different' stored as 
possible meanings for f different' and which of them was accessed on 
any particular occasion seemed to depend in part on the nature of 
the task. These different interpretations can be considered as 
different action systems, employed as subroutines to higher level 
systems. They might or might not become dominant themselves: it was 
suggested in Section II that use of the correct definition might 
require awareness, that is, dominance. A possible explanation for 
the finding is that the selection task requires a higher level of 
system to be dominant that the judgement task and that the correct 
definition is only available as a subroutine to relatively high level 
systems. This would be true if it were itself at a high level. 
Intuitively it seems possible that a newly acquired definition is 
stored at a higher level than a long-established one. Since many 
words have more than one meaning an earlier definition would not be 
automatically wiped out when a later one was acquired, though in 
this instance one might have expected it to be somehow tagged as 
incorrect. This finding is however a puzzling one and any explanation 
for it must be speculative. 
Introspection suggests that the experience of awareness at 
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different. levels differs and it seems natural to speak of higher and 
lower levels of awareness itself. Addressing the problems of philo- 
sophy with awareness seems so much more exalted than tying one's own 
shoe-laces, albeit with awareness. Because the dominant action 
system has access to and control over lower level systems but not higher 
level ones awareness at a high level has many more connections than 
awareness at a low level, which is a part of its sophistication. It 
was noted in Chapter 1 that Piaget (1977) speaks of degrees of aware- 
ness, the amount of awareness depending on the extent of integration, 
and this is essentially the same point. The processing model maintains 
an all-or-none character for awareness, while at the same time admitting 
of degrees such that some levels of awareness allow rational thought, 
for instance, while others do not. The appearance of irrationality 
can arise from the dominant action system being at too low a level. 
This is the case, for instance, with a child who occasionally gives a 
difference in error for a similarity: he is aware of what he is saying, 
but his awareness is not at a level high enough to tell him his answer 
is inappropriate. 
The writer would not wish to put too much store by the detail 
of Shallicets account but the general principles seem to fit the 
findings reported here and help to make them intelligible. Any mecha- 
nical or computing model for awareness would make occasional break- 
downs not only understandable but probable; it is perhaps more to be 
wondered at that in the adult the system normally works so smoothly 
and so flexibly. 
This thesis is entitled 'Development of linguistic and cognitive 
aspects of the understanding of similarity and difference?. As to 
linguistic aspects, the development is not necessarily complete for 
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either of the terms 'same' and 'different' in the age range studied, 
though deficiencies in the understanding of the latter term were 
much more widespread. In particular there was evidence of systematic 
misunderstanding of + difference' , not merely a lack of correct under- 
standing. Cognitively, it has been shown that similarity is more 
likely to be handled analogically and difference to be handled ana- 
lytically. The gradual development of analysis of similarity gives 
the appearance of a gradual development of awareness of similarity. 
Awareness is not to be expected with analogy, but some errors indi- 
cated genuine slips in the functioning of awareness. 
Claparede wrote in 1918 that the birth of awareness of 
similarity in the child was veiled in darkness; perhaps that veil 
has been lifted a little, and the scene is no longer wholly dark. 
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